| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thunderbolt: property: Cap recursion depth in __tb_property_parse_dir()
A DIRECTORY entry's value field is used as the dir_offset for a
recursive call into __tb_property_parse_dir() with no depth counter.
A crafted peer that chains DIRECTORY entries into a back-reference
loop drives the parser until the kernel stack is exhausted and the
guard page fires. Any untrusted XDomain peer (cable, dock, in-line
inspector, adjacent host) that reaches the PROPERTIES_REQUEST
control-plane exchange can trigger this without authentication.
Thread a depth counter through tb_property_parse() and
__tb_property_parse_dir(), and reject blocks that exceed
TB_PROPERTY_MAX_DEPTH = 8. That is comfortably larger than any
observed legitimate XDomain layout.
Operators who do not need XDomain host-to-host discovery can disable
the path entirely with thunderbolt.xdomain=0 on the kernel command
line. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_fs: copy only received bytes on short ep0 read
ffs_ep0_read() allocates its control-OUT data buffer with
kmalloc() (not kzalloc) at the Length value from the Setup
packet, then copies that full len to userspace regardless of
how many bytes were actually received:
data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
...
ret = __ffs_ep0_queue_wait(ffs, data, len);
if ((ret > 0) && (copy_to_user(buf, data, len)))
ret = -EFAULT;
__ffs_ep0_queue_wait() returns req->actual, which on a short
control OUT transfer is strictly less than len. The
copy_to_user() call still copies len bytes, so on a short OUT
the last (len - ret) bytes of the kmalloc() buffer --
uninitialised slab residue -- are delivered to the FunctionFS
daemon.
Short ep0 OUT completions are specified USB control-transfer
behavior and are produced by in-tree UDCs:
* dwc2 continues on req->actual < req->length for ep0 DATA OUT
(short-not-ok is the only ep0-OUT stall path).
* aspeed_udc ends ep0 OUT on rx_len < ep->ep.maxpacket.
* renesas_usbf logs "ep0 short packet" and completes the
request.
* dwc3 stalls on short IN but not on short OUT.
A short ep0 OUT is therefore not evidence of a broken UDC; it is
a normal condition f_fs has to cope with. The sibling gadgetfs
implementation in drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c already does
this correctly via min(len, dev->req->actual) before
copy_to_user(). This patch brings f_fs.c to the same safe
pattern rather than trimming at a defensive layer.
The bug is reached from the FunctionFS device node, which in
real deployments is owned by the privileged gadget daemon
(adbd, UMS, composite gadget services, etc.); it is not
reachable from unprivileged userspace. Linux host stacks
normally reject short-wLength control OUTs before they reach
the gadget, so reproducing this required a build that
bypasses that host-side check. With the bypass in place, a
1-byte payload on a 64-byte Setup produces 63 bytes of
non-canary slab residue in the daemon's read buffer.
Fix by copying only ret (actually received) bytes to
userspace. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: belkin_sa: validate interrupt status length
The Belkin interrupt callback treats interrupt data as a four-byte
status report and reads LSR/MSR fields at offsets 2 and 3. The
interrupt-in buffer length is derived from endpoint wMaxPacketSize, and
short interrupt transfers may complete successfully with a smaller
actual_length.
Check the completed interrupt packet length before parsing status
fields so short interrupt endpoints and short successful packets are
ignored instead of causing out-of-bounds or stale status-byte reads.
KASAN report as below:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in belkin_sa_read_int_callback()
Read of size 1
Call trace:
belkin_sa_read_int_callback() (drivers/usb/serial/belkin_sa.c:202)
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb() (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1630)
dummy_timer() (?:?) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: usbtmc: check URB actual_length for interrupt-IN notifications
USBTMC devices can use an optional interrupt endpoint for notification
messages. These typically contain two-byte headers indicating the
payload format, but the driver does not check if these headers are
present before accessing the data buffers. In cases where the URB
actual_length is not enough to fit these headers, the driver will either
cause an out-of-bounds read, or consume stale leftover data from a
previous notification.
Fix by checking if actual_data contains enough bytes for the headers,
otherwise resubmit URB to the interrupt endpoint. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: atmel_mxt_ts - fix boundary check in mxt_prepare_cfg_mem
When a configuration file provides an object size that is larger than the
driver's known mxt_obj_size(object), the driver intends to discard the
extra bytes.
The loop iterates using for (i = 0; i < size; i++). Inside the loop, the
condition to skip processing extra bytes is:
if (i > mxt_obj_size(object))
continue;
Since i is a 0-based index, the valid indices for the object are 0 through
mxt_obj_size(object) - 1.
