| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu/sdma4.4.2: replace BUG_ON() with WARN_ON()
There's no need to crash the kernel for these cases.
(cherry picked from commit fa4f86a148271e325e95287630a3a15a9cd35fdc) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu/gfx9.4.3: replace BUG_ON() with WARN_ON()
There's no need to crash the kernel for these cases.
(cherry picked from commit 5676593d08998d7a6d9e2d51d6b54b3820e3755c) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/khugepaged: write all dirty file folios when collapsing
[There is no upstream commit, as this code was removed by upstream
commit 044925f9b565 ("mm: fs: remove filemap_nr_thps*() functions and their users")]
As-is, khugepaged and writable-file opening exclude each other. A file
cannot be open writeable and have THPs (because the filesystem is not aware
of them). khugepaged will never collapse file pages for files that are
opened writeable. On an open(O_RDWR/O_WRONLY), the page cache for that
particular file is dropped. This is fine because nothing could've been
dirtied.
However, there is an edge-case: collapse_file() might not be able to
coexist with concurrent writers, but it can coexist with dirty folios
(from previous writers). Therefore, the following can happen:
open(file, O_RDWR)
write(file)
close(file)
madvise(file_mapping, MADV_COLLAPSE, some non-dirty range)
open(file, O_RDWR)
nr_thps > 0
truncate_inode_pages()
/* THPs are cleared out, but so are the dirty folios */
When this edge-case happens, there is data loss, as the dirty folios are
fully discarded.
Fix it by fully writing back the page cache (and waiting) when collapsing
file THPs. Doing so provides the guarantee that no dirty folio will be
observed while there are active THPs. To fully ensure this is safe, the
invalidate_lock needs to be held while doing the writeout, so that
do_dentry_open()'s page cache truncation excludes this write-and-wait.
As a side effect, move the nr_thps counter bumping outside the i_pages
lock. This is correct since the counter itself is an atomic_t and the
producer <-> consumer correctness is provided by a full memory barrier:
smp_mb() in collapse_file()/memory barrier implied by full ordering in
get_write_access() -> atomic_inc_unless_negative(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: wacom: use GFP_ATOMIC in wacom_wac_queue_flush()
wacom_wac_queue_flush() is called via the .raw_event callback
(wacom_raw_event → wacom_wac_pen_serial_enforce → wacom_wac_queue_flush).
For USB HID devices, this callback is invoked from hid_irq_in(), which
is a URB completion handler running in atomic context. Using GFP_KERNEL
in this path can sleep, leading to a "scheduling while atomic" bug.
Use GFP_ATOMIC instead. The existing code already handles allocation
failure by skipping the fifo entry and continuing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
iio: core: fix uninitialized data in debugfs
If *ppos is non-zero then simple_write_to_buffer() will not initialize
the start of buf[]. Non zero values for *ppos aren't going to work
anyway. Test for them at the start of the function and return -EINVAL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
debugobjects: Plug race against a concurrent OOM disable
syzbot reported a puzzling splat:
WARNING: kernel/time/hrtimer.c:443 at stub_timer+0xa/0x20
stub_timer() is installed as timer callback function in
hrtimer_fixup_assert_init(), which is invoked when
debug_object_assert_init() can't find a shadow object. In that case debug
objects emits a warning about it before invoking the fixup.
Though the provided console log lacks this warning and instead has the
following a few seconds before the splat:
ODEBUG: Out of memory. ODEBUG disabled
So the object was looked up in debug_object_assert_init() and the lookup
failed due a concurrent out of memory situation which disabled debug
objects and freed the shadow objects:
debug_object_assert_init()
if (!debug_objects_enabled)
return; obj = alloc();
if (!obj) {
// Out of memory
debug_objects_enabled = false;
free_objects();
obj = lookup_or_alloc();
// The lookup failed because the other side
// removed the objects, so this returns
// an error code as the object in question
// is not statically initialized
if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(obj))
return;
if (!obj) {
debug_oom();
return;
}
print(...)
if (!debug_objects_enabled)
return;
fixup(...)
