| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
cpufreq: pcc: fix use-after-free and double free in _OSC evaluation
pcc_cpufreq_do_osc() calls acpi_evaluate_object() twice for the
two-phase _OSC negotiation. Between the two calls it freed
output.pointer but left output.length unchanged. Since
acpi_evaluate_object() treats a non-zero length with a non-NULL
pointer as an existing buffer to write into, the second call wrote
into freed memory (use-after-free). The subsequent kfree(output.pointer)
at out_free then freed the same pointer a second time (double free).
Reset output.pointer to NULL and output.length to ACPI_ALLOCATE_BUFFER
after freeing the first result, so ACPICA allocates a fresh buffer for
each phase independently. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
mm/slab: do not limit zeroing to orig_size when only red zoning is enabled
When init (zeroing) on allocation is requested, for kmalloc() we
generally have to zero the full object size even if a smaller size is
requested, in order to provide krealloc()'s __GFP_ZERO guarantees.
But if we track the requested size, krealloc() uses that information to
do the right thing, so we can zero only the requested size. With red
zoning also enabled, any extra size became part of the red zone, so it
must not be zeroed and thus we must zero only the requested size.
However the current check is imprecise, and will trigger also when only
SLAB_RED_ZONE is enabled without SLAB_STORE_USER (which enables tracking
the requested size). This means enabling red zoning alone can compromise
krealloc()'s __GFP_ZERO contract.
Fix this by using slub_debug_orig_size() instead, which is the exact
check for whether the requested size is tracked. We don't need to care
if red zoning is also enabled or not. Also update and expand the
comment accordingly. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: hid-goodix-spi: validate report size to prevent stack buffer overflow
goodix_hid_set_raw_report() builds a protocol frame in a 128-byte stack
buffer (tmp_buf), writing an 11-12 byte header followed by the
caller-supplied report data. The HID core caps report size at
HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE (16384) by default, while the driver does not set
hid_ll_driver.max_buffer_size and performs no bounds checking before
copying the payload:
memcpy(tmp_buf + tx_len, buf, len);
A hidraw SET_REPORT ioctl with a report larger than ~116 bytes
overflows the stack buffer.
Add a size check after constructing the header, rejecting reports that
would exceed the buffer capacity.
Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: wacom: fix slab-out-of-bounds write in wacom_wac_queue_insert
wacom_wac_queue_insert() calls kfifo_skip() in a loop when the kfifo
doesn't have enough space for the incoming report. If the kfifo is
empty, kfifo_skip() reads stale data left in the kmalloc'd buffer
via __kfifo_peek_n() and interprets it as a record length, advancing
fifo->out by that garbage value. This corrupts the internal kfifo
state, causing kfifo_unused() to return a value much larger than the
actual buffer size, which bypasses __kfifo_in_r()'s guard:
if (len + recsize > kfifo_unused(fifo))
return 0;
kfifo_copy_in() then performs an out-of-bounds memcpy, writing up to
3842 bytes past the 256-byte buffer.
Add a !kfifo_is_empty() condition to the while loop so kfifo_skip()
is never called on an empty fifo, and check the return value of
kfifo_in() to reject reports that are too large for the fifo. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
HID: multitouch: fix out-of-bounds bit access on mt_io_flags
mt_io_flags is a single unsigned long, but mt_process_slot(),
mt_release_pending_palms() and mt_release_contacts() use it as a
per-slot bitmap indexed by the slot number. That slot number is only
bounded by td->maxcontacts, which is taken from the device's
ContactCountMaximum feature report and can be up to 255, not by
BITS_PER_LONG.
As a result, a multitouch device that advertises a large contact count
makes set_bit()/clear_bit() operate past the mt_io_flags word and
corrupt the adjacent members of struct mt_device. The sticky-fingers
release timer is the easiest way to reach this. mt_release_contacts()
runs
for (i = 0; i < mt->num_slots; i++)
clear_bit(i, &td->mt_io_flags);
with num_slots == maxcontacts. For maxcontacts around 250 the loop
clears the bits that overlap td->applications.next, zeroing that list
head, and the list_for_each_entry() that immediately follows then
dereferences NULL. The kernel panics from timer (softirq) context. On a
KASAN build this shows up as a general protection fault in
mt_release_contacts() with a null-ptr-deref at offset 0x58, which is
offsetof(struct mt_application, num_received).
The state is reachable from an untrusted USB or Bluetooth HID
multitouch device; no local privileges are required.
Store the per-slot active state in a separately allocated bitmap sized
for maxcontacts, the same pattern already used for pending_palm_slots,
and keep only MT_IO_FLAGS_RUNNING in mt_io_flags. The two
"mt_io_flags & MT_IO_SLOTS_MASK" arming checks become
bitmap_empty(td->active_slots, td->maxcontacts).
