| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, cpumap: Handle skb as well when clean up ptr_ring
The following warning was reported when running xdp_redirect_cpu with
both skb-mode and stress-mode enabled:
------------[ cut here ]------------
Incorrect XDP memory type (-2128176192) usage
WARNING: CPU: 7 PID: 1442 at net/core/xdp.c:405
Modules linked in:
CPU: 7 PID: 1442 Comm: kworker/7:0 Tainted: G 6.5.0-rc2+ #1
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996)
Workqueue: events __cpu_map_entry_free
RIP: 0010:__xdp_return+0x1e4/0x4a0
......
Call Trace:
<TASK>
? show_regs+0x65/0x70
? __warn+0xa5/0x240
? __xdp_return+0x1e4/0x4a0
......
xdp_return_frame+0x4d/0x150
__cpu_map_entry_free+0xf9/0x230
process_one_work+0x6b0/0xb80
worker_thread+0x96/0x720
kthread+0x1a5/0x1f0
ret_from_fork+0x3a/0x70
ret_from_fork_asm+0x1b/0x30
</TASK>
The reason for the warning is twofold. One is due to the kthread
cpu_map_kthread_run() is stopped prematurely. Another one is
__cpu_map_ring_cleanup() doesn't handle skb mode and treats skbs in
ptr_ring as XDP frames.
Prematurely-stopped kthread will be fixed by the preceding patch and
ptr_ring will be empty when __cpu_map_ring_cleanup() is called. But
as the comments in __cpu_map_ring_cleanup() said, handling and freeing
skbs in ptr_ring as well to "catch any broken behaviour gracefully". |
| IBM DB2 Merge Backup for Linux, UNIX and Windows 12.1.0.0 could allow an attacker to access sensitive information in memory due to the buffer not properly clearing resources. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: Zero padding when dumping algos and encap
When copying data to user-space we should ensure that only valid
data is copied over. Padding in structures may be filled with
random (possibly sensitve) data and should never be given directly
to user-space.
This patch fixes the copying of xfrm algorithms and the encap
template in xfrm_user so that padding is zeroed. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: xfrm_alloc_spi shouldn't use 0 as SPI
x->id.spi == 0 means "no SPI assigned", but since commit
94f39804d891 ("xfrm: Duplicate SPI Handling"), we now create states
and add them to the byspi list with this value.
__xfrm_state_delete doesn't remove those states from the byspi list,
since they shouldn't be there, and this shows up as a UAF the next
time we go through the byspi list. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpiolib: acpi: initialize acpi_gpio_info struct
Since commit 7c010d463372 ("gpiolib: acpi: Make sure we fill struct
acpi_gpio_info"), uninitialized acpi_gpio_info struct are passed to
__acpi_find_gpio() and later in the call stack info->quirks is used in
acpi_populate_gpio_lookup. This breaks the i2c_hid_cpi driver:
[ 58.122916] i2c_hid_acpi i2c-UNIW0001:00: HID over i2c has not been provided an Int IRQ
[ 58.123097] i2c_hid_acpi i2c-UNIW0001:00: probe with driver i2c_hid_acpi failed with error -22
Fix this by initializing the acpi_gpio_info pass to __acpi_find_gpio() |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iommu/s390: Make attach succeed when the device was surprise removed
When a PCI device is removed with surprise hotplug, there may still be
attempts to attach the device to the default domain as part of tear down
via (__iommu_release_dma_ownership()), or because the removal happens
during probe (__iommu_probe_device()). In both cases zpci_register_ioat()
fails with a cc value indicating that the device handle is invalid. This
is because the device is no longer part of the instance as far as the
hypervisor is concerned.
Currently this leads to an error return and s390_iommu_attach_device()
fails. This triggers the WARN_ON() in __iommu_group_set_domain_nofail()
because attaching to the default domain must never fail.
With the device fenced by the hypervisor no DMAs to or from memory are
possible and the IOMMU translations have no effect. Proceed as if the
registration was successful and let the hotplug event handling clean up
the device.
This is similar to how devices in the error state are handled since
commit 59bbf596791b ("iommu/s390: Make attach succeed even if the device
is in error state") except that for removal the domain will not be
registered later. This approach was also previously discussed at the
link.
Handle both cases, error state and removal, in a helper which checks if
the error needs to be propagated or ignored. Avoid magic number
condition codes by using the pre-existing, but never used, defines for
PCI load/store condition codes and rename them to reflect that they
apply to all PCI instructions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
igc: don't fail igc_probe() on LED setup error
When igc_led_setup() fails, igc_probe() fails and triggers kernel panic
in free_netdev() since unregister_netdev() is not called. [1]
This behavior can be tested using fault-injection framework, especially
the failslab feature. [2]
Since LED support is not mandatory, treat LED setup failures as
non-fatal and continue probe with a warning message, consequently
avoiding the kernel panic.
[1]
kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c:12047!
Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI
CPU: 0 UID: 0 PID: 937 Comm: repro-igc-led-e Not tainted 6.17.0-rc4-enjuk-tnguy-00865-gc4940196ab02 #64 PREEMPT(voluntary)
Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (Q35 + ICH9, 2009), BIOS 1.16.3-debian-1.16.3-2 04/01/2014
RIP: 0010:free_netdev+0x278/0x2b0
[...]
Call Trace:
<TASK>
igc_probe+0x370/0x910
local_pci_probe+0x3a/0x80
pci_device_probe+0xd1/0x200
[...]