The debug object splat is skipped because debug_objects_enabled is false,
but the fixup callback is invoked unconditionally, which makes the timer
disfunctional.
This is only a problem in debug_object_assert_init() and
debug_object_activate() as both have to handle statically initialized
objects and therefore must handle the error pointer return case
gracefully. All other places only handle the found/not found case and the
NULL pointer return is a signal for OOM. Otherwise they get a valid shadow
object.
Plug the hole by checking whether debug objects are still enabled before
invoking the print and fixup function in those two places. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
time/jiffies: Register jiffies clocksource before usage
Teddy reported that a XEN HVM has a long boot delay, which was bisected to
the recent enhancements to the negative motion detection. It turned out
that the jiffies clocksource is used in early boot before it is registered,
which leaves the max_delta_raw field at zero. That causes the read out to
be clamped to the max delta of 0, which means time is not making progress.
Cure it by ensuring that it is initialized before its first usage in
timekeeping_init(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu/gfx12: replace BUG_ON() with WARN_ON()
There's no need to crash the kernel for these cases.
(cherry picked from commit f952076f76d62f783e8ba4995a7c400d39354ccf) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu/sdma7.1: replace BUG_ON() with WARN_ON()
There's no need to crash the kernel for these cases.
(cherry picked from commit c4f230b51cf2d3e7e8b1c800331f3dbed2a9e3f5) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/super: fix emergency thaw double-unlock of s_umount
do_thaw_all() iterates over all superblocks via __iterate_supers()
with SUPER_ITER_EXCL, which acquires s_umount exclusively before
calling the callback and releases it afterwards. However, the
callback do_thaw_all_callback() calls thaw_super_locked() which
unconditionally releases s_umount on every code path. This results
in a second unlock attempt in __iterate_supers() that corrupts the
rwsem state, triggering a DEBUG_RWSEMS warning:
[ 182.601148] sysrq: Emergency Thaw of all frozen filesystems
[ 182.601865] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 182.602375] DEBUG_RWSEMS_WARN_ON((rwsem_owner(sem) != current) && !rwsem_test_oflags(sem, RWSEM_NONSPINNABLE)): count = 0x0, magic = 0xffff99b1011e5870, owner = 0x0, curr 0xffff99b101b06c80, list not empty
[ 182.603817] WARNING: kernel/locking/rwsem.c:1412 at up_write+0xa3/0x170, CPU#2: kworker/2:1/53
[ 182.604578] Modules linked in:
[ 182.604864] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 53 Comm: kworker/2:1 Not tainted 7.2.0-rc4-00001-gbd3bd93ea98a-dirty #4 PREEMPT(lazy)
[ 182.605711] Hardware name: QEMU Standard PC (i440FX + PIIX, 1996), BIOS 1.13.0-1kylin1 04/01/2014
[ 182.606417] Workqueue: events do_thaw_all
[ 182.606750] RIP: 0010:up_write+0xaf/0x170
[ 182.607076] Code: 19 3a 92 48 0f 44 c2 48 8b 55 08 48 8b 55 00 4c 8b 45 08 48 8b 55 00 48 8d 3d ad 91 e0 01 48 8b 4d 20 50 48 c7 c6 f0 8c 26 92 <67> 48 0f b9 3a e8 d7 93 4e 00 58 eb 81 48 83 7f 18 00 48 c7 c2 8d
[ 182.608563] RSP: 0018:ffffb670001d7e08 EFLAGS: 00010246
[ 182.609007] RAX: ffffffff92349e8d RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: ffff99b1011e5870
[ 182.609595] RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: ffffffff92268cf0 RDI: ffffffff92914d10
[ 182.610283] RBP: ffff99b1011e5870 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: ffff99b101b06c80
[ 182.610847] R10: ffff99b10139a808 R11: fefefefefefefeff R12: 0000000000000000
[ 182.611414] R13: ffffffff90cf74d0 R14: 0000000000000000 R15: ffff99b1011e5800
[ 182.612009] FS: 0000000000000000(0000) GS:ffff99b1eaaee000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 182.612670] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 182.613146] CR2: 00000000005c631c CR3: 00000000013ee000 CR4: 00000000000006f0
[ 182.613722] Call Trace:
[ 182.613946] <TASK>
[ 182.614130] __iterate_supers+0x128/0x150
[ 182.614463] do_thaw_all+0x1b/0x30
[ 182.614759] process_scheduled_works+0xbb/0x3f0
[ 182.615150] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 182.615499] worker_thread+0x129/0x270
[ 182.615816] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
[ 182.616201] kthread+0xe2/0x120
[ 182.616469] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 182.616792] ret_from_fork+0x15b/0x240
[ 182.617115] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
[ 182.617426] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
[ 182.617761] </TASK>
[ 182.617968] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
[ 182.618412] Emergency Thaw complete
Fix this by switching to SUPER_ITER_UNLOCKED and acquiring s_umount
in the callback via super_lock_excl() before calling
thaw_super_locked(). This matches the locking pattern expected by
thaw_super_locked() and eliminates the double unlock.
