Langroid is a framework for building large-language-model-powered applications. Prior to version 0.64.0, `SQLChatAgent` in `langroid` ships a `_validate_query` defense-in-depth layer whose `_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS` regex blocklist enumerates dangerous SQL primitives by specific function name. The list misses the canonical PostgreSQL filesystem-disclosure family `pg_read_file()`, `pg_stat_file()`, `pg_ls_logdir()`, `pg_ls_waldir()`, `pg_current_logfile()` (and similar `SELECT`-shaped functions in the same family). It also leaves SQL Server `OPENDATASOURCE` and SQLite `ATTACH '<file>' AS x` (DATABASE keyword omitted) unblocked. An attacker able to shape the LLM's generated SQL (directly via prompt input or transitively via prompt-injection in data the LLM ingests) can read arbitrary files from the PostgreSQL host through ordinary `SELECT` queries, even with the agent's strict default configuration (`allow_dangerous_operations=False`, `allowed_statement_types=['SELECT']`). The payloads survive the statement-type allowlist (each is a `SELECT`) and pass through the regex blocklist (none of the function names match), then reach the live SQLAlchemy engine via `SQLChatAgent.run_query`. Version 0.64.0 contains a patch for the issue.
Advisories
| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
Github GHSA |
GHSA-pmch-g965-grmr | Langroid: SQLChatAgent _validate_query blocklist misses pg_read_file family enabling arbitrary file read |
Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
References
History
Fri, 10 Jul 2026 01:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| First Time appeared |
Langroid
Langroid langroid |
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| Vendors & Products |
Langroid
Langroid langroid |
Fri, 10 Jul 2026 00:15:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
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| Description | Langroid is a framework for building large-language-model-powered applications. Prior to version 0.64.0, `SQLChatAgent` in `langroid` ships a `_validate_query` defense-in-depth layer whose `_DANGEROUS_SQL_PATTERNS` regex blocklist enumerates dangerous SQL primitives by specific function name. The list misses the canonical PostgreSQL filesystem-disclosure family `pg_read_file()`, `pg_stat_file()`, `pg_ls_logdir()`, `pg_ls_waldir()`, `pg_current_logfile()` (and similar `SELECT`-shaped functions in the same family). It also leaves SQL Server `OPENDATASOURCE` and SQLite `ATTACH '<file>' AS x` (DATABASE keyword omitted) unblocked. An attacker able to shape the LLM's generated SQL (directly via prompt input or transitively via prompt-injection in data the LLM ingests) can read arbitrary files from the PostgreSQL host through ordinary `SELECT` queries, even with the agent's strict default configuration (`allow_dangerous_operations=False`, `allowed_statement_types=['SELECT']`). The payloads survive the statement-type allowlist (each is a `SELECT`) and pass through the regex blocklist (none of the function names match), then reach the live SQLAlchemy engine via `SQLChatAgent.run_query`. Version 0.64.0 contains a patch for the issue. | |
| Title | Langroid: SQLChatAgent _validate_query blocklist misses pg_read_file family enabling arbitrary file read | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-22 CWE-89 |
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| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV4_0
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Projects
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2026-07-09T23:42:52.853Z
Reserved: 2026-06-03T22:05:13.644Z
Link: CVE-2026-50180
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OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-07-10T01:30:03Z
Github GHSA