Move MT_IO_FLAGS_RUNNING back to bit 0. It was bumped to bit 32 by the
same commit to leave the low byte for the slot bits; with the slot bits
gone it fits in bit 0 again, which also keeps it within the unsigned
long on 32-bit. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
hfs/hfsplus: fix u32 overflow in check_and_correct_requested_length
check_and_correct_requested_length() compares (off + len) against
node_size using u32 arithmetic. When the caller passes a large len
value (e.g. from an underflowed subtraction in hfs_brec_remove()),
off + len can wrap past 2^32 and produce a small result, causing the
bounds check to pass when it should fail.
For example, with off=14 and len=0xFFFFFFF2 (underflowed from
data_off - keyoffset - size in hfs_brec_remove), off + len wraps to 6,
which is less than a typical node_size of 512, so the check passes and
the subsequent memmove reads ~4GB past the node buffer.
Fix this by widening the addition to u64 before comparing against
node_size. This prevents the u32 wrap while keeping the logic
straightforward. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Reject fragmented frames in devmap
Devmap broadcast redirects clone the packet for all but the last
destination.
For native XDP, that clone path copies only the linear xdp_frame data,
while fragmented frames keep skb_shared_info in tailroom outside the
linear area. Cloning such a frame leaves XDP_FLAGS_HAS_FRAGS set but
without valid frag metadata, and the later free path can interpret
uninitialized tail data as skb_shared_info, leading to an out-of-bounds
access during frame return.
Reject fragmented native XDP frames in dev_map_enqueue_clone().
Add the same restriction to the generic XDP clone path in
dev_map_redirect_clone(). Generic XDP represents fragmented packets as
nonlinear skbs, and rejecting them here keeps clone-based broadcast
support aligned between native and generic XDP. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf: Validate BTF repeated field counts before expansion
btf_parse_struct_metas() walks user-supplied BTF during BPF_BTF_LOAD,
and btf_repeat_fields() expands repeatable fields from array elements
into the fixed BTF_FIELDS_MAX scratch array used by btf_parse_fields().
The remaining-capacity check performs the expanded field count calculation
in u32. A malformed BTF can wrap that calculation, causing the check to
pass even when the expanded field count exceeds the scratch array
capacity. The following memcpy() can then write past the end of the
array.
Use checked addition and multiplication before copying repeated fields
and reject impossible counts. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: digi_acceleport: fix write buffer corruption
The digi_write_inb_command() is supposed to wait for the write urb to
become available or return an error, but instead it updates the transfer
buffer and tries to resubmit the urb on timeout.
To make things worse, for commands like break control where no timeout
is used, the driver would corrupt the urb immediately due to a broken
jiffies comparison (on 32-bit machines this takes five minutes of uptime
to trigger due to INITIAL_JIFFIES).
Fix this by adding the missing return on timeout and waiting
indefinitely when no timeout has been specified as intended.
This issue was (sort of) flagged by Sashiko when reviewing an unrelated
change to the driver. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udf: validate free block extents against the partition length
udf_free_blocks() checks the logical block number and count against the
partition length, but drops the extent offset from that final bound. A
crafted extent can pass the guard while logicalBlockNum + offset + count
points past the partition, which later indexes past the space bitmap
array.
A single ftruncate(2) on a file backed by such an extent reliably
panics the kernel. This is a local availability issue. On desktop
systems where UDisks/polkit allows the active user to mount removable
UDF media without CAP_SYS_ADMIN, an unprivileged local user can supply
the crafted filesystem and trigger the panic by truncating a writable
file on it. Systems that require root or CAP_SYS_ADMIN to mount the
image have a higher prerequisite.
No confidentiality or integrity impact is claimed: the reproduced
primitive is an out-of-bounds read of a bitmap pointer slot followed by
a kernel panic.
Use the already computed logicalBlockNum + offset + count value for the
partition length check. Also make load_block_bitmap() reject an
out-of-range block group before indexing s_block_bitmap[], so corrupted
callers cannot walk past the flexible array. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udf: validate VAT header length against the VAT inode size
udf_load_vat() takes the virtual partition's start offset straight from
the on-disk VAT 2.0 header without checking it against the VAT inode
size:
map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset =
le16_to_cpu(vat20->lengthHeader);
map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_num_entries =
(sbi->s_vat_inode->i_size -
map->s_type_specific.s_virtual.s_start_offset) >> 2;
lengthHeader is a fully attacker-controlled 16-bit value. If it exceeds
the VAT inode size, the s_num_entries subtraction underflows to a huge
count, which defeats the "block > s_num_entries" bound in
udf_get_pblock_virt15(); and on the ICB-inline path that function reads
((__le32 *)(iinfo->i_data + s_start_offset))[block]
so a large s_start_offset indexes past the inode's in-ICB data. Mounting
a crafted UDF image with a virtual (VAT) partition then triggers an
out-of-bounds read.