When i == mxt_obj_size(object), the condition evaluates to false, and the
code processes the byte instead of discarding it.
This causes the code to calculate byte_offset = reg + i - cfg->start_ofs
and writes the byte there, overwriting exactly one byte of the adjacent
instance or object.
Update the boundary check to skip extra bytes correctly by using >=. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: route MIGRATE notifications to caller's netns
xfrm_send_migrate() in net/xfrm/xfrm_user.c and pfkey_send_migrate()
in net/key/af_key.c both hardcode &init_net for the multicast that
announces a successful XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE / SADB_X_MIGRATE.
XFRM_MSG_MIGRATE arrives on a per-netns NETLINK_XFRM socket, and the
rest of the xfrm/af_key netlink path was made netns-aware in 2008.
The other 14 multicast paths in xfrm_user.c route their event using
xs_net(x), xp_net(xp) or sock_net(skb->sk); only the migrate path
was missed.
Two consequences of the init_net hardcoding:
1. The notification (selector, old/new endpoint addresses, and the
km_address) is delivered to listeners on init_net's
XFRMNLGRP_MIGRATE / pfkey BROADCAST_ALL groups rather than on
the issuing netns. An IKE daemon running in init_net therefore
receives migration notifications originating from any other
netns on the host.
2. An IKE daemon running inside a non-init netns and subscribed
to its own XFRMNLGRP_MIGRATE / pfkey groups never receives the
notification of its own migration. IKEv2 MOBIKE / address-update
handling inside a netns is silently broken.
Thread struct net through km_migrate() and the xfrm_mgr.migrate
function pointer, drop the &init_net override in xfrm_send_migrate()
and pfkey_send_migrate(), and pass the caller's net (already in
scope in xfrm_migrate() via sock_net(skb->sk)) all the way down.
struct xfrm_mgr is in-tree only and not exported as a stable API,
so the function-pointer signature change is internal.
pfkey_broadcast() is already netns-aware via net_generic(net,
pfkey_net_id) since the pernet conversion. The five other
pfkey_broadcast() callers in af_key.c already pass xs_net(x),
sock_net(sk) or a per-netns net, so this only removes the
&init_net outlier. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: dwc2: Fix use after free in debug code
We're not allowed to dereference "urb" after calling
usb_hcd_giveback_urb() so save the urb->status ahead of time. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: SEV: Compute the correct max length of the in-GHCB scratch area
When setting the length of the GHCB scratch area, and the area is in the
GHCB shared buffer, set the effective length of the scratch area to the max
possible size given the start of the guest-provided pointer, and the end of
the shared buffer.
The code was "fine" when first introduced, as KVM doesn't consult the
length of the buffer when emulating MMIO, because the passed in @len always
specifies the *max* size required. But for PSC requests, the incoming @len
is just the minimum length (to process the header), and KVM needs to know
the full size of the scratch area to avoid buffer overflows (spoiler alert).
Opportunistically rename @len => @min_len to better reflect its role. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
auxdisplay: line-display: fix OOB read on zero-length message_store()
linedisp_display() unconditionally reads msg[count - 1] before
checking whether count is zero, so a write of zero bytes to the
message sysfs attribute hits msg[-1]:
write(fd, "", 0);
-> message_store(..., buf, count=0)
-> linedisp_display(linedisp, buf, count=0)
-> msg[count - 1] == '\n' ; OOB read
The kernfs write buffer for that store is a 1-byte allocation
(kernfs_fop_write_iter() does kmalloc(len + 1) with len == 0),
so msg[-1] is a 1-byte read before the slab object. On a
KASAN-enabled kernel this trips an out-of-bounds report and
panics; on stock kernels it silently reads adjacent slab data
and, if that byte happens to be '\n', the following count--
wraps ssize_t 0 to -1 and is then passed to kmemdup_nul().
linedisp_display() is reached from the message_store() sysfs
callback (drivers/auxdisplay/line-display.c message attribute,
mode 0644) and from the in-tree initial-message setup with
count == -1, so the OOB path is only userspace-triggerable via
zero-byte writes; vfs_write() does not short-circuit on
count == 0 and kernfs_fop_write_iter() dispatches the store
callback regardless.
Guard the trailing-newline trim with a count check. The
existing if (!count) block then takes the clear-display path
unchanged.
