| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Incorrect default permission in Framework for Galaxy Watch prior to SMR Jul-2025 Release 1 allows local attackers to reset some configuration of Galaxy Watch. |
| curl's websocket code did not update the 32 bit mask pattern for each new
outgoing frame as the specification says. Instead it used a fixed mask that
persisted and was used throughout the entire connection.
A predictable mask pattern allows for a malicious server to induce traffic
between the two communicating parties that could be interpreted by an involved
proxy (configured or transparent) as genuine, real, HTTP traffic with content
and thereby poison its cache. That cached poisoned content could then be
served to all users of that proxy. |
| Improper access control in SamsungAccount for Galaxy Watch prior to SMR Jul-2025 Release 1 allows local attackers to access phone number. |
| A potential security vulnerability has been identified in the HP Support Assistant, which allows a local attacker to escalate privileges via an arbitrary file deletion. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: core: ufs: Fix a hang in the error handler
ufshcd_err_handling_prepare() calls ufshcd_rpm_get_sync(). The latter
function can only succeed if UFSHCD_EH_IN_PROGRESS is not set because
resuming involves submitting a SCSI command and ufshcd_queuecommand()
returns SCSI_MLQUEUE_HOST_BUSY if UFSHCD_EH_IN_PROGRESS is set. Fix this
hang by setting UFSHCD_EH_IN_PROGRESS after ufshcd_rpm_get_sync() has
been called instead of before.
Backtrace:
__switch_to+0x174/0x338
__schedule+0x600/0x9e4
schedule+0x7c/0xe8
schedule_timeout+0xa4/0x1c8
io_schedule_timeout+0x48/0x70
wait_for_common_io+0xa8/0x160 //waiting on START_STOP
wait_for_completion_io_timeout+0x10/0x20
blk_execute_rq+0xe4/0x1e4
scsi_execute_cmd+0x108/0x244
ufshcd_set_dev_pwr_mode+0xe8/0x250
__ufshcd_wl_resume+0x94/0x354
ufshcd_wl_runtime_resume+0x3c/0x174
scsi_runtime_resume+0x64/0xa4
rpm_resume+0x15c/0xa1c
__pm_runtime_resume+0x4c/0x90 // Runtime resume ongoing
ufshcd_err_handler+0x1a0/0xd08
process_one_work+0x174/0x808
worker_thread+0x15c/0x490
kthread+0xf4/0x1ec
ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ bvanassche: rewrote patch description ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: Remove RTNL dance for SIOCBRADDIF and SIOCBRDELIF.
SIOCBRDELIF is passed to dev_ioctl() first and later forwarded to
br_ioctl_call(), which causes unnecessary RTNL dance and the splat
below [0] under RTNL pressure.
Let's say Thread A is trying to detach a device from a bridge and
Thread B is trying to remove the bridge.
In dev_ioctl(), Thread A bumps the bridge device's refcnt by
netdev_hold() and releases RTNL because the following br_ioctl_call()
also re-acquires RTNL.
In the race window, Thread B could acquire RTNL and try to remove
the bridge device. Then, rtnl_unlock() by Thread B will release RTNL
and wait for netdev_put() by Thread A.
Thread A, however, must hold RTNL after the unlock in dev_ifsioc(),
which may take long under RTNL pressure, resulting in the splat by
Thread B.
Thread A (SIOCBRDELIF) Thread B (SIOCBRDELBR)
---------------------- ----------------------
sock_ioctl sock_ioctl
`- sock_do_ioctl `- br_ioctl_call
`- dev_ioctl `- br_ioctl_stub
|- rtnl_lock |
|- dev_ifsioc '
' |- dev = __dev_get_by_name(...)
|- netdev_hold(dev, ...) .