While at it, remove the dead 'return;' at the end of
do_thaw_all_callback(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tracing: Fix union collision of module and refcnt for dynamic events
In 'struct trace_event_call', the 'module' pointer and the 'refcnt'
atomic variable share the same memory space in a union. For dynamic
events, the union member is 'refcnt', which acts as an active
reference counter.
When a dynamic event (such as kprobe, uprobe, fprobe, eprobe, or
wprobe) has a non-zero reference count (e.g. due to active event
triggers or perf attachments), its 'call->module' evaluates to a
small non-zero integer instead of NULL.
When filtering or setting events for a specific module (e.g., writing
':mod:<module>' to 'set_event'), the code in
'__ftrace_set_clr_event_nolock()' and 'update_event_fields()' reads
'call->module' directly without checking whether the event is dynamic.
This causes the kernel to treat the small integer (refcnt) as a
'struct module' pointer, leading to a NULL/invalid pointer dereference
(Oops) when dereferencing the module name.
Fix this by ensuring that the 'TRACE_EVENT_FL_DYNAMIC' flag is checked
before treating 'call->module' as a valid pointer in these code paths. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
userfaultfd: prevent registration of special VMAs
Vova Tokarev says:
userfaultfd allows registration on shadow stack VMAs. With userfaultfd
access, you can register on the shadow stack, discard a page ... and
inject a page with chosen return addresses via UFFDIO_COPY.
Update vma_can_userfault() to reject VM_SHADOW_STACK.
While on it, also reject VM_SPECIAL so that if a driver would implement
vm_uffd_ops, it wouldn't be possible to register special VMAs with
userfaultfd.
Since VM_SPECIAL includes VM_DONTEXPAND which is set but hugetlb, exclude
hugetlb VMAs from the check for VM_SPECIAL. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
afs: Fix afs_edit_dir_remove() to get, not find, block 0
Fix afs_edit_dir_remove() to use afs_dir_get_block() to get block 0 rather
than afs_dir_find_block() as the latter caches the found block in the
afs_dir_iter and may[*] switch out the page it's on if another
afs_dir_find_block() is done. This parallels what afs_edit_dir_add() does.
[*] There's more than one block per page. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mptcp: pm: userspace: fix use-after-free in get_local_id
In mptcp_pm_userspace_get_local_id(), the address entry is looked up under
spinlock, but its id is read after dropping the lock. A concurrent deletion
can free the entry between the unlock and the read, leading to UAF.
The race window is narrow. It was reproduced only with a locally
constructed stress test that repeatedly overlaps an MP_JOIN SYN with a
MPTCP_PM_CMD_SUBFLOW_DESTROY request.
However, the KASAN report below confirms that the race is reachable:
[ 666.319376] BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in mptcp_userspace_pm_get_local_id+0x1dc/0x1f0
[ 666.319386] Read of size 1 at addr ffff888124845610 by task swapper/0/0
...