Affects every auxdisplay driver that registers via
linedisp_register() / linedisp_attach(): ht16k33, max6959,
img-ascii-lcd, seg-led-gpio. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/vmalloc: do not trigger BUG() on BH disabled context
__get_vm_area_node() currently triggers a BUG() if in_interrupt() returns
true. However, in_interrupt() also reports true when BH are disabled.
The bridge code can call rhashtable_lookup_insert_fast() with bottom
halves disabled:
__vlan_add()
-> br_fdb_add_local()
spin_lock_bh(&br->hash_lock); <-- Disable BH
-> fdb_add_local()
-> fdb_create()
-> rhashtable_lookup_insert_fast()
-> kvmalloc()
-> vmalloc()
-> __get_vm_area_node()
-> BUG_ON(in_interrupt())
spin_unlock_bh(&br->hash_lock)
this triggers the BUG() despite the caller not being in NMI or
hard IRQ context.
Replace the in_interrupt() check with in_nmi() || in_hardirq(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: typec: altmodes/displayport: validate count before reading Status Update VDO
A broken/malicious device can send the incorrect count for a status
update VDO, which will cause the kernel to read uninitialized stack data
and send it off elsewhere.
Fix this up by correctly verifying the count for the update object. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ethtool: eeprom: add more safeties to EEPROM Netlink fallback
The Netlink fallback path for reading module EEPROM
(fallback_set_params()) validates that offset < eeprom_len,
but does not check that offset + length stays within eeprom_len.
The ioctl equivalent (ethtool_get_any_eeprom() in ioctl.c) has
always enforced both bounds:
if (eeprom.offset + eeprom.len > total_len)
return -EINVAL;
This could lead to surprises in both drivers and device FW.
Add the missing offset + length validation to fallback_set_params(),
mirroring the ioctl.
Similarly - ethtool core in general, and ethtool_get_any_eeprom()
in particular tries to zero-init all buffers passed to the drivers
to avoid any extra work of zeroing things out. eeprom_fallback()
uses a plain kmalloc(), change it to zalloc. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bridge: Fix sleep in atomic context in sysfs path
Since the start of the git history, brport_store() always acquired the
bridge lock. Back then this decision made sense: The bridge lock
protects the STP state of the bridge and its ports and at that time the
function was only used by two STP related attributes (cost and
priority).
Nowadays, brport_store() processes a lot more attributes and most of
them do not need the bridge lock:
* Bridge flags: Only require RTNL. Read locklessly by the data path.
Annotations can be added in net-next.
* FDB port flushing: Only requires the FDB lock.
* Multicast attributes: Only require the multicast lock.
* Group forward mask: Only requires RTNL. Read locklessly by the data
path. Annotations can be added in net-next.
* Backup port: Only requires RTNL. Read locklessly by the data path.
This is a problem as the bridge calls dev_set_promiscuity() when certain
bridge port flags change and this function can sleep since the commit
cited below, resulting in a splat such as [1].
Fix this by reducing the scope of the bridge lock and only take it when
processing the two STP related attributes that require it. Remove the
now stale comment from br_switchdev_set_port_flag(). The
SWITCHDEV_F_DEFER flag can be removed in net-next.
[1]
BUG: sleeping function called from invalid context at net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:1262
in_atomic(): 1, irqs_disabled(): 0, non_block: 0, pid: 372, name: bash
preempt_count: 201, expected: 0
RCU nest depth: 0, expected: 0
5 locks held by bash/372:
#0: ffff88810c51c3f0 (sb_writers#7){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:740)
#1: ffff888115ce9480 (&of->mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter (fs/kernfs/file.c:343)
#2: ffff88810b9fd330 (kn->active#37){.+.+}-{0:0}, at: kernfs_fop_write_iter (fs/kernfs/file.c:80 fs/kernfs/file.c:344)
#3: ffffffffa59473a0 (rtnl_mutex){+.+.}-{4:4}, at: brport_store (net/bridge/br_sysfs_if.c:326)
#4: ffff8881099d2d58 (&br->lock){+...}-{3:3}, at: brport_store (./include/linux/spinlock.h:348 net/bridge/br_sysfs_if.c:345)
Preemption disabled at:
0x0
Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl (lib/dump_stack.c:94 lib/dump_stack.c:120)
__might_resched.cold (kernel/sched/core.c:9163)
netif_rx_mode_run (net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:1262)
netif_rx_mode_sync (net/core/dev_addr_lists.c:1428)
dev_set_promiscuity (net/core/dev_api.c:289)
br_manage_promisc (net/bridge/br_if.c:135 net/bridge/br_if.c:172)
br_port_flags_change (net/bridge/br_if.c:242 net/bridge/br_if.c:747)
store_learning (net/bridge/br_sysfs_if.c:79 net/bridge/br_sysfs_if.c:235)
brport_store (net/bridge/br_sysfs_if.c:346)
kernfs_fop_write_iter (fs/kernfs/file.c:352)
new_sync_write (fs/read_write.c:595)
vfs_write (fs/read_write.c:688)
ksys_write (fs/read_write.c:740)
do_syscall_64 (arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94)
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: nexthop: Increase weight to u16
In CLOS networks, as link failures occur at various points in the network,
ECMP weights of the involved nodes are adjusted to compensate. With high
fan-out of the involved nodes, and overall high number of nodes,
a (non-)ECMP weight ratio that we would like to configure does not fit into
8 bits. Instead of, say, 255:254, we might like to configure something like
1000:999. For these deployments, the 8-bit weight may not be enough.