/ |- rtnl_unlock ------. |
| |- br_ioctl_call `---> |- rtnl_lock
Race | | `- br_ioctl_stub |- br_del_bridge
Window | | | |- dev = __dev_get_by_name(...)
| | | May take long | `- br_dev_delete(dev, ...)
| | | under RTNL pressure | `- unregister_netdevice_queue(dev, ...)
| | | | `- rtnl_unlock
\ | |- rtnl_lock <-' `- netdev_run_todo
| |- ... `- netdev_run_todo
| `- rtnl_unlock |- __rtnl_unlock
| |- netdev_wait_allrefs_any
|- netdev_put(dev, ...) <----------------'
Wait refcnt decrement
and log splat below
To avoid blocking SIOCBRDELBR unnecessarily, let's not call
dev_ioctl() for SIOCBRADDIF and SIOCBRDELIF.
In the dev_ioctl() path, we do the following:
1. Copy struct ifreq by get_user_ifreq in sock_do_ioctl()
2. Check CAP_NET_ADMIN in dev_ioctl()
3. Call dev_load() in dev_ioctl()
4. Fetch the master dev from ifr.ifr_name in dev_ifsioc()
3. can be done by request_module() in br_ioctl_call(), so we move
1., 2., and 4. to br_ioctl_stub().
Note that 2. is also checked later in add_del_if(), but it's better
performed before RTNL.
SIOCBRADDIF and SIOCBRDELIF have been processed in dev_ioctl() since
the pre-git era, and there seems to be no specific reason to process
them there.
[0]:
unregister_netdevice: waiting for wpan3 to become free. Usage count = 2
ref_tracker: wpan3@ffff8880662d8608 has 1/1 users at
__netdev_tracker_alloc include/linux/netdevice.h:4282 [inline]
netdev_hold include/linux/netdevice.h:4311 [inline]
dev_ifsioc+0xc6a/0x1160 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:624
dev_ioctl+0x255/0x10c0 net/core/dev_ioctl.c:826
sock_do_ioctl+0x1ca/0x260 net/socket.c:1213
sock_ioctl+0x23a/0x6c0 net/socket.c:1318
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:906 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:892 [inline]
__x64_sys_ioctl+0x1a4/0x210 fs/ioctl.c:892
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/common.c:52 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xcb/0x250 arch/x86/entry/common.c:83
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ext4: filesystems without casefold feature cannot be mounted with siphash
When mounting the ext4 filesystem, if the default hash version is set to
DX_HASH_SIPHASH but the casefold feature is not set, exit the mounting. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ovl: Use "buf" flexible array for memcpy() destination
The "buf" flexible array needs to be the memcpy() destination to avoid
false positive run-time warning from the recent FORTIFY_SOURCE
hardening:
memcpy: detected field-spanning write (size 93) of single field "&fh->fb"
at fs/overlayfs/export.c:799 (size 21) |
| A vulnerability was found in Undertow where the ProxyProtocolReadListener reuses the same StringBuilder instance across multiple requests. This issue occurs when the parseProxyProtocolV1 method processes multiple requests on the same HTTP connection. As a result, different requests may share the same StringBuilder instance, potentially leading to information leakage between requests or responses. In some cases, a value from a previous request or response may be erroneously reused, which could lead to unintended data exposure. This issue primarily results in errors and connection termination but creates a risk of data leakage in multi-request environments. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring: wait interruptibly for request completions on exit
WHen the ring exits, cleanup is done and the final cancelation and
waiting on completions is done by io_ring_exit_work. That function is
invoked by kworker, which doesn't take any signals. Because of that, it
doesn't really matter if we wait for completions in TASK_INTERRUPTIBLE
or TASK_UNINTERRUPTIBLE state. However, it does matter to the hung task
detection checker!
Normally we expect cancelations and completions to happen rather
quickly. Some test cases, however, will exit the ring and park the
owning task stopped (eg via SIGSTOP). If the owning task needs to run
task_work to complete requests, then io_ring_exit_work won't make any
progress until the task is runnable again. Hence io_ring_exit_work can
trigger the hung task detection, which is particularly problematic if
panic-on-hung-task is enabled.
