| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: Fix signedness bug in sdma_v4_0_process_trap_irq()
The "instance" variable needs to be signed for the error handling to work. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
filelock: Fix fcntl/close race recovery compat path
When I wrote commit 3cad1bc01041 ("filelock: Remove locks reliably when
fcntl/close race is detected"), I missed that there are two copies of the
code I was patching: The normal version, and the version for 64-bit offsets
on 32-bit kernels.
Thanks to Greg KH for stumbling over this while doing the stable
backport...
Apply exactly the same fix to the compat path for 32-bit kernels. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: Validate ff offset
This adds sanity checks for ff offset. There is a check
on rt->first_free at first, but walking through by ff
without any check. If the second ff is a large offset.
We may encounter an out-of-bound read. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: Add a check for attr_names and oatbl
Added out-of-bound checking for *ane (ATTR_NAME_ENTRY). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
jfs: don't walk off the end of ealist
Add a check before visiting the members of ea to
make sure each ea stays within the ealist. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: strict bound check before memcmp in ocfs2_xattr_find_entry()
xattr in ocfs2 maybe 'non-indexed', which saved with additional space
requested. It's better to check if the memory is out of bound before
memcmp, although this possibility mainly comes from crafted poisonous
images. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ocfs2: add bounds checking to ocfs2_check_dir_entry()
This adds sanity checks for ocfs2_dir_entry to make sure all members of
ocfs2_dir_entry don't stray beyond valid memory region. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfs: add bounds checking to xlog_recover_process_data
There is a lack of verification of the space occupied by fixed members
of xlog_op_header in the xlog_recover_process_data.
We can create a crafted image to trigger an out of bounds read by
following these steps:
1) Mount an image of xfs, and do some file operations to leave records
2) Before umounting, copy the image for subsequent steps to simulate
abnormal exit. Because umount will ensure that tail_blk and
head_blk are the same, which will result in the inability to enter
xlog_recover_process_data
3) Write a tool to parse and modify the copied image in step 2
4) Make the end of the xlog_op_header entries only 1 byte away from
xlog_rec_header->h_size
5) xlog_rec_header->h_num_logops++
6) Modify xlog_rec_header->h_crc
Fix:
Add a check to make sure there is sufficient space to access fixed members
of xlog_op_header. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
filelock: Remove locks reliably when fcntl/close race is detected
When fcntl_setlk() races with close(), it removes the created lock with
do_lock_file_wait().
However, LSMs can allow the first do_lock_file_wait() that created the lock
while denying the second do_lock_file_wait() that tries to remove the lock.
Separately, posix_lock_file() could also fail to
remove a lock due to GFP_KERNEL allocation failure (when splitting a range
in the middle).
After the bug has been triggered, use-after-free reads will occur in
lock_get_status() when userspace reads /proc/locks. This can likely be used
to read arbitrary kernel memory, but can't corrupt kernel memory.
Fix it by calling locks_remove_posix() instead, which is designed to
reliably get rid of POSIX locks associated with the given file and
files_struct and is also used by filp_flush(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix too early release of tcx_entry
Pedro Pinto and later independently also Hyunwoo Kim and Wongi Lee reported
an issue that the tcx_entry can be released too early leading to a use
after free (UAF) when an active old-style ingress or clsact qdisc with a
shared tc block is later replaced by another ingress or clsact instance.
Essentially, the sequence to trigger the UAF (one example) can be as follows:
1. A network namespace is created
2. An ingress qdisc is created. This allocates a tcx_entry, and
&tcx_entry->miniq is stored in the qdisc's miniqp->p_miniq. At the
same time, a tcf block with index 1 is created.
3. chain0 is attached to the tcf block. chain0 must be connected to
the block linked to the ingress qdisc to later reach the function
tcf_chain0_head_change_cb_del() which triggers the UAF.
4. Create and graft a clsact qdisc. This causes the ingress qdisc
created in step 1 to be removed, thus freeing the previously linked
tcx_entry:
rtnetlink_rcv_msg()
=> tc_modify_qdisc()
=> qdisc_create()
=> clsact_init() [a]
=> qdisc_graft()
=> qdisc_destroy()
=> __qdisc_destroy()
=> ingress_destroy() [b]
=> tcx_entry_free()
=> kfree_rcu() // tcx_entry freed
5. Finally, the network namespace is closed. This registers the
cleanup_net worker, and during the process of releasing the
remaining clsact qdisc, it accesses the tcx_entry that was
already freed in step 4, causing the UAF to occur:
cleanup_net()
=> ops_exit_list()
=> default_device_exit_batch()
=> unregister_netdevice_many()
=> unregister_netdevice_many_notify()
=> dev_shutdown()
=> qdisc_put()
=> clsact_destroy() [c]
=> tcf_block_put_ext()
=> tcf_chain0_head_change_cb_del()
=> tcf_chain_head_change_item()
=> clsact_chain_head_change()
=> mini_qdisc_pair_swap() // UAF
There are also other variants, the gist is to add an ingress (or clsact)
qdisc with a specific shared block, then to replace that qdisc, waiting
for the tcx_entry kfree_rcu() to be executed and subsequently accessing
the current active qdisc's miniq one way or another.
