| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: enetc: fix the deadlock of enetc_mdio_lock
After applying the workaround for err050089, the LS1028A platform
experiences RCU stalls on RT kernel. This issue is caused by the
recursive acquisition of the read lock enetc_mdio_lock. Here list some
of the call stacks identified under the enetc_poll path that may lead to
a deadlock:
enetc_poll
-> enetc_lock_mdio
-> enetc_clean_rx_ring OR napi_complete_done
-> napi_gro_receive
-> enetc_start_xmit
-> enetc_lock_mdio
-> enetc_map_tx_buffs
-> enetc_unlock_mdio
-> enetc_unlock_mdio
After enetc_poll acquires the read lock, a higher-priority writer attempts
to acquire the lock, causing preemption. The writer detects that a
read lock is already held and is scheduled out. However, readers under
enetc_poll cannot acquire the read lock again because a writer is already
waiting, leading to a thread hang.
Currently, the deadlock is avoided by adjusting enetc_lock_mdio to prevent
recursive lock acquisition. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: compress: fix UAF of f2fs_inode_info in f2fs_free_dic
The decompress_io_ctx may be released asynchronously after
I/O completion. If this file is deleted immediately after read,
and the kworker of processing post_read_wq has not been executed yet
due to high workloads, It is possible that the inode(f2fs_inode_info)
is evicted and freed before it is used f2fs_free_dic.
The UAF case as below:
Thread A Thread B
- f2fs_decompress_end_io
- f2fs_put_dic
- queue_work
add free_dic work to post_read_wq
- do_unlink
- iput
- evict
- call_rcu
This file is deleted after read.
Thread C kworker to process post_read_wq
- rcu_do_batch
- f2fs_free_inode
- kmem_cache_free
inode is freed by rcu
- process_scheduled_works
- f2fs_late_free_dic
- f2fs_free_dic
- f2fs_release_decomp_mem
read (dic->inode)->i_compress_algorithm
This patch store compress_algorithm and sbi in dic to avoid inode UAF.
In addition, the previous solution is deprecated in [1] may cause system hang.
[1] https://lore.kernel.org/all/c36ab955-c8db-4a8b-a9d0-f07b5f426c3f@kernel.org |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
padata: Fix pd UAF once and for all
There is a race condition/UAF in padata_reorder that goes back
to the initial commit. A reference count is taken at the start
of the process in padata_do_parallel, and released at the end in
padata_serial_worker.
This reference count is (and only is) required for padata_replace
to function correctly. If padata_replace is never called then
there is no issue.
In the function padata_reorder which serves as the core of padata,
as soon as padata is added to queue->serial.list, and the associated
spin lock released, that padata may be processed and the reference
count on pd would go away.
Fix this by getting the next padata before the squeue->serial lock
is released.
In order to make this possible, simplify padata_reorder by only
calling it once the next padata arrives. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Bluetooth: hci_core: Fix use-after-free in vhci_flush()
syzbot reported use-after-free in vhci_flush() without repro. [0]
From the splat, a thread close()d a vhci file descriptor while
its device was being used by iotcl() on another thread.
Once the last fd refcnt is released, vhci_release() calls
hci_unregister_dev(), hci_free_dev(), and kfree() for struct
vhci_data, which is set to hci_dev->dev->driver_data.
The problem is that there is no synchronisation after unlinking
hdev from hci_dev_list in hci_unregister_dev(). There might be
another thread still accessing the hdev which was fetched before
the unlink operation.
We can use SRCU for such synchronisation.
Let's run hci_dev_reset() under SRCU and wait for its completion
in hci_unregister_dev().
Another option would be to restore hci_dev->destruct(), which was
removed in commit 587ae086f6e4 ("Bluetooth: Remove unused
hci-destruct cb"). However, this would not be a good solution, as
we should not run hci_unregister_dev() while there are in-flight
ioctl() requests, which could lead to another data-race KCSAN splat.
Note that other drivers seem to have the same problem, for exmaple,
virtbt_remove().