As the ring exit doesn't take signals to begin with, have it wait
interruptibly rather than uninterruptibly. io_uring has a separate
stuck-exit warning that triggers independently anyway, so we're not
really missing anything by making this switch. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ibmvnic: Do not reset dql stats on NON_FATAL err
All ibmvnic resets, make a call to netdev_tx_reset_queue() when
re-opening the device. netdev_tx_reset_queue() resets the num_queued
and num_completed byte counters. These stats are used in Byte Queue
Limit (BQL) algorithms. The difference between these two stats tracks
the number of bytes currently sitting on the physical NIC. ibmvnic
increases the number of queued bytes though calls to
netdev_tx_sent_queue() in the drivers xmit function. When, VIOS reports
that it is done transmitting bytes, the ibmvnic device increases the
number of completed bytes through calls to netdev_tx_completed_queue().
It is important to note that the driver batches its transmit calls and
num_queued is increased every time that an skb is added to the next
batch, not necessarily when the batch is sent to VIOS for transmission.
Unlike other reset types, a NON FATAL reset will not flush the sub crq
tx buffers. Therefore, it is possible for the batched skb array to be
partially full. So if there is call to netdev_tx_reset_queue() when
re-opening the device, the value of num_queued (0) would not account
for the skb's that are currently batched. Eventually, when the batch
is sent to VIOS, the call to netdev_tx_completed_queue() would increase
num_completed to a value greater than the num_queued. This causes a
BUG_ON crash:
ibmvnic 30000002: Firmware reports error, cause: adapter problem.
Starting recovery...
ibmvnic 30000002: tx error 600
ibmvnic 30000002: tx error 600
ibmvnic 30000002: tx error 600
ibmvnic 30000002: tx error 600
------------[ cut here ]------------
kernel BUG at lib/dynamic_queue_limits.c:27!
Oops: Exception in kernel mode, sig: 5
[....]
NIP dql_completed+0x28/0x1c0
LR ibmvnic_complete_tx.isra.0+0x23c/0x420 [ibmvnic]
Call Trace:
ibmvnic_complete_tx.isra.0+0x3f8/0x420 [ibmvnic] (unreliable)
ibmvnic_interrupt_tx+0x40/0x70 [ibmvnic]
__handle_irq_event_percpu+0x98/0x270
---[ end trace ]---
Therefore, do not reset the dql stats when performing a NON_FATAL reset. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/vc4: drop all currently held locks if deadlock happens
If vc4_hdmi_reset_link() returns -EDEADLK, it means that a deadlock
happened in the locking context. This situation should be addressed by
dropping all currently held locks and block until the contended lock
becomes available. Currently, vc4 is not dealing with the deadlock
properly, producing the following output when PROVE_LOCKING is enabled:
[ 825.612809] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 825.612852] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 116 at drivers/gpu/drm/drm_modeset_lock.c:276 drm_modeset_drop_locks+0x60/0x68 [drm]
[ 825.613458] Modules linked in: 8021q mrp garp stp llc
raspberrypi_cpufreq brcmfmac brcmutil crct10dif_ce hci_uart cfg80211
btqca btbcm bluetooth vc4 raspberrypi_hwmon snd_soc_hdmi_codec cec
clk_raspberrypi ecdh_generic drm_display_helper ecc rfkill
drm_dma_helper drm_kms_helper pwm_bcm2835 bcm2835_thermal bcm2835_rng
rng_core i2c_bcm2835 drm fuse ip_tables x_tables ipv6
[ 825.613735] CPU: 1 PID: 116 Comm: kworker/1:2 Tainted: G W 6.1.0-rc6-01399-g941aae326315 #3
[ 825.613759] Hardware name: Raspberry Pi 3 Model B Rev 1.2 (DT)
[ 825.613777] Workqueue: events output_poll_execute [drm_kms_helper]
[ 825.614038] pstate: 60000005 (nZCv daif -PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
