| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: validate owner of durable handle on reconnect
Currently, ksmbd does not verify if the user attempting to reconnect
to a durable handle is the same user who originally opened the file.
This allows any authenticated user to hijack an orphaned durable handle
by predicting or brute-forcing the persistent ID.
According to MS-SMB2, the server MUST verify that the SecurityContext
of the reconnect request matches the SecurityContext associated with
the existing open.
Add a durable_owner structure to ksmbd_file to store the original opener's
UID, GID, and account name. and catpure the owner information when a file
handle becomes orphaned. and implementing ksmbd_vfs_compare_durable_owner()
to validate the identity of the requester during SMB2_CREATE (DHnC). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs/ntfs3: validate rec->used in journal-replay file record check
check_file_record() validates rec->total against the record size but
never validates rec->used. The do_action() journal-replay handlers read
rec->used from disk and use it to compute memmove lengths:
DeleteAttribute: memmove(attr, ..., used - asize - roff)
CreateAttribute: memmove(..., attr, used - roff)
change_attr_size: memmove(..., used - PtrOffset(rec, next))
When rec->used is smaller than the offset of a validated attribute, or
larger than the record size, these subtractions can underflow allowing
us to copy huge amounts of memory in to a 4kb buffer, generally
considered a bad idea overall.
This requires a corrupted filesystem, which isn't a threat model the
kernel really needs to worry about, but checking for such an obvious
out-of-bounds value is good to keep things robust, especially on journal
replay
Fix this up by bounding rec->used correctly.
This is much like commit b2bc7c44ed17 ("fs/ntfs3: Fix slab-out-of-bounds
read in DeleteIndexEntryRoot") which checked different values in this
same switch statement. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: server: fix active_num_conn leak on transport allocation failure
Commit 77ffbcac4e56 ("smb: server: fix leak of active_num_conn in
ksmbd_tcp_new_connection()") addressed the kthread_run() failure
path. The earlier alloc_transport() == NULL path in the same
function has the same leak, is reachable pre-authentication via any
TCP connect to port 445, and was empirically reproduced on UML
(ARCH=um, v7.0-rc7): a small number of forced allocation failures
were sufficient to put ksmbd into a state where every subsequent
connection attempt was rejected for the remainder of the boot.
ksmbd_kthread_fn() increments active_num_conn before calling
ksmbd_tcp_new_connection() and discards the return value, so when
alloc_transport() returns NULL the socket is released and -ENOMEM
returned without decrementing the counter. Each such failure
permanently consumes one slot from the max_connections pool; once
cumulative failures reach the cap, atomic_inc_return() hits the
threshold on every subsequent accept and every new connection is
rejected. The counter is only reset by module reload.
An unauthenticated remote attacker can drive the server toward the
memory pressure that makes alloc_transport() fail by holding open
connections with large RFC1002 lengths up to MAX_STREAM_PROT_LEN
(0x00FFFFFF); natural transient allocation failures on a loaded
host produce the same drift more slowly.
Mirror the existing rollback pattern in ksmbd_kthread_fn(): on the
alloc_transport() failure path, decrement active_num_conn gated on
server_conf.max_connections.
Repro details: with the patch reverted, forced alloc_transport()
NULL returns leaked counter slots and subsequent connection
attempts -- including legitimate connects issued after the
forced-fail window had closed -- were all rejected with "Limit the
maximum number of connections". With this patch applied, the same
connect sequence produces no rejections and the counter cycles
cleanly between zero and one on every accept. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix OOB read in smb2_ioctl_query_info QUERY_INFO path
smb2_ioctl_query_info() has two response-copy branches: PASSTHRU_FSCTL
and the default QUERY_INFO path. The QUERY_INFO branch clamps
qi.input_buffer_length to the server-reported OutputBufferLength and then
copies qi.input_buffer_length bytes from qi_rsp->Buffer to userspace, but
it never verifies that the flexible-array payload actually fits within
rsp_iov[1].iov_len.
A malicious server can return OutputBufferLength larger than the actual
QUERY_INFO response, causing copy_to_user() to walk past the response
buffer and expose adjacent kernel heap to userspace.