[0]:
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in skb_queue_empty_lockless include/linux/skbuff.h:1891 [inline]
BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in skb_queue_purge_reason+0x99/0x360 net/core/skbuff.c:3937
Read of size 8 at addr ffff88807cb8d858 by task syz.1.219/6718
CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 6718 Comm: syz.1.219 Not tainted 6.16.0-rc1-syzkaller-00196-g08207f42d3ff #0 PREEMPT(full)
Hardware name: Google Google Compute Engine/Google Compute Engine, BIOS Google 05/07/2025
Call Trace:
<TASK>
dump_stack_lvl+0x189/0x250 lib/dump_stack.c:120
print_address_description mm/kasan/report.c:408 [inline]
print_report+0xd2/0x2b0 mm/kasan/report.c:521
kasan_report+0x118/0x150 mm/kasan/report.c:634
skb_queue_empty_lockless include/linux/skbuff.h:1891 [inline]
skb_queue_purge_reason+0x99/0x360 net/core/skbuff.c:3937
skb_queue_purge include/linux/skbuff.h:3368 [inline]
vhci_flush+0x44/0x50 drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:69
hci_dev_do_reset net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:552 [inline]
hci_dev_reset+0x420/0x5c0 net/bluetooth/hci_core.c:592
sock_do_ioctl+0xd9/0x300 net/socket.c:1190
sock_ioctl+0x576/0x790 net/socket.c:1311
vfs_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:51 [inline]
__do_sys_ioctl fs/ioctl.c:907 [inline]
__se_sys_ioctl+0xf9/0x170 fs/ioctl.c:893
do_syscall_x64 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:63 [inline]
do_syscall_64+0xfa/0x3b0 arch/x86/entry/syscall_64.c:94
entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe+0x77/0x7f
RIP: 0033:0x7fcf5b98e929
Code: ff ff c3 66 2e 0f 1f 84 00 00 00 00 00 0f 1f 40 00 48 89 f8 48 89 f7 48 89 d6 48 89 ca 4d 89 c2 4d 89 c8 4c 8b 4c 24 08 0f 05 <48> 3d 01 f0 ff ff 73 01 c3 48 c7 c1 a8 ff ff ff f7 d8 64 89 01 48
RSP: 002b:00007fcf5c7b9038 EFLAGS: 00000246 ORIG_RAX: 0000000000000010
RAX: ffffffffffffffda RBX: 00007fcf5bbb6160 RCX: 00007fcf5b98e929
RDX: 0000000000000000 RSI: 00000000400448cb RDI: 0000000000000009
RBP: 00007fcf5ba10b39 R08: 0000000000000000 R09: 0000000000000000
R10: 0000000000000000 R11: 0000000000000246 R12: 0000000000000000
R13: 0000000000000000 R14: 00007fcf5bbb6160 R15: 00007ffd6353d528
</TASK>
Allocated by task 6535:
kasan_save_stack mm/kasan/common.c:47 [inline]
kasan_save_track+0x3e/0x80 mm/kasan/common.c:68
poison_kmalloc_redzone mm/kasan/common.c:377 [inline]
__kasan_kmalloc+0x93/0xb0 mm/kasan/common.c:394
kasan_kmalloc include/linux/kasan.h:260 [inline]
__kmalloc_cache_noprof+0x230/0x3d0 mm/slub.c:4359
kmalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:905 [inline]
kzalloc_noprof include/linux/slab.h:1039 [inline]
vhci_open+0x57/0x360 drivers/bluetooth/hci_vhci.c:635
misc_open+0x2bc/0x330 drivers/char/misc.c:161
chrdev_open+0x4c9/0x5e0 fs/char_dev.c:414
do_dentry_open+0xdf0/0x1970 fs/open.c:964
vfs_open+0x3b/0x340 fs/open.c:1094
do_open fs/namei.c:3887 [inline]
path_openat+0x2ee5/0x3830 fs/name
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: dsa: sja1105: fix kasan out-of-bounds warning in sja1105_table_delete_entry()
There are actually 2 problems:
- deleting the last element doesn't require the memmove of elements
[i + 1, end) over it. Actually, element i+1 is out of bounds.
- The memmove itself should move size - i - 1 elements, because the last
element is out of bounds.
