| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Insufficient Session Expiration vulnerability in Apache Tomcat meant that if the session ID for an authenticated HTTP session was changed after a WebSocket connection had been established under that authenticated HTTP session, the WebSokcet session would not be closed as required by the Jakarta WebSocket specification when the HTTP session ended.
This issue affects Apache Tomcat: from 11.0.0-M1 through 11.0.24, from 10.1.0-M1 through 10.1.57, from 9.0.0.M1 through 9.0.120.
The following versions were EOL at the time the CVE was created but are
known to be affected: from 8.5.0 through 8.5.100, from 7.0.43 through 7.0.109. Other unsupported versions may also be affected.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 11.0.25, 10.1.58 or 9.0.121, which fix the issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: avoid combining some incoming suboptions
Some MPTCP suboptions are mutually exclusive according to the RFC8684,
but also because in different places, the code doesn't expect some
combinations to be present. That's specially true for suboptions that
would be present twice, but with different attributes.
The new restrictions are the same as the ones applied on the output
side, with mptcp_write_options. The same rules can be reused with a
small fix: an MP_FASTCLOSE can be used with a DSS when the sender picks
this option [1], which is not the case on Linux. Here are the rules:
Which options can be used together?
X: mutually exclusive
O: often used together
C: can be used together in some cases
P: could be used together but we prefer not to (optimisations)
| Opt: | MPC | MPJ | DSS | ADD | RM | PRIO | FAIL | FC |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| MPC |------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| MPJ | X |------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| DSS | X | X |------|------|------|------|------|------|
| ADD | X | X | P |------|------|------|------|------|
| RM | C | C | C | P |------|------|------|------|
| PRIO | X | C | C | C | C |------|------|------|
| FAIL | X | X | C | X | X | X |------|------|
| FC | X | X | P | X | X | X | X |------|
| RST | X | X | X | X | X | X | O | O |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
The only difference is with the 'P': another stack could send and
ADD_ADDR with other suboptions (DSS, RM_ADDR), and this should be
allowed.
A few points of attention:
- In theory, an MP_CAPABLE could be used with a RM_ADDR, but there is
no reason to add it with a SYN. Note that even with a 4th ACK, it
doesn't seem to be useful, except when IDs are known in advance via
another channel. Better not to break that.
- Now, combining both an MP_CAPABLE and an MP_JOIN will no longer
result to a reject of the two options, but only the second suboption
is ignored. That seems OK to do that for this unexpected error. At
least now all inconsistent combinations are handled the same way.
This could change later in next. This also means the explicit checks
for having both MPC + MPJ in subflow.c will now be unreachable.
That's fine, they will be removed in a follow-up patch.
- In case of conflicting combinations, the extra suboption(s) is/are
ignored: having such combinations either means the remote peer is
buggy, or is evil. The simplest action is then taken in this case:
stop processing the current suboption.
- In mp_opt->suboptions, there is also a bit reserved to the checksum,
which can be used in an MP_CAPABLE and a DSS. Each time a DSS option
can be used in parallel with another option, the checksum can be set,
so the verification is combined into a new OPTIONS_MPTCP_DSS macro.
- An MP_CAPABLE ACK can carry a Data-Level Length, and an optional
Checksum: they are the same as the ones found in a DSS, because a DSS
cannot be used in parallel to an MP_CAPABLE. Similarly, even if there
is room, a DSS cannot be used with an MP_JOIN. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: codecs: lpass-tx-macro: Fix enum kcontrol accesses
The "DEC0 MODE" to "DEC7 MODE" controls are enumerated, but
tx_macro_dec_mode_get() and tx_macro_dec_mode_put() access their
value through ucontrol->value.integer.value[0] (a long) instead of
ucontrol->value.enumerated.item[0] (an unsigned int).