[ 666.319401] Call Trace:
[ 666.319405] <IRQ>
[ 666.319408] dump_stack_lvl+0x53/0x70
[ 666.319412] print_address_description.constprop.0+0x2c/0x3b0
[ 666.319418] print_report+0xbe/0x2b0
[ 666.319421] ? mptcp_userspace_pm_get_local_id+0x1dc/0x1f0
[ 666.319423] kasan_report+0xce/0x100
[ 666.319426] ? mptcp_userspace_pm_get_local_id+0x1dc/0x1f0
[ 666.319429] mptcp_userspace_pm_get_local_id+0x1dc/0x1f0
[ 666.319433] mptcp_pm_get_local_id+0x371/0x440
...
[ 666.319821] Allocated by task 45539:
[ 666.319844] kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
[ 666.319855] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
[ 666.319858] __kasan_kmalloc+0x8f/0xa0
[ 666.319863] __kmalloc_noprof+0x1e7/0x520
[ 666.319867] sock_kmalloc+0xdf/0x130
[ 666.319885] sock_kmemdup+0x1b/0x40
[ 666.319888] mptcp_userspace_pm_append_new_local_addr+0x261/0x500
[ 666.319910] mptcp_pm_nl_announce_doit+0x16a/0x610
...
[ 666.319967] Freed by task 45560:
[ 666.319988] kasan_save_stack+0x33/0x60
[ 666.319991] kasan_save_track+0x14/0x30
[ 666.319994] kasan_save_free_info+0x3b/0x60
[ 666.319998] __kasan_slab_free+0x43/0x70
[ 666.320000] kfree+0x166/0x440
[ 666.320003] sock_kfree_s+0x1d/0x50
[ 666.320007] mptcp_userspace_pm_delete_local_addr.isra.0+0x157/0x200
[ 666.320011] mptcp_pm_nl_subflow_destroy_doit+0x51d/0xea0
Fix by copying the id into a local variable while still holding the lock,
and use -1 as a "not found" sentinel. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mei: bus: access mei_device under device_lock on cleanup
Fix couple of problems in mei_cl_bus_dev_release():
mei_cl_flush_queues() is running without lock.
bus->file_list access after mei_dev_bus_put(bus) can become a
use-after-free if this was the last reference to bus.
Protect queues cleanup and WARN traversal by device lock there
to avoid the concurrent access problems.
Move WARN traversal before mei_dev_bus_put(bus).
This file uses bus variable name for mei_device, adjust
code of mei_cl_bus_dev_release() to use bus variable too. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
wifi: ath12k: fix NULL pointer dereference in rhash table destroy
When unbinding the ath12k driver, kernel NULL pointer dereferences
occur in irq_work_sync() called from rhashtable_destroy().
Two hash tables are affected:
1. ath12k_link_sta hash table in ath12k_base
2. ath12k_dp_link_peer hash table in ath12k_dp
The issue happens because the destroy functions are called unconditionally
in cleanup paths, but the hash tables are only initialized late in their
respective init functions. If the device was never fully started or if the
init functions failed before initializing the hash tables, the pointers
will be NULL. The issues are always reproducible from a VM because the MSI
addressing initialization is failing.
Call trace for ath12k_link_sta_rhash_tbl_destroy:
RIP: irq_work_sync+0x1e/0x70
rhashtable_destroy+0x12/0x60
ath12k_link_sta_rhash_tbl_destroy+0x19/0x40 [ath12k]
ath12k_core_stop+0xe/0x80 [ath12k]
ath12k_core_hw_group_cleanup+0x6b/0xb0 [ath12k]
ath12k_pci_remove+0x60/0x110 [ath12k]
Call trace for ath12k_dp_link_peer_rhash_tbl_destroy:
RIP: irq_work_sync+0x1e/0x70
rhashtable_destroy+0x12/0x60
ath12k_dp_link_peer_rhash_tbl_destroy+0x29/0x50 [ath12k]
ath12k_dp_cmn_device_deinit+0x21/0x140 [ath12k]
ath12k_core_hw_group_cleanup+0x6b/0xb0 [ath12k]
ath12k_pci_remove+0x60/0x110 [ath12k]
Fix this by adding NULL checks before calling rhashtable_destroy() in
both destroy functions.