To that end, in this patch increase the next hop weight from u8 to u16.
Increasing the width of an integral type can be tricky, because while the
code still compiles, the types may not check out anymore, and numerical
errors come up. To prevent this, the conversion was done in two steps.
First the type was changed from u8 to a single-member structure, which
invalidated all uses of the field. This allowed going through them one by
one and audit for type correctness. Then the structure was replaced with a
vanilla u16 again. This should ensure that no place was missed.
The UAPI for configuring nexthop group members is that an attribute
NHA_GROUP carries an array of struct nexthop_grp entries:
struct nexthop_grp {
__u32 id; /* nexthop id - must exist */
__u8 weight; /* weight of this nexthop */
__u8 resvd1;
__u16 resvd2;
};
The field resvd1 is currently validated and required to be zero. We can
lift this requirement and carry high-order bits of the weight in the
reserved field:
struct nexthop_grp {
__u32 id; /* nexthop id - must exist */
__u8 weight; /* weight of this nexthop */
__u8 weight_high;
__u16 resvd2;
};
Keeping the fields split this way was chosen in case an existing userspace
makes assumptions about the width of the weight field, and to sidestep any
endianness issues.
The weight field is currently encoded as the weight value minus one,
because weight of 0 is invalid. This same trick is impossible for the new
weight_high field, because zero must mean actual zero. With this in place:
- Old userspace is guaranteed to carry weight_high of 0, therefore
configuring 8-bit weights as appropriate. When dumping nexthops with
16-bit weight, it would only show the lower 8 bits. But configuring such
nexthops implies existence of userspace aware of the extension in the
first place.
- New userspace talking to an old kernel will work as long as it only
attempts to configure 8-bit weights, where the high-order bits are zero.
Old kernel will bounce attempts at configuring >8-bit weights.
Renaming reserved fields as they are allocated for some purpose is commonly
done in Linux. Whoever touches a reserved field is doing so at their own
risk. nexthop_grp::resvd1 in particular is currently used by at least
strace, however they carry an own copy of UAPI headers, and the conversion
should be trivial. A helper is provided for decoding the weight out of the
two fields. Forcing a conversion seems preferable to bending backwards and
introducing anonymous unions or whatever. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: clear intr_entry in fuse_resend and fuse_remove_pending_req
When fuse_resend() moves a request from fpq->processing back to
fiq->pending, it sets FR_PENDING and clears FR_SENT but does not
remove the requests intr_entry from fiq->interrupts. If the
request had FR_INTERRUPTED set from a prior signal, intr_entry
remains dangling on fiq->interrupts. When the requesting task
then receives a fatal signal, fuse_remove_pending_req() sees
FR_PENDING=1, removes the request from fiq->pending and frees it
via the refcount path, also without cleaning intr_entry. The
stale intr_entry causes use-after-free when fuse_read_interrupt()
iterates fiq->interrupts:
- list_del_init(&req->intr_entry) -> UAF write on freed slab
- req->in.h.unique -> UAF read, data leaked to userspace
Remove intr_entry from fiq->interrupts in fuse_resend() for
interrupted requests before they are placed back on fiq->pending.
Add a WARN_ON if the intr_entry is not empty on request destruction. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
KVM: arm64: nv: Avoid dereferencing NULL VNCR pseudo-TLB
VNCR TLB invalidation occurs from MMU notifiers or TLBI instructions,
and either can race against a vcpu not being onlined yet (no pseudo-TLB
allocated). Similarly, the TLB might be invalid, and the invalidation
should be skipped in this case.
Both kvm_invalidate_vncr_ipa() and kvm_invalidate_vncr_va() are
expected to perform the same checks, except that the latter doesn't
check for the allocation and blindly dereferences the pointer.