Guard the QUERY_INFO copy with a bounds check on the actual Buffer
payload. Use struct_size(qi_rsp, Buffer, qi.input_buffer_length)
rather than an open-coded addition so the guard cannot overflow on
32-bit builds. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix use-after-free of sbi in f2fs_compress_write_end_io()
In f2fs_compress_write_end_io(), dec_page_count(sbi, type) can bring
the F2FS_WB_CP_DATA counter to zero, unblocking
f2fs_wait_on_all_pages() in f2fs_put_super() on a concurrent unmount
CPU. The unmount path then proceeds to call
f2fs_destroy_page_array_cache(sbi), which destroys
sbi->page_array_slab via kmem_cache_destroy(), and eventually
kfree(sbi). Meanwhile, the bio completion callback is still executing:
when it reaches page_array_free(sbi, ...), it dereferences
sbi->page_array_slab — a destroyed slab cache — to call
kmem_cache_free(), causing a use-after-free.
This is the same class of bug as CVE-2026-23234 (which fixed the
equivalent race in f2fs_write_end_io() in data.c), but in the
compressed writeback completion path that was not covered by that fix.
Fix this by moving dec_page_count() to after page_array_free(), so
that all sbi accesses complete before the counter decrement that can
unblock unmount. For non-last folios (where atomic_dec_return on
cic->pending_pages is nonzero), dec_page_count is called immediately
before returning — page_array_free is not reached on this path, so
there is no post-decrement sbi access. For the last folio,
page_array_free runs while the F2FS_WB_CP_DATA counter is still
nonzero (this folio has not yet decremented it), keeping sbi alive,
and dec_page_count runs as the final operation. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ccp: Don't attempt to copy CSR to userspace if PSP command failed
When retrieving the PEK CSR, don't attempt to copy the blob to userspace
if the firmware command failed. If the failure was due to an invalid
length, i.e. the userspace buffer+length was too small, copying the number
of bytes _firmware_ requires will overflow the kernel-allocated buffer and
leak data to userspace.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
Read of size 2084 at addr ffff898144612e20 by task syz.9.219/21405
CPU: 14 UID: 0 PID: 21405 Comm: syz.9.219 Tainted: G U O 7.0.0-smp-DEV #28 PREEMPTLAZY
Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 12.62.0-0 11/19/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xc5/0x110 ../lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description ../mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0xbc/0x260 ../mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0xa2/0xe0 ../mm/kasan/report.c:595
check_region_inline ../mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 ../mm/kasan/generic.c:200
instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
_inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
_copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline]
sev_ioctl_do_pek_csr+0x31f/0x590 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:1872
sev_ioctl+0x3a4/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2562
vfs_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0x11d/0x1b0 ../fs/ioctl.c:583
do_syscall_x64 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xe0/0x800 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
</TASK>
WARN if the driver says the command succeeded, but the firmware error code
says otherwise, as __sev_do_cmd_locked() is expected to return -EIO on any
firwmware error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ccp: Don't attempt to copy PDH cert to userspace if PSP command failed
When retrieving the PDH cert, don't attempt to copy the blobs to userspace
if the firmware command failed. If the failure was due to an invalid
length, i.e. the userspace buffer+length was too small, copying the number
of bytes _firmware_ requires will overflow the kernel-allocated buffer and
leak data to userspace.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
Read of size 2084 at addr ffff8885c4ab8aa0 by task syz.0.186/21033
CPU: 51 UID: 0 PID: 21033 Comm: syz.0.186 Tainted: G U O 7.0.0-smp-DEV #28 PREEMPTLAZY
Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 34.84.12-0 11/17/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xc5/0x110 ../lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description ../mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0xbc/0x260 ../mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0xa2/0xe0 ../mm/kasan/report.c:595
check_region_inline ../mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 ../mm/kasan/generic.c:200
instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
_inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
_copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline]
sev_ioctl_do_pdh_export+0x3d3/0x7c0 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2347
sev_ioctl+0x2a2/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2568
vfs_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0x11d/0x1b0 ../fs/ioctl.c:583
do_syscall_x64 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xe0/0x800 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
</TASK>
WARN if the driver says the command succeeded, but the firmware error code
says otherwise, as __sev_do_cmd_locked() is expected to return -EIO on any
firwmware error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ccp: Don't attempt to copy ID to userspace if PSP command failed
When retrieving the ID for the CPU, don't attempt to copy the ID blob to
userspace if the firmware command failed. If the failure was due to an
invalid length, i.e. the userspace buffer+length was too small, copying
the number of bytes _firmware_ requires will overflow the kernel-allocated
buffer and leak data to userspace.