[ 825.614063] pc : drm_modeset_drop_locks+0x60/0x68 [drm]
[ 825.614603] lr : drm_helper_probe_detect+0x120/0x1b4 [drm_kms_helper]
[ 825.614829] sp : ffff800008313bf0
[ 825.614844] x29: ffff800008313bf0 x28: ffffcd7778b8b000 x27: 0000000000000000
[ 825.614883] x26: 0000000000000001 x25: 0000000000000001 x24: ffff677cc35c2758
[ 825.614920] x23: ffffcd7707d01430 x22: ffffcd7707c3edc7 x21: 0000000000000001
[ 825.614958] x20: 0000000000000000 x19: ffff800008313c10 x18: 000000000000b6d3
[ 825.614995] x17: ffffcd777835e214 x16: ffffcd7777cef870 x15: fffff81000000000
[ 825.615033] x14: 0000000000000000 x13: 0000000000000099 x12: 0000000000000002
[ 825.615070] x11: 72917988020af800 x10: 72917988020af800 x9 : 72917988020af800
[ 825.615108] x8 : ffff677cc665e0a8 x7 : d00a8c180000110c x6 : ffffcd77774c0054
[ 825.615145] x5 : 0000000000000000 x4 : 0000000000000001 x3 : 0000000000000000
[ 825.615181] x2 : ffff677cc55e1880 x1 : ffffcd7777cef8ec x0 : ffff800008313c10
[ 825.615219] Call trace:
[ 825.615232] drm_modeset_drop_locks+0x60/0x68 [drm]
[ 825.615773] drm_helper_probe_detect+0x120/0x1b4 [drm_kms_helper]
[ 825.616003] output_poll_execute+0xe4/0x224 [drm_kms_helper]
[ 825.616233] process_one_work+0x2b4/0x618
[ 825.616264] worker_thread+0x24c/0x464
[ 825.616288] kthread+0xec/0x110
[ 825.616310] ret_from_fork+0x10/0x20
[ 825.616335] irq event stamp: 7634
[ 825.616349] hardirqs last enabled at (7633): [<ffffcd777831ee90>] _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x3c/0x78
[ 825.616384] hardirqs last disabled at (7634): [<ffffcd7778315a78>] __schedule+0x134/0x9f0
[ 825.616411] softirqs last enabled at (7630): [<ffffcd7707aacea0>] local_bh_enable+0x4/0x30 [ipv6]
[ 825.617019] softirqs last disabled at (7618): [<ffffcd7707aace70>] local_bh_disable+0x4/0x30 [ipv6]
[ 825.617586] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
Therefore, deal with the deadlock as suggested by [1], using the
function drm_modeset_backoff().
[1] https://docs.kernel.org/gpu/drm-kms.html?highlight=kms#kms-locking |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qla4xxx: Add length check when parsing nlattrs
There are three places that qla4xxx parses nlattrs:
- qla4xxx_set_chap_entry()
- qla4xxx_iface_set_param()
- qla4xxx_sysfs_ddb_set_param()
and each of them directly converts the nlattr to specific pointer of
structure without length checking. This could be dangerous as those
attributes are not validated and a malformed nlattr (e.g., length 0) could
result in an OOB read that leaks heap dirty data.
Add the nla_len check before accessing the nlattr data and return EINVAL if
the length check fails. |
| A vulnerability in NETGEAR Nighthawk R7000P routers lets an authenticated admin execute OS command injections due to improper input validation.
This issue affects R7000P: through 1.3.3.154. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
virtio_net: Fix error unwinding of XDP initialization
When initializing XDP in virtnet_open(), some rq xdp initialization
may hit an error causing net device open failed. However, previous
rqs have already initialized XDP and enabled NAPI, which is not the
expected behavior. Need to roll back the previous rq initialization
to avoid leaks in error unwinding of init code.
Also extract helper functions of disable and enable queue pairs.
Use newly introduced disable helper function in error unwinding and
virtnet_close. Use enable helper function in virtnet_open. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/platform/uv: Use alternate source for socket to node data
The UV code attempts to build a set of tables to allow it to do
bidirectional socket<=>node lookups.