Solve this by introducing a new iterator built on top of the usual
kvm_for_each_vcpu() that checks for both of the above conditions,
and convert the two users to it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
module: decompress: check return value of module_extend_max_pages()
module_extend_max_pages() calls kvrealloc() internally and returns
-ENOMEM on allocation failure. The return value is never checked.
If the initial allocation fails, info->pages remains NULL and
info->max_pages remains 0. Subsequent calls to module_get_next_page()
will attempt to dynamically grow the array by calling
module_extend_max_pages(info, 0) since info->used_pages is 0. This
results in kvrealloc(NULL, 0) returning ZERO_SIZE_PTR, which is treated
as a success, leading to a dereference of ZERO_SIZE_PTR and a kernel
oops.
Fix: add the missing error check after module_extend_max_pages() and
return immediately on failure. This matches the pattern used by every
other kvrealloc() caller in the module loading path.
[Sami: Corrected the analysis in the commit message.] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: chacha20poly1305 - validate poly1305 template argument
chachapoly_create() still accepts the compatibility poly1305 parameter
in the template name, but it assumes the second template argument is
always present and immediately passes it to strcmp().
When the argument is missing, crypto_attr_alg_name() returns an error
pointer. Check for that before comparing the name so malformed template
instantiations fail with an error instead of dereferencing the error
pointer in strcmp().
This matches the surrounding Crypto API template pattern where
crypto_attr_alg_name() results are validated before string-specific use. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: composite: fix dead empty check in the USB_DT_OTG handler
The OTG branch of composite_setup() falls back to the first
configuration when none is selected:
if (cdev->config)
config = cdev->config;
else
config = list_first_entry(&cdev->configs,
struct usb_configuration, list);
if (!config)
goto done;
...
memcpy(req->buf, config->descriptors[0], value);
list_first_entry() never returns NULL. On an empty list it returns
container_of() of the list head. So the "if (!config)" check is dead.
When cdev->configs is empty, config points at the head inside struct
usb_composite_dev. config->descriptors[0] reads whatever sits at that
offset. The memcpy copies up to w_length bytes of it into the response
buffer.
cdev->configs can be empty in two cases. One is a teardown race on
gadget unbind with a control transfer in flight. The other is a driver
that sets is_otg before it adds a config. A reproducer that holds
cdev->configs empty triggers a KASAN fault in this branch.
Use list_first_entry_or_null() so the existing check does its job. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Fix NULL pointer dereference in func_set_flag()
func_set_flag() dereferences tr->current_trace_flags before verifying
that the current tracer is actually the function tracer. When the active
tracer has been switched away from "function" (e.g., to "wakeup_rt"),
tr->current_trace_flags can be NULL, leading to a NULL pointer
dereference and kernel crash.
The call chain that triggers this is:
trace_options_write()
-> __set_tracer_option()
-> trace->set_flag() /* func_set_flag */
In func_set_flag(), the first operation is:
if (!!set == !!(tr->current_trace_flags->val & bit))
This dereferences tr->current_trace_flags unconditionally. The safety
check that guards against a non-function tracer:
if (tr->current_trace != &function_trace)
return 0;
is placed *after* the dereference, which is too late.
This was observed with the following crash dump:
BUG: unable to handle page fault at 0000000000000000
RIP: func_set_flag+0xd
Call Trace:
__set_tracer_option+0x27
trace_options_write+0x75
vfs_write+0x12a
ksys_write+0x66
do_syscall_64+0x5b
RIP: ffffffff914c973d RSP: ff67ec88b01dfdf0 RFLAGS: 00010202
RAX: 0000000000000000 RBX: ff3a826e80354580 RCX: 0000000000000001
RDX: 0000000000000001 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: ffffffff93918080
The disassembly confirms the fault:
func_set_flag+0: mov 0x1f08(%rdi), %rax ; RAX = tr->current_trace_flags = NULL
func_set_flag+13: mov (%rax), %eax ; page fault: dereference NULL
At the time of the crash:
tr->current_trace_flags = 0x0 (NULL)
tr->current_trace = wakeup_rt_tracer (not function_trace)
The scenario is that a process opens a function tracer option file (such
as "func_stack_trace"), then the current tracer is switched to another
tracer (e.g., "wakeup_rt"), which sets current_trace_flags to NULL. When
the process subsequently writes to the option file, func_set_flag() is
invoked and crashes on the NULL dereference.
Fix this by moving the current_trace check before the
current_trace_flags dereference, so that func_set_flag() returns early
when the function tracer is not active. |