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in _copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
Read of size 64 at addr ffff8881867f5960 by task syz.0.906/24388
CPU: 130 UID: 0 PID: 24388 Comm: syz.0.906 Tainted: G U O 7.0.0-smp-DEV #28 PREEMPTLAZY
Tainted: [U]=USER, [O]=OOT_MODULE
Hardware name: Google, Inc. Arcadia_IT_80/Arcadia_IT_80, BIOS 12.62.0-0 11/19/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0xc5/0x110 ../lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description ../mm/kasan/report.c:378 [inline]
print_report+0xbc/0x260 ../mm/kasan/report.c:482
kasan_report+0xa2/0xe0 ../mm/kasan/report.c:595
check_region_inline ../mm/kasan/generic.c:-1 [inline]
kasan_check_range+0x264/0x2c0 ../mm/kasan/generic.c:200
instrument_copy_to_user ../include/linux/instrumented.h:129 [inline]
_inline_copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:205 [inline]
_copy_to_user+0x66/0xa0 ../lib/usercopy.c:26
copy_to_user ../include/linux/uaccess.h:236 [inline]
sev_ioctl_do_get_id2+0x361/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2222
sev_ioctl+0x25f/0x490 ../drivers/crypto/ccp/sev-dev.c:2575
vfs_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl ../fs/ioctl.c:597 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0x11d/0x1b0 ../fs/ioctl.c:583
do_syscall_x64 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xe0/0x800 ../arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x76/0x7e
</TASK>
WARN if the driver says the command succeeded, but the firmware error code
says otherwise, as __sev_do_cmd_locked() is expected to return -EIO on any
firwmware error. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix missing validation of ticket length in non-XDR key preparsing
In rxrpc_preparse(), there are two paths for parsing key payloads: the
XDR path (for large payloads) and the non-XDR path (for payloads <= 28
bytes). While the XDR path (rxrpc_preparse_xdr_rxkad()) correctly
validates the ticket length against AFSTOKEN_RK_TIX_MAX, the non-XDR
path fails to do so.
This allows an unprivileged user to provide a very large ticket length.
When this key is later read via rxrpc_read(), the total
token size (toksize) calculation results in a value that exceeds
AFSTOKEN_LENGTH_MAX, triggering a WARN_ON().
[ 2001.302904] WARNING: CPU: 2 PID: 2108 at net/rxrpc/key.c:778 rxrpc_read+0x109/0x5c0 [rxrpc]
Fix this by adding a check in the non-XDR parsing path of rxrpc_preparse()
to ensure the ticket length does not exceed AFSTOKEN_RK_TIX_MAX,
bringing it into parity with the XDR parsing logic. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fuse: reject oversized dirents in page cache
fuse_add_dirent_to_cache() computes a serialized dirent size from the
server-controlled namelen field and copies the dirent into a single
page-cache page. The existing logic only checks whether the dirent fits
in the remaining space of the current page and advances to a fresh page
if not. It never checks whether the dirent itself exceeds PAGE_SIZE.
As a result, a malicious FUSE server can return a dirent with
namelen=4095, producing a serialized record size of 4120 bytes. On 4 KiB
page systems this causes memcpy() to overflow the cache page by 24 bytes
into the following kernel page.
Reject dirents that cannot fit in a single page before copying them into
the readdir cache. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/kasan: fix double free for kasan pXds
kasan_free_pxd() assumes the page table is always struct page aligned.
But that's not always the case for all architectures. E.g. In case of
powerpc with 64K pagesize, PUD table (of size 4096) comes from slab cache
named pgtable-2^9. Hence instead of page_to_virt(pxd_page()) let's just
directly pass the start of the pxd table which is passed as the 1st
argument.