But when nr_cpus is set to a smaller number than actually present, the
cpu_to_node() mapping information for unused CPUs is not available to
build_socket_tables(). This results in skipping some nodes or sockets
when creating the tables and leaving some -1's for later code to trip.
over, causing oopses.
The problem is that the socket<=>node lookups are created by doing a
loop over all CPUs, then looking up the CPU's APICID and socket. But
if a CPU is not present, there is no way to start this lookup.
Instead of looping over all CPUs, take CPUs out of the equation
entirely. Loop over all APICIDs which are mapped to a valid NUMA node.
Then just extract the socket-id from the APICID.
This avoid tripping over disabled CPUs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/qaic: tighten bounds checking in decode_message()
Copy the bounds checking from encode_message() to decode_message().
This patch addresses the following concerns. Ensure that there is
enough space for at least one header so that we don't have a negative
size later.
if (msg_hdr_len < sizeof(*trans_hdr))
Ensure that we have enough space to read the next header from the
msg->data.
if (msg_len > msg_hdr_len - sizeof(*trans_hdr))
return -EINVAL;
Check that the trans_hdr->len is not below the minimum size:
if (hdr_len < sizeof(*trans_hdr))
This minimum check ensures that we don't corrupt memory in
decode_passthrough() when we do.
memcpy(out_trans->data, in_trans->data, len - sizeof(in_trans->hdr));
And finally, use size_add() to prevent an integer overflow:
if (size_add(msg_len, hdr_len) > msg_hdr_len) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: do not ignore genmask when looking up chain by id
When adding a rule to a chain referring to its ID, if that chain had been
deleted on the same batch, the rule might end up referring to a deleted
chain.
This will lead to a WARNING like following:
[ 33.098431] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 33.098678] WARNING: CPU: 5 PID: 69 at net/netfilter/nf_tables_api.c:2037 nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x23d/0x260
[ 33.099217] Modules linked in:
[ 33.099388] CPU: 5 PID: 69 Comm: kworker/5:1 Not tainted 6.4.0+ #409
[ 33.099726] Workqueue: events nf_tables_trans_destroy_work
[ 33.100018] RIP: 0010:nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x23d/0x260
[ 33.100306] Code: 8b 7c 24 68 e8 64 9c ed fe 4c 89 e7 e8 5c 9c ed fe 48 83 c4 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d 31 c0 89 c6 89 c7 c3 cc cc cc cc <0f> 0b 48 83 c4 08 5b 41 5c 41 5d 41 5e 41 5f 5d 31 c0 89 c6 89 c7
[ 33.101271] RSP: 0018:ffffc900004ffc48 EFLAGS: 00010202
[ 33.101546] RAX: 0000000000000001 RBX: ffff888006fc0a28 RCX: 0000000000000000
[ 33.101920] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 0000000000000000 RDI: 0000000000000000
[ 33.102649] RBP: ffffc900004ffc78 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
[ 33.103018] R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000000 R12: ffff8880135ef500
[ 33.103385] R13: 0000000000000000 R14: dead000000000122 R15: ffff888006fc0a10