This same pattern was fixed in the sibling drivers by
commit bcfe5f76cc40 ("ASoC: codecs: rx-macro: fix accessing array
out of bounds for enum type") and
commit 0ea5eff7c606 ("ASoC: codecs: va-macro: fix accessing array
out of bounds for enum type"), but tx-macro was missed.
On 64-bit kernels built with CONFIG_SND_CTL_DEBUG, the elem value
sanity check catches the 4 bytes written past the enumerated item
and every read of these controls fails with -EINVAL:
snd-sm8250 sound: control 2:0:0:DEC0 MODE:0: access overflow |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ASoC: SOF: ipc4-pcm: Continue the pipeline trigger in case of IPC timeout
Ignore IPC errors for pipeline state change if the firmware state is
crashed or the IPC has timed out.
If the firmware has crashed the kernel still needs to go through the state
changes to reset its internal to be able to correctly work the next time
the DSP is booted up.
The case with IPC timeout is a bit more problematic, but it has been
rootcaused to be the result of system scheduling blockage and the firmware
did actually received and handled the message, but the reply handling got
blocked by issues outside of the SOF stack.
So far the best way to handle this is to continue with setting the state. |
| Incorrect authorization in Forms in Google Chrome prior to 152.0.7977.65 allowed a remote attacker to obtain sensitive information via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: Low) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: byd - synchronize timer deletion before freeing private data
byd_disconnect() uses timer_delete() before freeing the driver's private
data. This does not wait for a running byd_clear_touch() callback, which
dereferences the private data and its psmouse pointer. A callback racing
with disconnect can therefore access the private data after it has been
freed. The timer can also still be re-armed by byd_process_byte() while
the disconnect is in progress.
Use timer_shutdown_sync() before freeing the private data: it waits for
a running callback and turns any later re-arm attempt into a no-op. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpio: ml-ioh: use raw_spinlock_t for the register lock
ioh_irq_type() is registered as the irq_chip .irq_set_type callback and
takes chip->spinlock with spin_lock_irqsave(). This callback is reached
from __setup_irq() -> __irq_set_trigger() -> chip->irq_set_type() while
the caller holds desc->lock, a raw_spinlock_t, with hardirqs disabled.
That context is not sleepable, but on PREEMPT_RT a regular spinlock_t is
an rtmutex-backed sleeping lock, so acquiring it there is invalid.
ioh_irq_enable() and ioh_irq_disable() take the same lock from the
.irq_enable/.irq_disable callbacks, which are likewise invoked with
desc->lock held.
Convert the register lock to raw_spinlock_t. The same lock also
serializes the GPIO direction/value callbacks and the suspend/resume
register save/restore, and those critical sections only perform short
sequences of MMIO register accesses (ioread32()/iowrite32()); the
.irq_set_type callback additionally emits a dev_warn() on an unsupported
type. None of these are sleepable operations, so keeping this register
lock non-sleeping is appropriate for the irqchip callbacks and does not
change the GPIO-side locking contract.
This is the same fix as commit a02b8950d619 ("gpio: pch: use
raw_spinlock_t for the register lock"); this driver shares the same
structure as gpio-pch. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
libceph: fix OOB read in decode_watchers() via missing bounds check
ceph_start_decoding() validates that struct_len bytes remain in the
buffer after the encoding header, but accepts struct_len=0 as valid:
ceph_decode_need(p, end, 0, bad) always passes. When a malicious or
compromised OSD sends an obj_list_watch_response_t reply with
struct_len=0, ceph_start_decoding() returns success with p == end,
leaving zero bytes guaranteed for subsequent reads.
The immediately following ceph_decode_32(p) in decode_watchers() has
no preceding bounds check. With p == end this is a 4-byte read past
the validated buffer boundary. The garbage value is then passed
directly to kzalloc_objs() as the watcher count.
The sibling function decode_watcher() already uses the safe variants
(ceph_decode_copy_safe, ceph_decode_64_safe, ceph_decode_skip_32)
after its own ceph_start_decoding() call. decode_watchers() is the
only site that uses the bare variant, confirming an oversight.