The correct fix is to turn the miniq_active boolean into a counter. What
can be observed, at step 2 above, the counter transitions from 0->1, at
step [a] from 1->2 (in order for the miniq object to remain active during
the replacement), then in [b] from 2->1 and finally [c] 1->0 with the
eventual release. The reference counter in general ranges from [0,2] and
it does not need to be atomic since all access to the counter is protected
by the rtnl mutex. With this in place, there is no longer a UAF happening
and the tcx_entry is freed at the correct time. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Fix overrunning reservations in ringbuf
The BPF ring buffer internally is implemented as a power-of-2 sized circular
buffer, with two logical and ever-increasing counters: consumer_pos is the
consumer counter to show which logical position the consumer consumed the
data, and producer_pos which is the producer counter denoting the amount of
data reserved by all producers.
Each time a record is reserved, the producer that "owns" the record will
successfully advance producer counter. In user space each time a record is
read, the consumer of the data advanced the consumer counter once it finished
processing. Both counters are stored in separate pages so that from user
space, the producer counter is read-only and the consumer counter is read-write.
One aspect that simplifies and thus speeds up the implementation of both
producers and consumers is how the data area is mapped twice contiguously
back-to-back in the virtual memory, allowing to not take any special measures
for samples that have to wrap around at the end of the circular buffer data
area, because the next page after the last data page would be first data page
again, and thus the sample will still appear completely contiguous in virtual
memory.
Each record has a struct bpf_ringbuf_hdr { u32 len; u32 pg_off; } header for
book-keeping the length and offset, and is inaccessible to the BPF program.
Helpers like bpf_ringbuf_reserve() return `(void *)hdr + BPF_RINGBUF_HDR_SZ`
for the BPF program to use. Bing-Jhong and Muhammad reported that it is however
possible to make a second allocated memory chunk overlapping with the first
chunk and as a result, the BPF program is now able to edit first chunk's
header.
For example, consider the creation of a BPF_MAP_TYPE_RINGBUF map with size
of 0x4000. Next, the consumer_pos is modified to 0x3000 /before/ a call to
bpf_ringbuf_reserve() is made. This will allocate a chunk A, which is in
[0x0,0x3008], and the BPF program is able to edit [0x8,0x3008]. Now, lets
allocate a chunk B with size 0x3000. This will succeed because consumer_pos
was edited ahead of time to pass the `new_prod_pos - cons_pos > rb->mask`
check. Chunk B will be in range [0x3008,0x6010], and the BPF program is able
to edit [0x3010,0x6010]. Due to the ring buffer memory layout mentioned
earlier, the ranges [0x0,0x4000] and [0x4000,0x8000] point to the same data
pages. This means that chunk B at [0x4000,0x4008] is chunk A's header.
bpf_ringbuf_submit() / bpf_ringbuf_discard() use the header's pg_off to then
locate the bpf_ringbuf itself via bpf_ringbuf_restore_from_rec(). Once chunk
B modified chunk A's header, then bpf_ringbuf_commit() refers to the wrong
page and could cause a crash.
Fix it by calculating the oldest pending_pos and check whether the range
from the oldest outstanding record to the newest would span beyond the ring
buffer size. If that is the case, then reject the request. We've tested with
the ring buffer benchmark in BPF selftests (./benchs/run_bench_ringbufs.sh)
before/after the fix and while it seems a bit slower on some benchmarks, it
is still not significantly enough to matter. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: change vm->task_info handling
This patch changes the handling and lifecycle of vm->task_info object.
The major changes are:
- vm->task_info is a dynamically allocated ptr now, and its uasge is
reference counted.
- introducing two new helper funcs for task_info lifecycle management
- amdgpu_vm_get_task_info: reference counts up task_info before
returning this info
- amdgpu_vm_put_task_info: reference counts down task_info
- last put to task_info() frees task_info from the vm.
This patch also does logistical changes required for existing usage
of vm->task_info.