The out-of-bounds element still remains out of bounds after being
accessed, so the problem is only that we touch it, not that it becomes
in active use. But I suppose it can lead to issues if the out-of-bounds
element is part of an unmapped page. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: fgraph: Fix stack layout to match __arch_ftrace_regs argument of ftrace_return_to_handler
Naresh Kamboju reported a "Bad frame pointer" kernel warning while
running LTP trace ftrace_stress_test.sh in riscv. We can reproduce the
same issue with the following command:
```
$ cd /sys/kernel/debug/tracing
$ echo 'f:myprobe do_nanosleep%return args1=$retval' > dynamic_events
$ echo 1 > events/fprobes/enable
$ echo 1 > tracing_on
$ sleep 1
```
And we can get the following kernel warning:
[ 127.692888] ------------[ cut here ]------------
[ 127.693755] Bad frame pointer: expected ff2000000065be50, received ba34c141e9594000
[ 127.693755] from func do_nanosleep return to ffffffff800ccb16
[ 127.698699] WARNING: CPU: 1 PID: 129 at kernel/trace/fgraph.c:755 ftrace_return_to_handler+0x1b2/0x1be
[ 127.699894] Modules linked in:
[ 127.700908] CPU: 1 UID: 0 PID: 129 Comm: sleep Not tainted 6.14.0-rc3-g0ab191c74642 #32
[ 127.701453] Hardware name: riscv-virtio,qemu (DT)
[ 127.701859] epc : ftrace_return_to_handler+0x1b2/0x1be
[ 127.702032] ra : ftrace_return_to_handler+0x1b2/0x1be
[ 127.702151] epc : ffffffff8013b5e0 ra : ffffffff8013b5e0 sp : ff2000000065bd10
[ 127.702221] gp : ffffffff819c12f8 tp : ff60000080853100 t0 : 6e00000000000000
[ 127.702284] t1 : 0000000000000020 t2 : 6e7566206d6f7266 s0 : ff2000000065bd80
[ 127.702346] s1 : ff60000081262000 a0 : 000000000000007b a1 : ffffffff81894f20
[ 127.702408] a2 : 0000000000000010 a3 : fffffffffffffffe a4 : 0000000000000000
[ 127.702470] a5 : 0000000000000000 a6 : 0000000000000008 a7 : 0000000000000038
[ 127.702530] s2 : ba34c141e9594000 s3 : 0000000000000000 s4 : ff2000000065bdd0
[ 127.702591] s5 : 00007fff8adcf400 s6 : 000055556dc1d8c0 s7 : 0000000000000068
[ 127.702651] s8 : 00007fff8adf5d10 s9 : 000000000000006d s10: 0000000000000001
[ 127.702710] s11: 00005555737377c8 t3 : ffffffff819d899e t4 : ffffffff819d899e
[ 127.702769] t5 : ffffffff819d89a0 t6 : ff2000000065bb18
[ 127.702826] status: 0000000200000120 badaddr: 0000000000000000 cause: 0000000000000003
[ 127.703292] [<ffffffff8013b5e0>] ftrace_return_to_handler+0x1b2/0x1be
[ 127.703760] [<ffffffff80017bce>] return_to_handler+0x16/0x26
[ 127.704009] [<ffffffff80017bb8>] return_to_handler+0x0/0x26
[ 127.704057] [<ffffffff800d3352>] common_nsleep+0x42/0x54
[ 127.704117] [<ffffffff800d44a2>] __riscv_sys_clock_nanosleep+0xba/0x10a
[ 127.704176] [<ffffffff80901c56>] do_trap_ecall_u+0x188/0x218
[ 127.704295] [<ffffffff8090cc3e>] handle_exception+0x14a/0x156
[ 127.705436] ---[ end trace 0000000000000000 ]---
The reason is that the stack layout for constructing argument for the
ftrace_return_to_handler in the return_to_handler does not match the
__arch_ftrace_regs structure of riscv, leading to unexpected results. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
io_uring: prevent opcode speculation
sqe->opcode is used for different tables, make sure we santitise it
against speculations. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: ufs: core: Fix use-after free in init error and remove paths
devm_blk_crypto_profile_init() registers a cleanup handler to run when
the associated (platform-) device is being released. For UFS, the
crypto private data and pointers are stored as part of the ufs_hba's
data structure 'struct ufs_hba::crypto_profile'. This structure is
allocated as part of the underlying ufshcd and therefore Scsi_host
allocation.
During driver release or during error handling in ufshcd_pltfrm_init(),
this structure is released as part of ufshcd_dealloc_host() before the
(platform-) device associated with the crypto call above is released.