Fix by replacing ceph_decode_32(p) with ceph_decode_32_safe(p, end,
*num_watchers, bad), consistent with the established pattern.
Attacker model: a malicious or compromised OSD in a multi-tenant Ceph
deployment (e.g. cloud) can trigger this against any kernel client
that calls CEPH_OSD_OP_LIST_WATCHERS, without any further privileges
beyond OSD session establishment.
[ idryomov: trim changelog ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/vfio_ccw: Free all memory if cp_init() fails
The routine cp_free() is called to unpin/free any memory once an I/O
is completed successfully, or if cp_prefetch() fails. But if cp_init()
fails, and cp->initialized is not enabled, the same routine cannot be
used to free all the memory.
An attempt to address this exists in ccwchain_handle_ccw(), where a
single call to ccwchain_free() is made for the currently-processed
CCW segment. But this will leak other segments (created as a result
of a Transfer in Channel) that had been allocated as part of the same
channel program.
Address this by performing the cleanup outside of the recursive
ccwchain_handle_ccw()/ccwchain_loop_tic() logic. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/vfio_ccw: Cancel existing workqueues
The initialization of the io_work and crw_work workqueues begs the
question of whether they should be un-initialized. Add the corresponding
cleanup tags in _release_dev to ensure work isn't dispatched after
the private struct is free'd. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/vfio_ccw: Ensure index for read/write regions are within range
The introduction of the capability chain rightly clamped the
region indexes to the range of the capabilities itself, but
neglected to do so for the existing read/write regions which
should also be enforced. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/vfio_ccw: Ensure first IDAW remains constant
The first IDAW in a list does not need to be on a 2K/4K boundary
like all others, and so is read separately to accurately calculate
the size of the buffer needed to read the full IDAL.
Verify that the address found in the first IDAW is unchanged between
reads, to ensure a consistent set of IDAWs being worked with. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/vfio_ccw: Move cp cleanup out of not operational
The fsm_notoper() routine is called when the device has been
lost, and is (by definition) no longer operational. Since this
can happen asynchronously from the normal behavior of the
driver, the cleanup may happen when holding other locks
in the calling sequence (notably, the cio subchannel lock).
Push the cleanup of the private->cp resources to a workqueue,
where it can be done out from under that lock sequence and
a future patch can safely manage the locking requirements. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/vfio_ccw: Selectively expand io_mutex
The io_mutex was defined to serialize the io_regions, but then has
also sort of been associated with the I/O themselves because of
the close relationship they share.
With the handful of races that are possible, the choices are either to:
A) expand the scope of io_mutex to close these remaining windows, or
B) reduce the scope of io_mutex to just io_region, and introduce a new
lock mechanism for the remaining I/O resources
This patch implements A, since B brings with it a lot more interactions
that would need to be tracked and kept in a correct hierarchy. It also
takes advantage of the workqueue element for cp_free() that now gets
called out of fsm_notoper(), which could be invoked out of an interrupt
context and thus cannot acquire a mutex itself. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
s390/vfio_ccw: Implement a crw lock
Unlike the channel_program struct, which covers synchronous I/O
submissions and asynchronous interrupts, the CRW region relies
exclusively on asynchronous events coming from hardware.
Implement a lock to manage the list of those payloads, to ensure
they are read cohesively. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: disallow multiple FENCE chunks in one submit
amdgpu_cs_pass1() dispatches on chunk_id once per chunk without
rejecting repeated ids. p->uf_bo is a single-slot field, so a
submission carrying two AMDGPU_CHUNK_ID_FENCE chunks runs
amdgpu_cs_p1_user_fence() twice, and the second run overwrites
p->uf_bo with a freshly referenced BO without dropping the reference
taken by the first.
amdgpu_cs_parser_fini() only unrefs the final p->uf_bo, so every FENCE
chunk but the last leaks a BO reference. The leaked BO outlives handle
close and process exit.
