| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| MoguBlog through 6.2 exposes Elasticsearch index management endpoints in the mogu_search service without authentication, allowing remote attackers to delete, recreate, or alter the blog search index. Attackers can invoke POST endpoints to wipe the entire search index, delete specific documents, or inject malicious index entries, causing search functionality to return incorrect or no results. |
| AVideo through commit c3edcc274c389816d434acadac07ee78eaf330c1 contains a stored cross-site scripting vulnerability in the Bookmark plugin where chapter names are not encoded before being concatenated into public watch-page HTML. A video owner can inject malicious scripts via the bookmark name parameter, and every visitor of that video executes the payload in the AVideo origin. |
| WWBN AVideo through commit c3edcc274c389816d434acadac07ee78eaf330c1 contains a reflected cross-site scripting vulnerability in confirmLivePassword.php that copies REQUEST_URI into a form action attribute without encoding. Attackers can craft a malicious URL with a quote character to break out of the action attribute and inject event handlers that execute in the victim's browser within the site origin. |
| Forgejo before 16.0.4 allows use of restricted API tokens for unintended access to the "allow maintainer edit" feature. |
| An unrecovered panic in the event stream header decoder in Amazon AWS SDK for Go v2 before release-2026-03-23 might allow an unauthenticated remote actor to terminate the consuming application process via a crafted event stream response frame containing a header value type outside the valid range.
To remediate this issue, users should upgrade to release-2026-03-23 or later, and patch any forked or derivative code. |
| knowns through 0.33.0 fails to confine the path argument of the code.find MCP tool to the project root, allowing AI agent sessions to read source files anywhere on the host. Attackers can supply absolute paths or relative traversal sequences to the path argument and retrieve full file contents from outside the intended project directory. |
| CyberPanel before 3.0.5 fails to enforce two-factor authentication on API endpoints, allowing attackers to bypass TOTP requirements using password-derived tokens. Attackers who obtain an administrator's password can derive API tokens and perform administrative operations or create authenticated sessions without the second factor. |
| OpenPanel through commit cd24bb8 contains an SQL injection vulnerability in the analytics filter builder that fails to validate profile.* filter column identifiers before interpolating them into ClickHouse WHERE clauses. An authenticated attacker with project-scoped read or root export credentials can inject arbitrary ClickHouse SQL to bypass project isolation and read other organizations' analytics data and profile PII via blind boolean oracle techniques. |
| The ANJIA AJL33PC0801 IP camera uses a hard-coded credential for bootloader authentication. An attacker with physical access to the device may leverage this weakness to gain privileged bootloader access, allowing unauthorized modification of firmware and system configuration and potentially resulting in complete device compromise. |
| Concrete CMS before 9.5.3 evaluated the authorization check for an Express entry submission against the entity of the posted form rather than the entity identified by the dashboard route. As a result, a user permitted to add entries to one Express object could create entries in a different Express object outside their authorization scope, potentially polluting protected datasets, triggering workflows, or injecting content into administrative processes. The dashboard submit route resolved the mutated entity from the attacker-controlled route ID while the permission check validated the independently posted form's entity, and the submission proceeded because the two entities were never compared. The Concrete CMS security team gave this vulnerability a CVSS v4.0 score of 5.1 with vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:H/UI:N/VC:N/VI:L/VA:N/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N. Thanks Yonatan Drori from Tenzai for reporting. |
| CWE-522: Insufficiently Protected Credentials vulnerability that could result in exposure of authentication information and unauthorized access to RTU functionality. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: think-lmi: Free system certificate signatures
Multi-certificate support also allows the system authentication object
to store ->signature and ->save_signature, which leak when the driver is
removed. Free the signatures to avoid leaking memory. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/chrome: sensorhub: Bound the EC-reported sensor number
Each EC FIFO event carries an 8-bit sensor number (in->sensor_num).
cros_ec_sensorhub_ring_handler() validates the FIFO event count, the
per-read count and the ring bound, but not the sensor number, which
cros_ec_sensor_ring_process_event() then uses unchecked to index
sensorhub->batch_state[] - allocated with only sensorhub->sensor_num
entries. A sensor number of sensor_num or larger is an out-of-bounds
read and write of batch_state[].