[ 33.103762] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff888024c80000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 33.104184] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 33.104493] CR2: 00007fe863b56a50 CR3: 00000000124b0001 CR4: 0000000000770ee0
[ 33.104872] PKRU: 55555554
[ 33.104999] Call Trace:
[ 33.105113] <TASK>
[ 33.105214] ? show_regs+0x72/0x90
[ 33.105371] ? __warn+0xa5/0x210
[ 33.105520] ? nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x23d/0x260
[ 33.105732] ? report_bug+0x1f2/0x200
[ 33.105902] ? handle_bug+0x46/0x90
[ 33.106546] ? exc_invalid_op+0x19/0x50
[ 33.106762] ? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1b/0x20
[ 33.106995] ? nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x23d/0x260
[ 33.107249] ? nf_tables_chain_destroy+0x30/0x260
[ 33.107506] nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x669/0x680
[ 33.107782] ? mark_held_locks+0x28/0xa0
[ 33.107996] ? __pfx_nf_tables_trans_destroy_work+0x10/0x10
[ 33.108294] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irq+0x28/0x70
[ 33.108538] process_one_work+0x68c/0xb70
[ 33.108755] ? lock_acquire+0x17f/0x420
[ 33.108977] ? __pfx_process_one_work+0x10/0x10
[ 33.109218] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x128/0x1d0
[ 33.109435] ? _raw_spin_lock_irq+0x71/0x80
[ 33.109634] worker_thread+0x2bd/0x700
[ 33.109817] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 33.110254] kthread+0x18b/0x1d0
[ 33.110410] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 33.110581] ret_from_fork+0x29/0x50
[ 33.110757] </TASK>
[ 33.110866] irq event stamp: 1651
[ 33.111017] hardirqs last enabled at (1659): [<ffffffffa206a209>] __up_console_sem+0x79/0xa0
[ 33.111379] hardirqs last disabled at (1666): [<ffffffffa206a1ee>] __up_console_sem+0x5e/0xa0
[ 33.111740] softirqs last enabled at (1616): [<ffffffffa1f5d40e>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x9e/0xe0
[ 33.112094] softirqs last disabled at (1367): [<ffffffffa1f5d40e>] __irq_exit_rcu+0x9e/0xe0
[ 33.112453] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
This is due to the nft_chain_lookup_byid ignoring the genmask. After this
change, adding the new rule will fail as it will not find the chain. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/uffd: fix warning without PTE_MARKER_UFFD_WP compiled in
When PTE_MARKER_UFFD_WP not configured, it's still possible to reach pte
marker code and trigger an warning. Add a few CONFIG_PTE_MARKER_UFFD_WP
ifdefs to make sure the code won't be reached when not compiled in. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: Reinject transport-mode packets through workqueue
The following warning is displayed when the tcp6-multi-diffip11 stress
test case of the LTP test suite is tested:
watchdog: BUG: soft lockup - CPU#0 stuck for 22s! [ns-tcpserver:48198]
CPU: 0 PID: 48198 Comm: ns-tcpserver Kdump: loaded Not tainted 6.0.0-rc6+ #39
Hardware name: QEMU KVM Virtual Machine, BIOS 0.0.0 02/06/2015
pstate: 80400005 (Nzcv daif +PAN -UAO -TCO -DIT -SSBS BTYPE=--)
pc : des3_ede_encrypt+0x27c/0x460 [libdes]
lr : 0x3f
sp : ffff80000ceaa1b0
x29: ffff80000ceaa1b0 x28: ffff0000df056100 x27: ffff0000e51e5280