Once this device is released, the crypto cleanup code will run, using
the just-released 'struct ufs_hba::crypto_profile'. This causes a
use-after-free situation:
Call trace:
kfree+0x60/0x2d8 (P)
kvfree+0x44/0x60
blk_crypto_profile_destroy_callback+0x28/0x70
devm_action_release+0x1c/0x30
release_nodes+0x6c/0x108
devres_release_all+0x98/0x100
device_unbind_cleanup+0x20/0x70
really_probe+0x218/0x2d0
In other words, the initialisation code flow is:
platform-device probe
ufshcd_pltfrm_init()
ufshcd_alloc_host()
scsi_host_alloc()
allocation of struct ufs_hba
creation of scsi-host devices
devm_blk_crypto_profile_init()
devm registration of cleanup handler using platform-device
and during error handling of ufshcd_pltfrm_init() or during driver
removal:
ufshcd_dealloc_host()
scsi_host_put()
put_device(scsi-host)
release of struct ufs_hba
put_device(platform-device)
crypto cleanup handler
To fix this use-after free, change ufshcd_alloc_host() to register a
devres action to automatically cleanup the underlying SCSI device on
ufshcd destruction, without requiring explicit calls to
ufshcd_dealloc_host(). This way:
* the crypto profile and all other ufs_hba-owned resources are
destroyed before SCSI (as they've been registered after)
* a memleak is plugged in tc-dwc-g210-pci.c remove() as a
side-effect
* EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(ufshcd_dealloc_host) can be removed fully as
it's not needed anymore
* no future drivers using ufshcd_alloc_host() could ever forget
adding the cleanup |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
riscv: mm: Fix the out of bound issue of vmemmap address
In sparse vmemmap model, the virtual address of vmemmap is calculated as:
((struct page *)VMEMMAP_START - (phys_ram_base >> PAGE_SHIFT)).
And the struct page's va can be calculated with an offset:
(vmemmap + (pfn)).
However, when initializing struct pages, kernel actually starts from the
first page from the same section that phys_ram_base belongs to. If the
first page's physical address is not (phys_ram_base >> PAGE_SHIFT), then
we get an va below VMEMMAP_START when calculating va for it's struct page.
For example, if phys_ram_base starts from 0x82000000 with pfn 0x82000, the
first page in the same section is actually pfn 0x80000. During
init_unavailable_range(), we will initialize struct page for pfn 0x80000
with virtual address ((struct page *)VMEMMAP_START - 0x2000), which is
below VMEMMAP_START as well as PCI_IO_END.
This commit fixes this bug by introducing a new variable
'vmemmap_start_pfn' which is aligned with memory section size and using
it to calculate vmemmap address instead of phys_ram_base. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: usb: lan78xx: Fix double free issue with interrupt buffer allocation
In lan78xx_probe(), the buffer `buf` was being freed twice: once
implicitly through `usb_free_urb(dev->urb_intr)` with the
`URB_FREE_BUFFER` flag and again explicitly by `kfree(buf)`. This caused
a double free issue.
To resolve this, reordered `kmalloc()` and `usb_alloc_urb()` calls to
simplify the initialization sequence and removed the redundant
`kfree(buf)`. Now, `buf` is allocated after `usb_alloc_urb()`, ensuring
it is correctly managed by `usb_fill_int_urb()` and freed by
`usb_free_urb()` as intended. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
arm64: mm: fix VA-range sanity check
Both create_mapping_noalloc() and update_mapping_prot() sanity-check
their 'virt' parameter, but the check itself doesn't make much sense.
The condition used today appears to be a historical accident.
The sanity-check condition:
if ((virt >= PAGE_END) && (virt < VMALLOC_START)) {
[ ... warning here ... ]
return;
}
... can only be true for the KASAN shadow region or the module region,
and there's no reason to exclude these specifically for creating and
updateing mappings.
When arm64 support was first upstreamed in commit:
c1cc1552616d0f35 ("arm64: MMU initialisation")
... the condition was:
if (virt < VMALLOC_START) {
[ ... warning here ... ]
return;
}
At the time, VMALLOC_START was the lowest kernel address, and this was
checking whether 'virt' would be translated via TTBR1.
Subsequently in commit:
14c127c957c1c607 ("arm64: mm: Flip kernel VA space")
... the condition was changed to:
if ((virt >= VA_START) && (virt < VMALLOC_START)) {
[ ... warning here ... ]
return;
}
This appear to have been a thinko. The commit moved the linear map to
the bottom of the kernel address space, with VMALLOC_START being at the
halfway point. The old condition would warn for changes to the linear
map below this, and at the time VA_START was the end of the linear map.