Validate the sensor number in the ring handler, where each event is read
from the EC, and drop a malformed event before it is used. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86/amd/pmc: Propagate SMU errors and validate S2D address
amd_stb_s2d_init() discards the return value of several S2D SMU commands.
When the SMU refuses a command (e.g. "SMU cmd failed. err: 0xff") the
failure is only noticed indirectly - if at all - and reported as -EIO,
masking the real error.
More seriously, the S2D_PHYS_ADDR_LOW/HIGH return values are ignored, so
on failure phys_addr_low/hi are left uninitialised and the assembled
address is passed straight to devm_ioremap(). When the SMU leaves them at
zero this maps physical address 0 and trips the ioremap-on-RAM warning:
amd_pmc AMDI000B:00: SMU cmd failed. err: 0xff
ioremap on RAM at 0x0000000000000000 - 0x0000000000ffffff
WARNING: CPU: 13 PID: 4592 at arch/x86/mm/ioremap.c:...
Check the return value of each SMU command and propagate it, and reject a
zero physical address before calling devm_ioremap(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86/amd/pmc: Fix LPS0 and debugfs leaks when STB init fails
amd_pmc_probe() registers the LPS0 s2idle handler with
acpi_register_lps0_dev() and creates the driver's debugfs directory before
calling amd_stb_s2d_init(), which is the last step in probe that can fail.
When amd_stb_s2d_init() fails (for example the S2D telemetry region cannot
be ioremapped on a long-running system, or the SMU rejects the S2D setup)
the error path only calls pci_dev_put() and returns. This leaves
amd_pmc_s2idle_dev_ops on the global lps0_s2idle_devops_head list and leaks
the debugfs directory, while the devm-managed resources backing the handler
are torn down.
Reloading the module then walks the corrupted list in
acpi_register_lps0_dev() and hits:
list_add corruption. next->prev should be prev, but was NULL.
kernel BUG at lib/list_debug.c:29!
acpi_register_lps0_dev+0x44/0x80
amd_pmc_probe+0x224/0x380 [amd_pmc]
platform_probe+0x67/0x90
Even without a reload, the stale registration means the next s2idle
transition calls into torn-down driver state.
Unwind the debugfs directory and the LPS0 registration on the
amd_stb_s2d_init() error path. acpi_unregister_lps0_dev() is safe to call
unconditionally here: it is guarded on the same conditions as
acpi_register_lps0_dev(), which is exactly what amd_pmc_remove() already
relies on. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: hp-bioscfg: fix heap OOB read in sk_store() and kek_store()
sk_store() and kek_store() strip a trailing newline from the sysfs
write before allocating the key buffer:
length = count;
if (buf[length - 1] == '\n')
length--;
bioscfg_drv.spm_data.signing_key = kmemdup(buf, length, GFP_KERNEL);
but then pass the original "count" (not "length") as the copy size to
hp_wmi_perform_query(), which memcpy()s that many bytes out of the
"length"-sized allocation, reading one byte past it whenever the write
ends in a newline, the normal case for a shell "echo" into sysfs.
KASAN confirms this directly:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in hp_wmi_perform_query+0x1e9/0x460 [hp_bioscfg]
Read of size 28 at addr ffff88813c8e2b80 by task python3/16022
...
sk_store+0xa7/0x240 [hp_bioscfg]
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x3e1/0x5d0
...
The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
allocated 27-byte region [ffff88813c8e2b80, ffff88813c8e2b9b)
Reproduced identically for kek_store, and at multiple write sizes
(28, 57, 201 bytes), each time reading exactly one byte past a
kmemdup() allocation one byte smaller than the write.
Fix by passing "length" instead of "count" to hp_wmi_perform_query()
in both functions. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: hp-bioscfg: fix heap OOB read on empty password write
validate_password_input() computes length = strlen(buf) and then
checks buf[length - 1] to strip a trailing newline, without checking
that length is nonzero first. Writing an empty string (a bare '\n')
to current_password or new_password gives length == 0, and
buf[length - 1] reads buf[-1], one byte before the heap allocation
holding the copied input.
KASAN confirms this directly:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in store_password_instance.constprop.0+0x223/0x2a0 [hp_bioscfg]
Read of size 1 at addr ffff88811bd8da9f by task sh/13740
...
store_password_instance.constprop.0+0x223/0x2a0 [hp_bioscfg]
current_password_store+0x14/0x20 [hp_bioscfg]
...
The buggy address is located 23 bytes to the right of
allocated 8-byte region [ffff88811bd8da80, ffff88811bd8da88)
Reproduced identically via new_password_store. Execution continues
past the bad read (the garbage byte only affects whether "length" is
decremented by one), so the write completes and returns success; this
is a pure information read past the buffer, not a crash, but it is
still an out-of-bounds access KASAN correctly flags.
Fix by only checking buf[length - 1] when length is nonzero. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: hp-bioscfg: fix off-by-one write in hp_get_string_from_buffer()
hp_get_string_from_buffer() clamps the converted string length against
the destination buffer size with "size > dst_size", so when the
converted length is exactly equal to dst_size, conv_dst_size is left
at dst_size and the unconditional NUL terminator write
dst[conv_dst_size] = 0;
lands one byte past the destination buffer. This is the same shape of
bug as the previously fixed off-by-one in hp_convert_hexstr_to_str():
the buffer is sized correctly for the content, but the terminator
write is never checked against that size.
Fix by changing the comparison to ">=" so conv_dst_size is always left
with room for the terminator.
All fixed-size destinations that reach this function (path[512],
current_value[512], current_password/current_value[64], and the
per-entry buffers in encodings[][512] and prerequisites[][512]) are
affected. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
platform/x86: hp-bioscfg: pass validated element count to package parsers
The per-type package parsers are handed the wrong element count.
hp_init_bios_package_attribute() validates obj->package.count and then
calls one of the five hp_populate_*_package_data() wrappers (string,
integer, enumeration, ordered list, password). Each wrapper forwards a
count to its hp_populate_*_elements_from_package() parser, but instead
of forwarding the validated obj->package.count it derives the count
from elements[0]. elements[0] is the NAME field and is always an
ACPI_TYPE_STRING, so reading ->package.count from it in fact reads
->string.length through the union acpi_object. The parsers thus bound
themselves against the length of the name string rather than against
the real number of elements in the package.
This is safe today because hp_init_bios_package_attribute() refuses any
package that has fewer than the type's element count, so a parser only
ever runs on a full package and never reads past it regardless of the
bogus bound.
An upcoming change relaxes that check to accept shorter packages. Once
a parser can receive fewer elements than its per-type count, a bound
taken from the name length no longer reflects the array size, and the
"elem < count" loop conditions and "elem + n >= count" sub-loop guards
read past the end of elements[] - an out-of-bounds heap read.
Forward the validated obj->package.count to every *_package_data()
wrapper so the parsers bound themselves against the real package size.
This does not change behaviour for the packages that enumerate
correctly today and is a prerequisite for accepting shorter packages
safely. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring/waitid: honor task_work cancellation
io_waitid_cb() may run through the fallback task_work path when
task_work_add() can no longer queue work to the originating task. The
fallback runs from a kworker and io_uring marks such task work as
canceled through tw.cancel.
io_waitid_cb() currently ignores tw.cancel and calls __do_wait().
waitid is task-context dependent: __do_wait() performs child lookup
relative to current, and the retry path also uses
current->signal->wait_chldexit. If the callback runs from the fallback
kworker, current is therefore not the task that submitted the request.
Honor tw.cancel before entering __do_wait(). Complete the request with
-ECANCELED and skip the siginfo copy, since canceled task work may run
without the submitting task's userspace execution context.
Keep the existing siginfo handling for normal waitid completion and
explicit cancellation. |