Reject duplicate FENCE chunks the same way commit fec5f8e8c6bc
("drm/amdgpu: disallow multiple BO_HANDLES chunks in one submit") did
for p->bo_list.
(cherry picked from commit 665b1fc2a1845206408f9a2c6da67101789edb82) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: bounds-check buffer log item's dirty bitmap
xlog_recover_do_reg_buffer() replays each dirty region described by a
buffer log item's bitmap into the buffer read for that item:
memcpy(xfs_buf_offset(bp, (uint)bit << XFS_BLF_SHIFT),
item->ri_buf[i].iov_base,
nbits << XFS_BLF_SHIFT);
The destination offset (bit/nbits, from the logged dirty bitmap) and the
buffer size (from the logged blf_len) are both attacker-controlled and
otherwise unrelated, yet the only thing bounding the copy is an ASSERT(),
which compiles away on production kernels. A crafted image logging a
small blf_len together with a bitmap bit past the end of that buffer
drives the memcpy() past the buffer's allocation, corrupting adjacent
kernel heap during mount-time log recovery. This is reachable by anyone
who can get a crafted image mounted -- the malicious-filesystem threat
model XFS already guards against elsewhere.
Turn the ASSERT() into a real XFS_IS_CORRUPT() check that aborts recovery
of the buffer with -EFSCORRUPTED, consistent with the validate-and-fail
idiom already used in xlog_recover_do_inode_buffer() and
xfs_dquot_item_recover.c. xlog_recover_do_reg_buffer() therefore becomes
STATIC int and its three callers propagate the error.
Found and confirmed with KASAN on a CONFIG_XFS_DEBUG=n build: the crafted
image trips a slab-out-of-bounds write before this change and fails
recovery cleanly with -EFSCORRUPTED after it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: fix ilock leak on error in xfs_dq_get_next_id
xfs_dq_get_next_id() takes the quota inode ILOCK before calling
xfs_iread_extents(). If xfs_iread_extents() fails, the function returns
immediately without releasing the lock, leaking the quota inode ILOCK.
This can leave the quota inode locked and cause subsequent quota
operations to hang.
Fix this by jumping to a common unlock path on error instead of returning
directly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
packet: use consistent hard_header_len in TX_RING send path
tpacket_snd() reads dev->hard_header_len independently for skb
allocation and header construction in tpacket_fill_skb(). Concurrent
netdevice reconfiguration can therefore make the reserved headroom
smaller than the amount later pushed, or make copylen - hard_header_len
negative.
Snapshot hard_header_len once before processing ring frames and use it
for the frame limit, headroom allocation, copy length, and skb
construction. Pass the snapshot to tpacket_fill_skb().
The separate SOCK_DGRAM consistency problem between hard_header_len and
header_ops->create is not addressed here. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
packet: synchronize pressure clearing with ring reconfiguration
packet_set_ring() updates the RX ring state under sk_receive_queue.lock,
but used to publish the tpacket receive mode through po->prot_hook.func
after releasing that lock. packet_poll() and packet_recvmsg() can then
run the pressure clearing path after the ring has been cleared while
still seeing tpacket_rcv, causing __packet_rcv_has_room() to dereference
stale or NULL ring storage.
Move the existing receive hook assignment into the same
sk_receive_queue.lock section as the ring state update. Keep the
assignment otherwise unchanged, including on TX ring reconfiguration, to
avoid adding behavior changes that are not required for the fix.
Serialize packet_recvmsg() pressure clearing with the same queue lock
only after PACKET_SOCK_PRESSURE has been observed. If the flag is clear
and the socket has moved away from tpacket_rcv, packet_set_ring() has
already detached the socket and waited for synchronize_net(), so no new
packet input can set the flag again.
packet_poll() already holds sk_receive_queue.lock, so it uses the new
unlocked helper directly. |