x26: ffff80004df75030 x25: ffff0000e51e4600 x24: 000000000000003b
x23: 0000000000802080 x22: 000000000000003d x21: 0000000000000038
x20: 0000000080000020 x19: 000000000000000a x18: 0000000000000033
x17: ffff0000e51e4780 x16: ffff80004e2d1448 x15: ffff80004e2d1248
x14: ffff0000e51e4680 x13: ffff80004e2d1348 x12: ffff80004e2d1548
x11: ffff80004e2d1848 x10: ffff80004e2d1648 x9 : ffff80004e2d1748
x8 : ffff80004e2d1948 x7 : 000000000bcaf83d x6 : 000000000000001b
x5 : ffff80004e2d1048 x4 : 00000000761bf3bf x3 : 000000007f1dd0a3
x2 : ffff0000e51e4780 x1 : ffff0000e3b9a2f8 x0 : 00000000db44e872
Call trace:
des3_ede_encrypt+0x27c/0x460 [libdes]
crypto_des3_ede_encrypt+0x1c/0x30 [des_generic]
crypto_cbc_encrypt+0x148/0x190
crypto_skcipher_encrypt+0x2c/0x40
crypto_authenc_encrypt+0xc8/0xfc [authenc]
crypto_aead_encrypt+0x2c/0x40
echainiv_encrypt+0x144/0x1a0 [echainiv]
crypto_aead_encrypt+0x2c/0x40
esp6_output_tail+0x1c8/0x5d0 [esp6]
esp6_output+0x120/0x278 [esp6]
xfrm_output_one+0x458/0x4ec
xfrm_output_resume+0x6c/0x1f0
xfrm_output+0xac/0x4ac
__xfrm6_output+0x130/0x270
xfrm6_output+0x60/0xec
ip6_xmit+0x2ec/0x5bc
inet6_csk_xmit+0xbc/0x10c
__tcp_transmit_skb+0x460/0x8c0
tcp_write_xmit+0x348/0x890
__tcp_push_pending_frames+0x44/0x110
tcp_rcv_established+0x3c8/0x720
tcp_v6_do_rcv+0xdc/0x4a0
tcp_v6_rcv+0xc24/0xcb0
ip6_protocol_deliver_rcu+0xf0/0x574
ip6_input_finish+0x48/0x7c
ip6_input+0x48/0xc0
ip6_rcv_finish+0x80/0x9c
xfrm_trans_reinject+0xb0/0xf4
tasklet_action_common.constprop.0+0xf8/0x134
tasklet_action+0x30/0x3c
__do_softirq+0x128/0x368
do_softirq+0xb4/0xc0
__local_bh_enable_ip+0xb0/0xb4
put_cpu_fpsimd_context+0x40/0x70
kernel_neon_end+0x20/0x40
sha1_base_do_update.constprop.0.isra.0+0x11c/0x140 [sha1_ce]
sha1_ce_finup+0x94/0x110 [sha1_ce]
crypto_shash_finup+0x34/0xc0
hmac_finup+0x48/0xe0
crypto_shash_finup+0x34/0xc0
shash_digest_unaligned+0x74/0x90
crypto_shash_digest+0x4c/0x9c
shash_ahash_digest+0xc8/0xf0
shash_async_digest+0x28/0x34
crypto_ahash_digest+0x48/0xcc
crypto_authenc_genicv+0x88/0xcc [authenc]
crypto_authenc_encrypt+0xd8/0xfc [authenc]
crypto_aead_encrypt+0x2c/0x40
echainiv_encrypt+0x144/0x1a0 [echainiv]
crypto_aead_encrypt+0x2c/0x40
esp6_output_tail+0x1c8/0x5d0 [esp6]
esp6_output+0x120/0x278 [esp6]
xfrm_output_one+0x458/0x4ec
xfrm_output_resume+0x6c/0x1f0
xfrm_output+0xac/0x4ac
__xfrm6_output+0x130/0x270
xfrm6_output+0x60/0xec
ip6_xmit+0x2ec/0x5bc
inet6_csk_xmit+0xbc/0x10c
__tcp_transmit_skb+0x460/0x8c0
tcp_write_xmit+0x348/0x890
__tcp_push_pending_frames+0x44/0x110
tcp_push+0xb4/0x14c
tcp_sendmsg_locked+0x71c/0xb64
tcp_sendmsg+0x40/0x6c
inet6_sendmsg+0x4c/0x80
sock_sendmsg+0x5c/0x6c
__sys_sendto+0x128/0x15c
__arm64_sys_sendto+0x30/0x40
invoke_syscall+0x50/0x120
el0_svc_common.constprop.0+0x170/0x194
do_el0_svc+0x38/0x4c
el0_svc+0x28/0xe0
el0t_64_sync_handler+0xbc/0x13c
el0t_64_sync+0x180/0x184
Get softirq info by bcc tool:
./softirqs -NT 10
Tracing soft irq event time... Hit Ctrl-C to end.
15:34:34
SOFTIRQ TOTAL_nsecs
block 158990
timer 20030920
sched 46577080
net_rx 676746820
tasklet 9906067650
15:34:45
SOFTIRQ TOTAL_nsecs
block 86100
sched 38849790
net_rx
---truncated--- |