Subsequently we cleaned up the naming of VA_START in commit:
77ad4ce69321abbe ("arm64: memory: rename VA_START to PAGE_END")
... keeping the erroneous condition as:
if ((virt >= PAGE_END) && (virt < VMALLOC_START)) {
[ ... warning here ... ]
return;
}
Correct the condition to check against the start of the TTBR1 address
space, which is currently PAGE_OFFSET. This simplifies the logic, and
more clearly matches the "outside kernel range" message in the warning. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
fs: dlm: fix use after free in midcomms commit
While working on processing dlm message in softirq context I experienced
the following KASAN use-after-free warning:
[ 151.760477] ==================================================================
[ 151.761803] BUG: KASAN: use-after-free in dlm_midcomms_commit_mhandle+0x19d/0x4b0
[ 151.763414] Read of size 4 at addr ffff88811a980c60 by task lock_torture/1347
[ 151.765284] CPU: 7 PID: 1347 Comm: lock_torture Not tainted 6.1.0-rc4+ #2828
[ 151.766778] Hardware name: Red Hat KVM/RHEL-AV, BIOS 1.16.0-3.module+el8.7.0+16134+e5908aa2 04/01/2014
[ 151.768726] Call Trace:
[ 151.769277] <TASK>
[ 151.769748] dump_stack_lvl+0x5b/0x86
[ 151.770556] print_report+0x180/0x4c8
[ 151.771378] ? kasan_complete_mode_report_info+0x7c/0x1e0
[ 151.772241] ? dlm_midcomms_commit_mhandle+0x19d/0x4b0
[ 151.773069] kasan_report+0x93/0x1a0
[ 151.773668] ? dlm_midcomms_commit_mhandle+0x19d/0x4b0
[ 151.774514] __asan_load4+0x7e/0xa0
[ 151.775089] dlm_midcomms_commit_mhandle+0x19d/0x4b0
[ 151.775890] ? create_message.isra.29.constprop.64+0x57/0xc0
[ 151.776770] send_common+0x19f/0x1b0
[ 151.777342] ? remove_from_waiters+0x60/0x60
[ 151.778017] ? lock_downgrade+0x410/0x410
[ 151.778648] ? __this_cpu_preempt_check+0x13/0x20
[ 151.779421] ? rcu_lockdep_current_cpu_online+0x88/0xc0
[ 151.780292] _convert_lock+0x46/0x150
[ 151.780893] convert_lock+0x7b/0xc0
[ 151.781459] dlm_lock+0x3ac/0x580
[ 151.781993] ? 0xffffffffc0540000
[ 151.782522] ? torture_stop+0x120/0x120 [dlm_locktorture]
[ 151.783379] ? dlm_scan_rsbs+0xa70/0xa70
[ 151.784003] ? preempt_count_sub+0xd6/0x130
[ 151.784661] ? is_module_address+0x47/0x70
[ 151.785309] ? torture_stop+0x120/0x120 [dlm_locktorture]
[ 151.786166] ? 0xffffffffc0540000
[ 151.786693] ? lockdep_init_map_type+0xc3/0x360
[ 151.787414] ? 0xffffffffc0540000
[ 151.787947] torture_dlm_lock_sync.isra.3+0xe9/0x150 [dlm_locktorture]
[ 151.789004] ? torture_stop+0x120/0x120 [dlm_locktorture]
[ 151.789858] ? 0xffffffffc0540000
[ 151.790392] ? lock_torture_cleanup+0x20/0x20 [dlm_locktorture]
[ 151.791347] ? delay_tsc+0x94/0xc0
[ 151.791898] torture_ex_iter+0xc3/0xea [dlm_locktorture]
[ 151.792735] ? torture_start+0x30/0x30 [dlm_locktorture]
[ 151.793606] lock_torture+0x177/0x270 [dlm_locktorture]
[ 151.794448] ? torture_dlm_lock_sync.isra.3+0x150/0x150 [dlm_locktorture]
[ 151.795539] ? lock_torture_stats+0x80/0x80 [dlm_locktorture]
[ 151.796476] ? do_raw_spin_lock+0x11e/0x1e0
[ 151.797152] ? mark_held_locks+0x34/0xb0
[ 151.797784] ? _raw_spin_unlock_irqrestore+0x30/0x70
[ 151.798581] ? __kthread_parkme+0x79/0x110
[ 151.799246] ? trace_preempt_on+0x2a/0xf0
[ 151.799902] ? __kthread_parkme+0x79/0x110
[ 151.800579] ? preempt_count_sub+0xd6/0x130
[ 151.801271] ? __kasan_check_read+0x11/0x20
[ 151.801963] ? __kthread_parkme+0xec/0x110
[ 151.802630] ? lock_torture_stats+0x80/0x80 [dlm_locktorture]
[ 151.803569] kthread+0x192/0x1d0
[ 151.804104] ? kthread_complete_and_exit+0x30/0x30
[ 151.804881] ret_from_fork+0x1f/0x30
[ 151.805480] </TASK>
[ 151.806111] Allocated by task 1347:
[ 151.806681] kasan_save_stack+0x26/0x50
[ 151.807308] kasan_set_track+0x25/0x30
[ 151.807920] kasan_save_alloc_info+0x1e/0x30
[ 151.808609] __kasan_slab_alloc+0x63/0x80
[ 151.809263] kmem_cache_alloc+0x1ad/0x830
[ 151.809916] dlm_allocate_mhandle+0x17/0x20
[ 151.810590] dlm_midcomms_get_mhandle+0x96/0x260
[ 151.811344] _create_message+0x95/0x180
[ 151.811994] create_message.isra.29.constprop.64+0x57/0xc0
[ 151.812880] send_common+0x129/0x1b0
[ 151.813467] _convert_lock+0x46/0x150
[ 151.814074] convert_lock+0x7b/0xc0
[ 151.814648] dlm_lock+0x3ac/0x580
[ 151.815199] torture_dlm_lock_sync.isra.3+0xe9/0x150 [dlm_locktorture]
[ 151.816258] torture_ex_iter+0xc3/0xea [dlm_locktorture]
[ 151.817129] lock_t
---truncated--- |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drivers: base: Free devm resources when unregistering a device
In the current code, devres_release_all() only gets called if the device
has a bus and has been probed.
This leads to issues when using bus-less or driver-less devices where
the device might never get freed if a managed resource holds a reference
to the device. This is happening in the DRM framework for example.
We should thus call devres_release_all() in the device_del() function to
make sure that the device-managed actions are properly executed when the
device is unregistered, even if it has neither a bus nor a driver.
This is effectively the same change than commit 2f8d16a996da ("devres:
release resources on device_del()") that got reverted by commit
a525a3ddeaca ("driver core: free devres in device_release") over
memory leaks concerns.
This patch effectively combines the two commits mentioned above to
release the resources both on device_del() and device_release() and get
the best of both worlds. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
vdpa: Add max vqp attr to vdpa_nl_policy for nlattr length check
The vdpa_nl_policy structure is used to validate the nlattr when parsing
the incoming nlmsg. It will ensure the attribute being described produces
a valid nlattr pointer in info->attrs before entering into each handler
in vdpa_nl_ops.
That is to say, the missing part in vdpa_nl_policy may lead to illegal
nlattr after parsing, which could lead to OOB read just like CVE-2023-3773.
This patch adds the missing nla_policy for vdpa max vqp attr to avoid
such bugs. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
f2fs: fix to wait on block writeback for post_read case
If inode is compressed, but not encrypted, it missed to call
f2fs_wait_on_block_writeback() to wait for GCed page writeback
in IPU write path.
Thread A GC-Thread
- f2fs_gc
- do_garbage_collect
- gc_data_segment
- move_data_block
- f2fs_submit_page_write
migrate normal cluster's block via
meta_inode's page cache
- f2fs_write_single_data_page
- f2fs_do_write_data_page
- f2fs_inplace_write_data
- f2fs_submit_page_bio
IRQ
- f2fs_read_end_io
IRQ
old data overrides new data due to
out-of-order GC and common IO.