[2]
#!/bin/bash -ex
FAILSLAB_PATH=/sys/kernel/debug/failslab/
DEVICE=0000:00:05.0
START_ADDR=$(grep " igc_led_setup" /proc/kallsyms \
| awk '{printf("0x%s", $1)}')
END_ADDR=$(printf "0x%x" $((START_ADDR + 0x100)))
echo $START_ADDR > $FAILSLAB_PATH/require-start
echo $END_ADDR > $FAILSLAB_PATH/require-end
echo 1 > $FAILSLAB_PATH/times
echo 100 > $FAILSLAB_PATH/probability
echo N > $FAILSLAB_PATH/ignore-gfp-wait
echo $DEVICE > /sys/bus/pci/drivers/igc/bind |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: mac80211: increase scan_ies_len for S1G
Currently the S1G capability element is not taken into account
for the scan_ies_len, which leads to a buffer length validation
failure in ieee80211_prep_hw_scan() and subsequent WARN in
__ieee80211_start_scan(). This prevents hw scanning from functioning.
To fix ensure we accommodate for the S1G capability length. |
| pgAdmin versions 9.11 are affected by a Restore restriction bypass via key disclosure vulnerability that occurs when running in server mode and performing restores from PLAIN-format dump files. An attacker with access to the pgAdmin web interface can observe an active restore operation, extract the `\restrict` key in real time, and race the restore process by overwriting the restore script with a payload that re-enables meta-commands using `\unrestrict <key>`. This results in reliable command execution on the pgAdmin host during the restore operation. |
| A flaw was found in Moodle. An authorization logic flaw, specifically due to incomplete role checks during the badge awarding process, allowed badges to be granted without proper verification. This could enable unauthorized users to obtain badges they are not entitled to, potentially leading to privilege escalation or unauthorized access to certain features. |
| Remote prevention of access to cellular service with no user interaction (for example, crashing the cellular radio service with a malformed packet) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/handshake: restore destructor on submit failure
handshake_req_submit() replaces sk->sk_destruct but never restores it when
submission fails before the request is hashed. handshake_sk_destruct() then
returns early and the original destructor never runs, leaking the socket.
Restore sk_destruct on the error path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gve: defer interrupt enabling until NAPI registration
Currently, interrupts are automatically enabled immediately upon
request. This allows interrupt to fire before the associated NAPI
context is fully initialized and cause failures like below:
[ 0.946369] Call Trace:
[ 0.946369] <IRQ>
[ 0.946369] __napi_poll+0x2a/0x1e0
[ 0.946369] net_rx_action+0x2f9/0x3f0
[ 0.946369] handle_softirqs+0xd6/0x2c0
[ 0.946369] ? handle_edge_irq+0xc1/0x1b0
[ 0.946369] __irq_exit_rcu+0xc3/0xe0
[ 0.946369] common_interrupt+0x81/0xa0
[ 0.946369] </IRQ>
[ 0.946369] <TASK>
[ 0.946369] asm_common_interrupt+0x22/0x40
[ 0.946369] RIP: 0010:pv_native_safe_halt+0xb/0x10
Use the `IRQF_NO_AUTOEN` flag when requesting interrupts to prevent auto
enablement and explicitly enable the interrupt in NAPI initialization
path (and disable it during NAPI teardown).
This ensures that interrupt lifecycle is strictly coupled with
readiness of NAPI context. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/core: always drop device refcount in ib_del_sub_device_and_put()
Since nldev_deldev() (introduced by commit 060c642b2ab8 ("RDMA/nldev: Add
support to add/delete a sub IB device through netlink") grabs a reference
using ib_device_get_by_index() before calling ib_del_sub_device_and_put(),
we need to drop that reference before returning -EOPNOTSUPP error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpio: mpsse: ensure worker is torn down
When an IRQ worker is running, unplugging the device would cause a
crash. The sealevel hardware this driver was written for was not
hotpluggable, so I never realized it.
This change uses a spinlock to protect a list of workers, which
it tears down on disconnect. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: avoid chain re-validation if possible
Hamza Mahfooz reports cpu soft lock-ups in
nft_chain_validate():
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#1 stuck for 27s! [iptables-nft-re:37547]
[..]
RIP: 0010:nft_chain_validate+0xcb/0x110 [nf_tables]
[..]
nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables]
nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables]
nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables]
nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables]
nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables]
nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables]
nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables]
nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables]
nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables]
nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables]
nft_immediate_validate+0x36/0x50 [nf_tables]
nft_chain_validate+0xc9/0x110 [nf_tables]
nft_table_validate+0x6b/0xb0 [nf_tables]
nf_tables_validate+0x8b/0xa0 [nf_tables]
nf_tables_commit+0x1df/0x1eb0 [nf_tables]
[..]
Currently nf_tables will traverse the entire table (chain graph), starting
from the entry points (base chains), exploring all possible paths
(chain jumps). But there are cases where we could avoid revalidation.
Consider:
1 input -> j2 -> j3
2 input -> j2 -> j3
3 input -> j1 -> j2 -> j3
Then the second rule does not need to revalidate j2, and, by extension j3,
because this was already checked during validation of the first rule.
We need to validate it only for rule 3.
This is needed because chain loop detection also ensures we do not exceed
the jump stack: Just because we know that j2 is cycle free, its last jump
might now exceed the allowed stack size. We also need to update all
reachable chains with the new largest observed call depth.
Care has to be taken to revalidate even if the chain depth won't be an
issue: chain validation also ensures that expressions are not called from
invalid base chains. For example, the masquerade expression can only be
called from NAT postrouting base chains.
Therefore we also need to keep record of the base chain context (type,
hooknum) and revalidate if the chain becomes reachable from a different
hook location. |
| Improper access control in SecSettingsIntelligence prior to SMR Mar-2025 Release 1 allows local attackers to launch privileged activities. User interaction is required for triggering this vulnerability. |
| Improper neutralization in Microsoft Management Console allows an unauthorized attacker to bypass a security feature locally. |
| .NET Remote Code Execution Vulnerability |
| Windows PrintWorkflowUserSvc Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability |
