| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net, sunrpc: Remap EPERM in case of connection failure in xs_tcp_setup_socket
When using a BPF program on kernel_connect(), the call can return -EPERM. This
causes xs_tcp_setup_socket() to loop forever, filling up the syslog and causing
the kernel to potentially freeze up.
Neil suggested:
This will propagate -EPERM up into other layers which might not be ready
to handle it. It might be safer to map EPERM to an error we would be more
likely to expect from the network system - such as ECONNREFUSED or ENETDOWN.
ECONNREFUSED as error seems reasonable. For programs setting a different error
can be out of reach (see handling in 4fbac77d2d09) in particular on kernels
which do not have f10d05966196 ("bpf: Make BPF_PROG_RUN_ARRAY return -err
instead of allow boolean"), thus given that it is better to simply remap for
consistent behavior. UDP does handle EPERM in xs_udp_send_request(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: mos7840: fix crash on resume
Since commit c49cfa917025 ("USB: serial: use generic method if no
alternative is provided in usb serial layer"), USB serial core calls the
generic resume implementation when the driver has not provided one.
This can trigger a crash on resume with mos7840 since support for
multiple read URBs was added back in 2011. Specifically, both port read
URBs are now submitted on resume for open ports, but the context pointer
of the second URB is left set to the core rather than mos7840 port
structure.
Fix this by implementing dedicated suspend and resume functions for
mos7840.
Tested with Delock 87414 USB 2.0 to 4x serial adapter.
[ johan: analyse crash and rewrite commit message; set busy flag on
resume; drop bulk-in check; drop unnecessary usb_kill_urb() ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
x86/bhi: Avoid warning in #DB handler due to BHI mitigation
When BHI mitigation is enabled, if SYSENTER is invoked with the TF flag set
then entry_SYSENTER_compat() uses CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY and calls the
clear_bhb_loop() before the TF flag is cleared. This causes the #DB handler
(exc_debug_kernel()) to issue a warning because single-step is used outside the
entry_SYSENTER_compat() function.
To address this issue, entry_SYSENTER_compat() should use CLEAR_BRANCH_HISTORY
after making sure the TF flag is cleared.
The problem can be reproduced with the following sequence:
$ cat sysenter_step.c
int main()
{ asm("pushf; pop %ax; bts $8,%ax; push %ax; popf; sysenter"); }
$ gcc -o sysenter_step sysenter_step.c
$ ./sysenter_step
Segmentation fault (core dumped)
The program is expected to crash, and the #DB handler will issue a warning.
Kernel log:
WARNING: CPU: 27 PID: 7000 at arch/x86/kernel/traps.c:1009 exc_debug_kernel+0xd2/0x160
...
RIP: 0010:exc_debug_kernel+0xd2/0x160
...
Call Trace:
<#DB>
? show_regs+0x68/0x80
? __warn+0x8c/0x140
? exc_debug_kernel+0xd2/0x160
? report_bug+0x175/0x1a0
? handle_bug+0x44/0x90
? exc_invalid_op+0x1c/0x70
? asm_exc_invalid_op+0x1f/0x30
? exc_debug_kernel+0xd2/0x160
exc_debug+0x43/0x50
asm_exc_debug+0x1e/0x40
RIP: 0010:clear_bhb_loop+0x0/0xb0
...
</#DB>
<TASK>
? entry_SYSENTER_compat_after_hwframe+0x6e/0x8d
</TASK>
[ bp: Massage commit message. ] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: cs_dsp: Return error if block header overflows file
Return an error from cs_dsp_power_up() if a block header is longer
than the amount of data left in the file.
The previous code in cs_dsp_load() and cs_dsp_load_coeff() would loop
while there was enough data left in the file for a valid region. This
protected against overrunning the end of the file data, but it didn't
abort the file processing with an error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: cs_dsp: Validate payload length before processing block
Move the payload length check in cs_dsp_load() and cs_dsp_coeff_load()
to be done before the block is processed.
The check that the length of a block payload does not exceed the number
of remaining bytes in the firwmware file buffer was being done near the
end of the loop iteration. However, some code before that check used the
length field without validating it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: Using uninitialized value *size when calling amdgpu_vce_cs_reloc
Initialize the size before calling amdgpu_vce_cs_reloc, such as case 0x03000001.
V2: To really improve the handling we would actually
need to have a separate value of 0xffffffff.(Christian) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp_metrics: validate source addr length
I don't see anything checking that TCP_METRICS_ATTR_SADDR_IPV4
is at least 4 bytes long, and the policy doesn't have an entry
for this attribute at all (neither does it for IPv6 but v6 is
manually validated). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet: fix a possible leak when destroy a ctrl during qp establishment
In nvmet_sq_destroy we capture sq->ctrl early and if it is non-NULL we
know that a ctrl was allocated (in the admin connect request handler)
and we need to release pending AERs, clear ctrl->sqs and sq->ctrl
(for nvme-loop primarily), and drop the final reference on the ctrl.
However, a small window is possible where nvmet_sq_destroy starts (as
a result of the client giving up and disconnecting) concurrently with
the nvme admin connect cmd (which may be in an early stage). But *before*
kill_and_confirm of sq->ref (i.e. the admin connect managed to get an sq
live reference). In this case, sq->ctrl was allocated however after it was
captured in a local variable in nvmet_sq_destroy.
This prevented the final reference drop on the ctrl.
Solve this by re-capturing the sq->ctrl after all inflight request has
completed, where for sure sq->ctrl reference is final, and move forward
based on that.
This issue was observed in an environment with many hosts connecting
multiple ctrls simoutanuosly, creating a delay in allocating a ctrl
leading up to this race window. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: qedf: Make qedf_execute_tmf() non-preemptible
Stop calling smp_processor_id() from preemptible code in
qedf_execute_tmf90. This results in BUG_ON() when running an RT kernel.
[ 659.343280] BUG: using smp_processor_id() in preemptible [00000000] code: sg_reset/3646
[ 659.343282] caller is qedf_execute_tmf+0x8b/0x360 [qedf] |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Revert "mm/writeback: fix possible divide-by-zero in wb_dirty_limits(), again"
Patch series "mm: Avoid possible overflows in dirty throttling".
Dirty throttling logic assumes dirty limits in page units fit into
32-bits. This patch series makes sure this is true (see patch 2/2 for
more details).
This patch (of 2):
This reverts commit 9319b647902cbd5cc884ac08a8a6d54ce111fc78.
The commit is broken in several ways. Firstly, the removed (u64) cast
from the multiplication will introduce a multiplication overflow on 32-bit
archs if wb_thresh * bg_thresh >= 1<<32 (which is actually common - the
default settings with 4GB of RAM will trigger this). Secondly, the
div64_u64() is unnecessarily expensive on 32-bit archs. We have
div64_ul() in case we want to be safe & cheap. Thirdly, if dirty
thresholds are larger than 1<<32 pages, then dirty balancing is going to
blow up in many other spectacular ways anyway so trying to fix one
possible overflow is just moot. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ftruncate: pass a signed offset
The old ftruncate() syscall, using the 32-bit off_t misses a sign
extension when called in compat mode on 64-bit architectures. As a
result, passing a negative length accidentally succeeds in truncating
to file size between 2GiB and 4GiB.
Changing the type of the compat syscall to the signed compat_off_t
changes the behavior so it instead returns -EINVAL.
The native entry point, the truncate() syscall and the corresponding
loff_t based variants are all correct already and do not suffer
from this mistake. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: atm: cxacru: fix endpoint checking in cxacru_bind()
Syzbot is still reporting quite an old issue [1] that occurs due to
incomplete checking of present usb endpoints. As such, wrong
endpoints types may be used at urb sumbitting stage which in turn
triggers a warning in usb_submit_urb().
Fix the issue by verifying that required endpoint types are present
for both in and out endpoints, taking into account cmd endpoint type.
Unfortunately, this patch has not been tested on real hardware.
[1] Syzbot report:
usb 1-1: BOGUS urb xfer, pipe 1 != type 3
WARNING: CPU: 0 PID: 8667 at drivers/usb/core/urb.c:502 usb_submit_urb+0xed2/0x18a0 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:502
Modules linked in:
CPU: 0 PID: 8667 Comm: kworker/0:4 Not tainted 5.14.0-rc4-syzkaller #0
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 01/01/2011
Workqueue: usb_hub_wq hub_event
RIP: 0010:usb_submit_urb+0xed2/0x18a0 drivers/usb/core/urb.c:502
...
Call Trace:
cxacru_cm+0x3c0/0x8e0 drivers/usb/atm/cxacru.c:649
cxacru_card_status+0x22/0xd0 drivers/usb/atm/cxacru.c:760
cxacru_bind+0x7ac/0x11a0 drivers/usb/atm/cxacru.c:1209
usbatm_usb_probe+0x321/0x1ae0 drivers/usb/atm/usbatm.c:1055
cxacru_usb_probe+0xdf/0x1e0 drivers/usb/atm/cxacru.c:1363
usb_probe_interface+0x315/0x7f0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:396
call_driver_probe drivers/base/dd.c:517 [inline]
really_probe+0x23c/0xcd0 drivers/base/dd.c:595
__driver_probe_device+0x338/0x4d0 drivers/base/dd.c:747
driver_probe_device+0x4c/0x1a0 drivers/base/dd.c:777
__device_attach_driver+0x20b/0x2f0 drivers/base/dd.c:894
bus_for_each_drv+0x15f/0x1e0 drivers/base/bus.c:427
__device_attach+0x228/0x4a0 drivers/base/dd.c:965
bus_probe_device+0x1e4/0x290 drivers/base/bus.c:487
device_add+0xc2f/0x2180 drivers/base/core.c:3354
usb_set_configuration+0x113a/0x1910 drivers/usb/core/message.c:2170
usb_generic_driver_probe+0xba/0x100 drivers/usb/core/generic.c:238
usb_probe_device+0xd9/0x2c0 drivers/usb/core/driver.c:293 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amdgpu: avoid using null object of framebuffer
Instead of using state->fb->obj[0] directly, get object from framebuffer
by calling drm_gem_fb_get_obj() and return error code when object is
null to avoid using null object of framebuffer. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915/gt: Fix potential UAF by revoke of fence registers
CI has been sporadically reporting the following issue triggered by
igt@i915_selftest@live@hangcheck on ADL-P and similar machines:
<6> [414.049203] i915: Running intel_hangcheck_live_selftests/igt_reset_evict_fence
...
<6> [414.068804] i915 0000:00:02.0: [drm] GT0: GUC: submission enabled
<6> [414.068812] i915 0000:00:02.0: [drm] GT0: GUC: SLPC enabled
<3> [414.070354] Unable to pin Y-tiled fence; err:-4
<3> [414.071282] i915_vma_revoke_fence:301 GEM_BUG_ON(!i915_active_is_idle(&fence->active))
...
<4>[ 609.603992] ------------[ cut here ]------------
<2>[ 609.603995] kernel BUG at drivers/gpu/drm/i915/gt/intel_ggtt_fencing.c:301!
<4>[ 609.604003] invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP NOPTI
<4>[ 609.604006] CPU: 0 PID: 268 Comm: kworker/u64:3 Tainted: G U W 6.9.0-CI_DRM_14785-g1ba62f8cea9c+ #1
<4>[ 609.604008] Hardware name: Intel Corporation Alder Lake Client Platform/AlderLake-P DDR4 RVP, BIOS RPLPFWI1.R00.4035.A00.2301200723 01/20/2023
<4>[ 609.604010] Workqueue: i915 __i915_gem_free_work [i915]
<4>[ 609.604149] RIP: 0010:i915_vma_revoke_fence+0x187/0x1f0 [i915]
...
<4>[ 609.604271] Call Trace:
<4>[ 609.604273] <TASK>
...
<4>[ 609.604716] __i915_vma_evict+0x2e9/0x550 [i915]
<4>[ 609.604852] __i915_vma_unbind+0x7c/0x160 [i915]
<4>[ 609.604977] force_unbind+0x24/0xa0 [i915]
<4>[ 609.605098] i915_vma_destroy+0x2f/0xa0 [i915]
<4>[ 609.605210] __i915_gem_object_pages_fini+0x51/0x2f0 [i915]
<4>[ 609.605330] __i915_gem_free_objects.isra.0+0x6a/0xc0 [i915]
<4>[ 609.605440] process_scheduled_works+0x351/0x690
...
In the past, there were similar failures reported by CI from other IGT
tests, observed on other platforms.
Before commit 63baf4f3d587 ("drm/i915/gt: Only wait for GPU activity
before unbinding a GGTT fence"), i915_vma_revoke_fence() was waiting for
idleness of vma->active via fence_update(). That commit introduced
vma->fence->active in order for the fence_update() to be able to wait
selectively on that one instead of vma->active since only idleness of
fence registers was needed. But then, another commit 0d86ee35097a
("drm/i915/gt: Make fence revocation unequivocal") replaced the call to
fence_update() in i915_vma_revoke_fence() with only fence_write(), and
also added that GEM_BUG_ON(!i915_active_is_idle(&fence->active)) in front.
No justification was provided on why we might then expect idleness of
vma->fence->active without first waiting on it.
The issue can be potentially caused by a race among revocation of fence
registers on one side and sequential execution of signal callbacks invoked
on completion of a request that was using them on the other, still
processed in parallel to revocation of those fence registers. Fix it by
waiting for idleness of vma->fence->active in i915_vma_revoke_fence().
(cherry picked from commit 24bb052d3dd499c5956abad5f7d8e4fd07da7fb1) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tun: add missing verification for short frame
The cited commit missed to check against the validity of the frame length
in the tun_xdp_one() path, which could cause a corrupted skb to be sent
downstack. Even before the skb is transmitted, the
tun_xdp_one-->eth_type_trans() may access the Ethernet header although it
can be less than ETH_HLEN. Once transmitted, this could either cause
out-of-bound access beyond the actual length, or confuse the underlayer
with incorrect or inconsistent header length in the skb metadata.
In the alternative path, tun_get_user() already prohibits short frame which
has the length less than Ethernet header size from being transmitted for
IFF_TAP.
This is to drop any frame shorter than the Ethernet header size just like
how tun_get_user() does.
CVE: CVE-2024-41091 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tap: add missing verification for short frame
The cited commit missed to check against the validity of the frame length
in the tap_get_user_xdp() path, which could cause a corrupted skb to be
sent downstack. Even before the skb is transmitted, the
tap_get_user_xdp()-->skb_set_network_header() may assume the size is more
than ETH_HLEN. Once transmitted, this could either cause out-of-bound
access beyond the actual length, or confuse the underlayer with incorrect
or inconsistent header length in the skb metadata.
In the alternative path, tap_get_user() already prohibits short frame which
has the length less than Ethernet header size from being transmitted.
This is to drop any frame shorter than the Ethernet header size just like
how tap_get_user() does.
CVE: CVE-2024-41090 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
powerpc/eeh: avoid possible crash when edev->pdev changes
If a PCI device is removed during eeh_pe_report_edev(), edev->pdev
will change and can cause a crash, hold the PCI rescan/remove lock
while taking a copy of edev->pdev->bus. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
firmware: cs_dsp: Use strnlen() on name fields in V1 wmfw files
Use strnlen() instead of strlen() on the algorithm and coefficient name
string arrays in V1 wmfw files.
In V1 wmfw files the name is a NUL-terminated string in a fixed-size
array. cs_dsp should protect against overrunning the array if the NUL
terminator is missing. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ppp: reject claimed-as-LCP but actually malformed packets
Since 'ppp_async_encode()' assumes valid LCP packets (with code
from 1 to 7 inclusive), add 'ppp_check_packet()' to ensure that
LCP packet has an actual body beyond PPP_LCP header bytes, and
reject claimed-as-LCP but actually malformed data otherwise. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
netfilter: nf_tables: prefer nft_chain_validate
nft_chain_validate already performs loop detection because a cycle will
result in a call stack overflow (ctx->level >= NFT_JUMP_STACK_SIZE).
It also follows maps via ->validate callback in nft_lookup, so there
appears no reason to iterate the maps again.
nf_tables_check_loops() and all its helper functions can be removed.
This improves ruleset load time significantly, from 23s down to 12s.
This also fixes a crash bug. Old loop detection code can result in
unbounded recursion:
BUG: TASK stack guard page was hit at ....
Oops: stack guard page: 0000 [#1] PREEMPT SMP KASAN
CPU: 4 PID: 1539 Comm: nft Not tainted 6.10.0-rc5+ #1
[..]
with a suitable ruleset during validation of register stores.
I can't see any actual reason to attempt to check for this from
nft_validate_register_store(), at this point the transaction is still in
progress, so we don't have a full picture of the rule graph.
For nf-next it might make sense to either remove it or make this depend
on table->validate_state in case we could catch an error earlier
(for improved error reporting to userspace). |