- f2fs_read_end_io |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-mq: use quiesced elevator switch when reinitializing queues
The hctx's run_work may be racing with the elevator switch when
reinitializing hardware queues. The queue is merely frozen in this
context, but that only prevents requests from allocating and doesn't
stop the hctx work from running. The work may get an elevator pointer
that's being torn down, and can result in use-after-free errors and
kernel panics (example below). Use the quiesced elevator switch instead,
and make the previous one static since it is now only used locally.
nvme nvme0: resetting controller
nvme nvme0: 32/0/0 default/read/poll queues
BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008
#PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode
#PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page
PGD 80000020c8861067 P4D 80000020c8861067 PUD 250f8c8067 PMD 0
Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP PTI
Workqueue: kblockd blk_mq_run_work_fn
RIP: 0010:kyber_has_work+0x29/0x70
...
Call Trace:
__blk_mq_do_dispatch_sched+0x83/0x2b0
__blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x12e/0x170
blk_mq_sched_dispatch_requests+0x30/0x60
__blk_mq_run_hw_queue+0x2b/0x50
process_one_work+0x1ef/0x380
worker_thread+0x2d/0x3e0 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Do mark_chain_precision for ARG_CONST_ALLOC_SIZE_OR_ZERO
Precision markers need to be propagated whenever we have an ARG_CONST_*
style argument, as the verifier cannot consider imprecise scalars to be
equivalent for the purposes of states_equal check when such arguments
refine the return value (in this case, set mem_size for PTR_TO_MEM). The
resultant mem_size for the R0 is derived from the constant value, and if
the verifier incorrectly prunes states considering them equivalent where
such arguments exist (by seeing that both registers have reg->precise as
false in regsafe), we can end up with invalid programs passing the
verifier which can do access beyond what should have been the correct
mem_size in that explored state.
To show a concrete example of the problem:
0000000000000000 <prog>:
0: r2 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 80)
1: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 76)
2: r3 = r1
3: r3 += 4
4: if r3 > r2 goto +18 <LBB5_5>
5: w2 = 0
6: *(u32 *)(r1 + 0) = r2
7: r1 = *(u32 *)(r1 + 0)
8: r2 = 1
9: if w1 == 0 goto +1 <LBB5_3>
10: r2 = -1
0000000000000058 <LBB5_3>:
11: r1 = 0 ll
13: r3 = 0
14: call bpf_ringbuf_reserve
15: if r0 == 0 goto +7 <LBB5_5>
16: r1 = r0
17: r1 += 16777215
18: w2 = 0
19: *(u8 *)(r1 + 0) = r2
20: r1 = r0
21: r2 = 0
22: call bpf_ringbuf_submit
00000000000000b8 <LBB5_5>:
23: w0 = 0
24: exit
For the first case, the single line execution's exploration will prune
the search at insn 14 for the branch insn 9's second leg as it will be
verified first using r2 = -1 (UINT_MAX), while as w1 at insn 9 will
always be 0 so at runtime we don't get error for being greater than
UINT_MAX/4 from bpf_ringbuf_reserve. The verifier during regsafe just
sees reg->precise as false for both r2 registers in both states, hence
considers them equal for purposes of states_equal.
If we propagated precise markers using the backtracking support, we
would use the precise marking to then ensure that old r2 (UINT_MAX) was
within the new r2 (1) and this would never be true, so the verification
would rightfully fail.
The end result is that the out of bounds access at instruction 19 would
be permitted without this fix.
Note that reg->precise is always set to true when user does not have
CAP_BPF (or when subprog count is greater than 1 (i.e. use of any static
or global functions)), hence this is only a problem when precision marks
need to be explicitly propagated (i.e. privileged users with CAP_BPF).
A simplified test case has been included in the next patch to prevent
future regressions. |
| A vulnerability was detected in TRENDnet TEW-432BRP 3.10B20. The affected element is the function formSetFirewallRule of the file /goform/formSetFirewallRule. The manipulation of the argument firewall_name results in stack-based buffer overflow. The attack can be executed remotely. The exploit is now public and may be used. The vendor explains: "This product has been EOL for 15 years (since 2009). As the item has been EOL for such a long time, we are not able to replicate or fix any vulnerabilities." This vulnerability only affects products that are no longer supported by the maintainer. |
| Command injection in Raynet rvia version 12.6 Update 8 and previous versions allows adversaries to execute arbitrary code via a crafted path that matches the improperly terminated search criteria of rvia's Java search using the find command. |
| Integer overflow in WTF in Google Chrome prior to 148.0.7778.216 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside a sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High) |