The NULL check approach was chosen because the rhashtable pointer
serves as the initialization state indicator. The init can fail at
various points, leaving some components uninitialized. Checking the
pointer directly is simpler than adding separate state flags that
would need synchronization. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: vivid: fix cleanup bugs in vivid_init()
When platform_device_register() fails in vivid_init(), the embedded
struct device in vivid_pdev has already been initialized by
device_initialize(), but the failure path jumps to free_output_strings
without dropping the device reference for the current platform device:
vivid_init()
-> platform_device_register(&vivid_pdev)
-> device_initialize(&vivid_pdev.dev)
-> setup_pdev_dma_masks(&vivid_pdev)
-> platform_device_add(&vivid_pdev)
This leads to a reference leak when platform_device_register() fails.
Fix this by calling platform_device_put() before jumping to the common
cleanup path.
Also, the unreg_driver label incorrectly calls
platform_driver_register() instead of platform_driver_unregister(),
which breaks cleanup when workqueue creation fails after successful
driver registration. Fix that as well.
The reference leak was identified by a static analysis tool I developed
and confirmed by manual review. The incorrect cleanup call was found
during code inspection. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: nuvoton: npcm-video: fix memory leaks in probe and remove
npcm_video_probe() allocates the npcm_video structure with kzalloc_obj()
but never frees it on any probe error path or in npcm_video_remove(),
leaking the allocation on every failed probe and every normal unbind.
Additionally, when npcm_video_setup_video() fails, the reserved memory
association established by of_reserved_mem_device_init() in
npcm_video_init() is not released, leaking the rmem_assigned_device
entry on the global list.
Fix both by adding kfree(video) to all probe error paths and to
npcm_video_remove(), and adding the missing
of_reserved_mem_device_release() call when npcm_video_setup_video()
fails. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: v4l2-fwnode: Fix subdev owner overwritten in v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor()
The v4l2 helper v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor() calls
v4l2_async_register_subdev(), which is a macro that expands to
__v4l2_async_register_subdev(sd,THIS_MODULE). Since the macro is expanded
inside v4l2-fwnode.c, THIS_MODULE resolves to the v4l2-fwnode module
rather than the sensor driver module that originally set sd->owner. When
v4l2-fwnode is built-in, THIS_MODULE evaluates to NULL, which then
overwrites the sensor driver's owner with NULL.
This causes the problem that the sensor module's reference count is never
incremented during async registration, so the module can be removed while
the subdevice is still in use by a notifier (e.g., a CSI-2 receiver
bridge driver).
Fix this by renaming v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor() to
__v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor() with an added explicit module
argument and introducing a wrapper macro:
#define v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor(sd) \
__v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor(sd, THIS_MODULE)
This ensures the sensor driver module is properly referenced even when
the sensor driver does not init the owner field before calling
v4l2_async_register_subdev_sensor() and prevents premature module removal. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
media: nxp: imx8-isi: Add missing v4l2_subdev_cleanup() in crossbar and pipe
Both mxc_isi_crossbar_init() and mxc_isi_pipe_init() call
v4l2_subdev_init_finalize() which allocates the subdev active state,
but neither mxc_isi_crossbar_cleanup() nor mxc_isi_pipe_cleanup()
calls v4l2_subdev_cleanup() to free it.
This causes a memory leak on every rmmod, reported by kmemleak:
unreferenced object 0xffff0000d06fc800 (size 192):
comm "(udev-worker)", pid 254, jiffies 4294913455
backtrace (crc 36eeae58):
kmemleak_alloc+0x34/0x40
__kvmalloc_node_noprof+0x5f8/0x7d8
__v4l2_subdev_state_alloc+0x1fc/0x30c
__v4l2_subdev_init_finalize+0x178/0x368
Add the missing v4l2_subdev_cleanup() calls before media_entity_cleanup()
in both crossbar and pipe cleanup paths. |