This fixes the below double free kasan issue seen with PMEM:
radix-mmu: Mapped 0x0000047d10000000-0x0000047f90000000 with 2.00 MiB pages
==================================================================
BUG: KASAN: double-free in kasan_remove_zero_shadow+0x9c4/0xa20
Free of addr c0000003c38e0000 by task ndctl/2164
CPU: 34 UID: 0 PID: 2164 Comm: ndctl Not tainted 6.19.0-rc1-00048-gea1013c15392 #157 VOLUNTARY
Hardware name: IBM,9080-HEX POWER10 (architected) 0x800200 0xf000006 of:IBM,FW1060.00 (NH1060_012) hv:phyp pSeries
Call Trace:
dump_stack_lvl+0x88/0xc4 (unreliable)
print_report+0x214/0x63c
kasan_report_invalid_free+0xe4/0x110
check_slab_allocation+0x100/0x150
kmem_cache_free+0x128/0x6e0
kasan_remove_zero_shadow+0x9c4/0xa20
memunmap_pages+0x2b8/0x5c0
devm_action_release+0x54/0x70
release_nodes+0xc8/0x1a0
devres_release_all+0xe0/0x140
device_unbind_cleanup+0x30/0x120
device_release_driver_internal+0x3e4/0x450
unbind_store+0xfc/0x110
drv_attr_store+0x78/0xb0
sysfs_kf_write+0x114/0x140
kernfs_fop_write_iter+0x264/0x3f0
vfs_write+0x3bc/0x7d0
ksys_write+0xa4/0x190
system_call_exception+0x190/0x480
system_call_vectored_common+0x15c/0x2ec
---- interrupt: 3000 at 0x7fff93b3d3f4
NIP: 00007fff93b3d3f4 LR: 00007fff93b3d3f4 CTR: 0000000000000000
REGS: c0000003f1b07e80 TRAP: 3000 Not tainted (6.19.0-rc1-00048-gea1013c15392)
MSR: 800000000280f033 <SF,VEC,VSX,EE,PR,FP,ME,IR,DR,RI,LE> CR: 48888208 XER: 00000000
<...>
NIP [00007fff93b3d3f4] 0x7fff93b3d3f4
LR [00007fff93b3d3f4] 0x7fff93b3d3f4
---- interrupt: 3000
The buggy address belongs to the object at c0000003c38e0000
which belongs to the cache pgtable-2^9 of size 4096
The buggy address is located 0 bytes inside of
4096-byte region [c0000003c38e0000, c0000003c38e1000)
The buggy address belongs to the physical page:
page: refcount:0 mapcount:0 mapping:0000000000000000 index:0x0 pfn:0x3c38c
head: order:2 mapcount:0 entire_mapcount:0 nr_pages_mapped:0 pincount:0
memcg:c0000003bfd63e01
flags: 0x63ffff800000040(head|node=6|zone=0|lastcpupid=0x7ffff)
page_type: f5(slab)
raw: 063ffff800000040 c000000140058980 5deadbeef0000122 0000000000000000
raw: 0000000000000000 0000000080200020 00000000f5000000 c0000003bfd63e01
head: 063ffff800000040 c000000140058980 5deadbeef0000122 0000000000000000
head: 0000000000000000 0000000080200020 00000000f5000000 c0000003bfd63e01
head: 063ffff800000002 c00c000000f0e301 00000000ffffffff 00000000ffffffff
head: ffffffffffffffff 0000000000000000 00000000ffffffff 0000000000000004
page dumped because: kasan: bad access detected
[ 138.953636] [ T2164] Memory state around the buggy address:
[ 138.953643] [ T2164] c0000003c38dff00: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 138.953652] [ T2164] c0000003c38dff80: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 138.953661] [ T2164] >c0000003c38e0000: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 138.953669] [ T2164] ^
[ 138.953675] [ T2164] c0000003c38e0080: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 138.953684] [ T2164] c0000003c38e0100: fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc fc
[ 138.953692] [ T2164] ==================================================================
[ 138.953701] [ T2164] Disabling lock debugging due to kernel taint |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: only handle RESPONSE during service challenge
Only process RESPONSE packets while the service connection is still in
RXRPC_CONN_SERVICE_CHALLENGING. Check that state under state_lock before
running response verification and security initialization, then use a local
secured flag to decide whether to queue the secured-connection work after
the state transition. This keeps duplicate or late RESPONSE packets from
re-running the setup path and removes the unlocked post-transition state
test. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
af_unix: read UNIX_DIAG_VFS data under unix_state_lock
Exact UNIX diag lookups hold a reference to the socket, but not to
u->path. Meanwhile, unix_release_sock() clears u->path under
unix_state_lock() and drops the path reference after unlocking.
