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Search Results (2 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-86597 | 1 Snowflake | 6 Snowflake-connector-python, Snowflake Go Driver, Snowflake Jdbc Driver and 3 more | 2026-09-08 | 6.5 Medium |
| Insertion of sensitive information into log files in the Snowflake Python, Go, JDBC, Node.js, PHP PDO, and ODBC drivers allowed authentication tokens, query-result encryption keys, pre-signed cloud-storage URLs, and SAML assertions to be written to diagnostic logs in circumstances where the available log redaction did not cover all affected log paths and data types. An attacker with read access to the log destination, whether the local filesystem, a log aggregation service, or a CI/CD artifact store, could obtain credentials and decryption keys that, if still valid at the time of access, could be used to authenticate to the corresponding Snowflake account or cloud-storage object. Successful exploitation requires read access to the log destination, and impact is bounded by credential lifetime and object scope. The fix is available in the patched versions listed above. Users must manually upgrade and should securely delete previously generated diagnostic logs containing sensitive information where retention is not required. | ||||
| CVE-2026-86600 | 1 Snowflake | 9 Libsnowflakeclient, Snowflake-connector-python, Snowflake Connector For .net and 6 more | 2026-09-08 | 8.2 High |
| In affected Snowflake drivers, WORKLOAD_IDENTITY authentication requests a cloud workload-identity token and attaches it to the login request without verifying that the configured host is a Snowflake endpoint. An attacker who can modify the connection configuration can cause the driver to mint a fresh attestation and send it to a host they control. The captured token can be replayed to Snowflake for its remaining lifetime in accounts where that workload identity is already registered. On Azure, the token audience is also taken from connection configuration. Combined with an attacker-controlled host, the driver can request a Managed Identity access token scoped to a non-Snowflake Azure resource and deliver it to the attacker. That path is the only case in which impact extends beyond Snowflake; it is bounded by the token lifetime and the managed identity’s permissions. Successful exploitation requires WORKLOAD_IDENTITY authentication on a workload that already has an ambient cloud identity. Patched driver versions restrict this authenticator to recognized Snowflake hosts. Users must manually upgrade. | ||||
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