V2: Do not block all the prints when task_info not found (Felix)
V3: Fixed review comments from Felix
- Fix wrong indentation
- No debug message for -ENOMEM
- Add NULL check for task_info
- Do not duplicate the debug messages (ti vs no ti)
- Get first reference of task_info in vm_init(), put last
in vm_fini()
V4: Fixed review comments from Felix
- fix double reference increment in create_task_info
- change amdgpu_vm_get_task_info_pasid
- additional changes in amdgpu_gem.c while porting |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: avoid too many retransmit packets
If a TCP socket is using TCP_USER_TIMEOUT, and the other peer
retracted its window to zero, tcp_retransmit_timer() can
retransmit a packet every two jiffies (2 ms for HZ=1000),
for about 4 minutes after TCP_USER_TIMEOUT has 'expired'.
The fix is to make sure tcp_rtx_probe0_timed_out() takes
icsk->icsk_user_timeout into account.
Before blamed commit, the socket would not timeout after
icsk->icsk_user_timeout, but would use standard exponential
backoff for the retransmits.
Also worth noting that before commit e89688e3e978 ("net: tcp:
fix unexcepted socket die when snd_wnd is 0"), the issue
would last 2 minutes instead of 4. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: ena: Add validation for completion descriptors consistency
Validate that `first` flag is set only for the first
descriptor in multi-buffer packets.
In case of an invalid descriptor, a reset will occur.
A new reset reason for RX data corruption has been added. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/rxe: Fix responder length checking for UD request packets
According to the IBA specification:
If a UD request packet is detected with an invalid length, the request
shall be an invalid request and it shall be silently dropped by
the responder. The responder then waits for a new request packet.
commit 689c5421bfe0 ("RDMA/rxe: Fix incorrect responder length checking")
defers responder length check for UD QPs in function `copy_data`.
But it introduces a regression issue for UD QPs.
When the packet size is too large to fit in the receive buffer.
`copy_data` will return error code -EINVAL. Then `send_data_in`
will return RESPST_ERR_MALFORMED_WQE. UD QP will transfer into
ERROR state. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: ti: k3-udma-glue: Fix of_k3_udma_glue_parse_chn_by_id()
The of_k3_udma_glue_parse_chn_by_id() helper function erroneously
invokes "of_node_put()" on the "udmax_np" device-node passed to it,
without having incremented its reference count at any point. Fix it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
RDMA/mlx5: Add check for srq max_sge attribute
max_sge attribute is passed by the user, and is inserted and used
unchecked, so verify that the value doesn't exceed maximum allowed value
before using it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
dmaengine: xilinx: xdma: Fix data synchronisation in xdma_channel_isr()
Requests the vchan lock before using xdma->stop_request. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPICA: Revert "ACPICA: avoid Info: mapping multiple BARs. Your kernel is fine."
Undo the modifications made in commit d410ee5109a1 ("ACPICA: avoid
"Info: mapping multiple BARs. Your kernel is fine.""). The initial
purpose of this commit was to stop memory mappings for operation
regions from overlapping page boundaries, as it can trigger warnings
if different page attributes are present.
However, it was found that when this situation arises, mapping
continues until the boundary's end, but there is still an attempt to
read/write the entire length of the map, leading to a NULL pointer
deference. For example, if a four-byte mapping request is made but
only one byte is mapped because it hits the current page boundary's
end, a four-byte read/write attempt is still made, resulting in a NULL
pointer deference.
Instead, map the entire length, as the ACPI specification does not
mandate that it must be within the same page boundary. It is
permissible for it to be mapped across different regions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tipc: force a dst refcount before doing decryption
As it says in commit 3bc07321ccc2 ("xfrm: Force a dst refcount before
entering the xfrm type handlers"):
"Crypto requests might return asynchronous. In this case we leave the
rcu protected region, so force a refcount on the skb's destination
entry before we enter the xfrm type input/output handlers."
On TIPC decryption path it has the same problem, and skb_dst_force()
should be called before doing decryption to avoid a possible crash.
Shuang reported this issue when this warning is triggered:
[] WARNING: include/net/dst.h:337 tipc_sk_rcv+0x1055/0x1ea0 [tipc]
[] Kdump: loaded Tainted: G W --------- - - 4.18.0-496.el8.x86_64+debug
[] Workqueue: crypto cryptd_queue_worker
[] RIP: 0010:tipc_sk_rcv+0x1055/0x1ea0 [tipc]
[] Call Trace:
[] tipc_sk_mcast_rcv+0x548/0xea0 [tipc]
[] tipc_rcv+0xcf5/0x1060 [tipc]
[] tipc_aead_decrypt_done+0x215/0x2e0 [tipc]
[] cryptd_aead_crypt+0xdb/0x190
[] cryptd_queue_worker+0xed/0x190
[] process_one_work+0x93d/0x17e0 |