Read the inode and device numbers for UNIX_DIAG_VFS while holding
unix_state_lock(), then emit the netlink attribute after dropping the
lock.
This keeps the VFS data stable while the reply is being built. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/i915/gt: fix refcount underflow in intel_engine_park_heartbeat
A use-after-free / refcount underflow is possible when the heartbeat
worker and intel_engine_park_heartbeat() race to release the same
engine->heartbeat.systole request.
The heartbeat worker reads engine->heartbeat.systole and calls
i915_request_put() on it when the request is complete, but clears
the pointer in a separate, non-atomic step. Concurrently, a request
retirement on another CPU can drop the engine wakeref to zero, triggering
__engine_park() -> intel_engine_park_heartbeat(). If the heartbeat
timer is pending at that point, cancel_delayed_work() returns true and
intel_engine_park_heartbeat() reads the stale non-NULL systole pointer
and calls i915_request_put() on it again, causing a refcount underflow:
```
<4> [487.221889] Workqueue: i915-unordered engine_retire [i915]
<4> [487.222640] RIP: 0010:refcount_warn_saturate+0x68/0xb0
...
<4> [487.222707] Call Trace:
<4> [487.222711] <TASK>
<4> [487.222716] intel_engine_park_heartbeat.part.0+0x6f/0x80 [i915]
<4> [487.223115] intel_engine_park_heartbeat+0x25/0x40 [i915]
<4> [487.223566] __engine_park+0xb9/0x650 [i915]
<4> [487.223973] ____intel_wakeref_put_last+0x2e/0xb0 [i915]
<4> [487.224408] __intel_wakeref_put_last+0x72/0x90 [i915]
<4> [487.224797] intel_context_exit_engine+0x7c/0x80 [i915]
<4> [487.225238] intel_context_exit+0xf1/0x1b0 [i915]
<4> [487.225695] i915_request_retire.part.0+0x1b9/0x530 [i915]
<4> [487.226178] i915_request_retire+0x1c/0x40 [i915]
<4> [487.226625] engine_retire+0x122/0x180 [i915]
<4> [487.227037] process_one_work+0x239/0x760
<4> [487.227060] worker_thread+0x200/0x3f0
<4> [487.227068] ? __pfx_worker_thread+0x10/0x10
<4> [487.227075] kthread+0x10d/0x150
<4> [487.227083] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
<4> [487.227092] ret_from_fork+0x3d4/0x480
<4> [487.227099] ? __pfx_kthread+0x10/0x10
<4> [487.227107] ret_from_fork_asm+0x1a/0x30
<4> [487.227141] </TASK>
```
Fix this by replacing the non-atomic pointer read + separate clear with
xchg() in both racing paths. xchg() is a single indivisible hardware
instruction that atomically reads the old pointer and writes NULL. This
guarantees only one of the two concurrent callers obtains the non-NULL
pointer and performs the put, the other gets NULL and skips it.
(cherry picked from commit 13238dc0ee4f9ab8dafa2cca7295736191ae2f42) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: proc: size address buffers for %pISpc output
The AF_RXRPC procfs helpers format local and remote socket addresses into
fixed 50-byte stack buffers with "%pISpc".
That is too small for the longest current-tree IPv6-with-port form the
formatter can produce. In lib/vsprintf.c, the compressed IPv6 path uses a
dotted-quad tail not only for v4mapped addresses, but also for ISATAP
addresses via ipv6_addr_is_isatap().
As a result, a case such as
[ffff:ffff:ffff:ffff:0:5efe:255.255.255.255]:65535
is possible with the current formatter. That is 50 visible characters, so
51 bytes including the trailing NUL, which does not fit in the existing
char[50] buffers used by net/rxrpc/proc.c.
Size the buffers from the formatter's maximum textual form and switch the
call sites to scnprintf().
Changes since v1:
- correct the changelog to cite the actual maximum current-tree case
explicitly
- frame the proof around the ISATAP formatting path instead of the earlier
mapped-v4 example |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: llcp: add missing return after LLCP_CLOSED checks
In nfc_llcp_recv_hdlc() and nfc_llcp_recv_disc(), when the socket
state is LLCP_CLOSED, the code correctly calls release_sock() and
nfc_llcp_sock_put() but fails to return. Execution falls through to
the remainder of the function, which calls release_sock() and
nfc_llcp_sock_put() again. This results in a double release_sock()
and a refcount underflow via double nfc_llcp_sock_put(), leading to
a use-after-free.
Add the missing return statements after the LLCP_CLOSED branches
in both functions to prevent the fall-through. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
i2c: s3c24xx: check the size of the SMBUS message before using it
The first byte of an i2c SMBUS message is the size, and it should be
verified to ensure that it is in the range of 0..I2C_SMBUS_BLOCK_MAX
before processing it.
This is the same logic that was added in commit a6e04f05ce0b ("i2c:
tegra: check msg length in SMBUS block read") to the i2c tegra driver. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
staging: rtl8723bs: initialize le_tmp64 in rtw_BIP_verify()
Initialize le_tmp64 to zero in rtw_BIP_verify() to prevent using
uninitialized data.
Smatch warns that only 6 bytes are copied to this 8-byte (u64)
variable, leaving the last two bytes uninitialized:
drivers/staging/rtl8723bs/core/rtw_security.c:1308 rtw_BIP_verify()
warn: not copying enough bytes for '&le_tmp64' (8 vs 6 bytes)
Initializing the variable at the start of the function fixes this
warning and ensures predictable behavior. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
NFC: digital: Bounds check NFC-A cascade depth in SDD response handler
The NFC-A anti-collision cascade in digital_in_recv_sdd_res() appends 3
or 4 bytes to target->nfcid1 on each round, but the number of cascade
rounds is controlled entirely by the peer device. The peer sets the
cascade tag in the SDD_RES (deciding 3 vs 4 bytes) and the
cascade-incomplete bit in the SEL_RES (deciding whether another round
follows).
ISO 14443-3 limits NFC-A to three cascade levels and target->nfcid1 is
sized accordingly (NFC_NFCID1_MAXSIZE = 10), but nothing in the driver
actually enforces this. This means a malicious peer can keep the
cascade running, writing past the heap-allocated nfc_target with each
round.
Fix this by rejecting the response when the accumulated UID would exceed
the buffer.
Commit e329e71013c9 ("NFC: nci: Bounds check struct nfc_target arrays")
fixed similar missing checks against the same field on the NCI path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
smb: client: fix OOB reads parsing symlink error response
When a CREATE returns STATUS_STOPPED_ON_SYMLINK, smb2_check_message()
returns success without any length validation, leaving the symlink
parsers as the only defense against an untrusted server.
symlink_data() walks SMB 3.1.1 error contexts with the loop test "p <
end", but reads p->ErrorId at offset 4 and p->ErrorDataLength at offset
0. When the server-controlled ErrorDataLength advances p to within 1-7
bytes of end, the next iteration will read past it. When the matching
context is found, sym->SymLinkErrorTag is read at offset 4 from
p->ErrorContextData with no check that the symlink header itself fits.
smb2_parse_symlink_response() then bounds-checks the substitute name
using SMB2_SYMLINK_STRUCT_SIZE as the offset of PathBuffer from
iov_base. That value is computed as sizeof(smb2_err_rsp) +
sizeof(smb2_symlink_err_rsp), which is correct only when
ErrorContextCount == 0.
With at least one error context the symlink data sits 8 bytes deeper,
and each skipped non-matching context shifts it further by 8 +
ALIGN(ErrorDataLength, 8). The check is too short, allowing the
substitute name read to run past iov_len. The out-of-bound heap bytes
are UTF-16-decoded into the symlink target and returned to userspace via
readlink(2).
Fix this all up by making the loops test require the full context header
to fit, rejecting sym if its header runs past end, and bound the
substitute name against the actual position of sym->PathBuffer rather
than a fixed offset.
Because sub_offs and sub_len are 16bits, the pointer math will not
overflow here with the new greater-than. |