Reject a VAT whose header length does not leave room for at least one
entry within the VAT inode. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
udf: validate sparing table length as an entry count, not a byte count
udf_load_sparable_map() accepts a sparing table when
sizeof(*st) + le16_to_cpu(st->reallocationTableLen) > sb->s_blocksize
is false, i.e. it treats reallocationTableLen as a number of BYTES that
must fit in the block. But the table is walked as an array of 8-byte
sparingEntry elements:
for (i = 0; i < le16_to_cpu(st->reallocationTableLen); i++) {
struct sparingEntry *entry = &st->mapEntry[i];
... entry->origLocation ...
}
in udf_get_pblock_spar15() and udf_relocate_blocks(). A
reallocationTableLen of N therefore passes the check whenever
sizeof(*st) + N <= blocksize, yet the consumers index
sizeof(*st) + N * sizeof(struct sparingEntry) bytes -- up to ~8x the
block. On a crafted UDF image this is an out-of-bounds read in
udf_get_pblock_spar15(); udf_relocate_blocks() additionally feeds the
same length to udf_update_tag(), whose crc_itu_t() reads far past the
block, and its memmove() through st->mapEntry[] is an out-of-bounds
write.
Validate reallocationTableLen as the entry count it is, with
struct_size(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds heap read in Discovery Get Log Page
nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page() validates only the dword alignment
of the host-supplied Log Page Offset (lpo). The 64-bit offset is then
added to a small kzalloc'd buffer that holds the discovery log page
and the result is passed straight to nvmet_copy_to_sgl(), which
memcpy()s data_len bytes out to the host with no source-side bound
check:
u64 offset = nvmet_get_log_page_offset(req->cmd); /* 64-bit host */
size_t data_len = nvmet_get_log_page_len(req->cmd); /* 32-bit host */
...
if (offset & 0x3) { ... } /* only check */
...
alloc_len = sizeof(*hdr) + entry_size * discovery_log_entries(req);
buffer = kzalloc(alloc_len, GFP_KERNEL);
...
status = nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + offset, data_len);
The Discovery controller is unauthenticated -- nvmet_host_allowed()
returns true unconditionally for the discovery subsystem -- so the call
is reachable pre-authentication by any TCP/RDMA/FC peer that can reach
the nvmet target. With a discovery log page of ~1 KiB, an attacker
requesting up to 4 KiB starting at offset == alloc_len reads the next
slab page out and gets its content returned over the fabric (an
empirical run on a default nvmet-tcp loopback target leaked 81
canonical kernel pointers in one Get Log Page response). Pointing the
offset at unmapped kernel memory faults the in-kernel memcpy and
crashes (or panics, on panic_on_oops=1) the target host instead.
The attacker-controlled source-side offset pattern
"nvmet_copy_to_sgl(req, 0, buffer + ATTACKER_OFFSET, ...)" is unique
to nvmet_execute_disc_get_log_page in the entire nvmet codebase: every
other Get Log Page handler in admin-cmd.c either ignores lpo (and
silently starts every response at offset 0) or tracks a local
destination offset with a fixed source pointer.
Validate the host-supplied offset against the log page size, cap the
copy length to what is actually available, and zero-fill any remainder
of the host transfer buffer. The zero-fill matches the existing
short-response pattern in nvmet_execute_get_log_changed_ns()
(admin-cmd.c) and prevents leaking transport SGL contents when the
host asks for more bytes than the log page contains. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvmet-auth: validate reply message payload bounds against transfer length
nvmet_auth_reply() accesses the variable-length rval[] array using
attacker-controlled hl (hash length) and dhvlen (DH value length) fields
without verifying they fit within the allocated buffer of tl bytes.
A malicious NVMe-oF initiator can craft a DHCHAP_REPLY message with a
small transfer length but large hl/dhvlen values, causing out-of-bounds
heap reads when the target processes the DH public key (rval + 2*hl) or
performs the host response memcmp.
With DH authentication configured, the OOB pointer is passed directly to
sg_init_one() and read by crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(), reaching
up to 526 bytes past the buffer. This is exploitable pre-authentication.
Add bounds validation ensuring sizeof(*data) + 2*hl + dhvlen <= tl before
any access to the variable-length fields.
Discovered by Atuin - Automated Vulnerability Discovery Engine. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
partitions: aix: bound the pp_count scan to the ppe array
aix_partition() reads the physical volume descriptor into a fixed-size
struct pvd and then scans its physical-partition-extent array:
int numpps = be16_to_cpu(pvd->pp_count);
...
for (i = 0; i < numpps; i += 1) {
struct ppe *p = pvd->ppe + i;
...
lp_ix = be16_to_cpu(p->lp_ix);
pvd points at a single kmalloc()'d struct pvd whose ppe[] member holds a
fixed ARRAY_SIZE(pvd->ppe) (1016) entries, but the loop runs up to the
on-disk pp_count. pp_count is an unvalidated __be16 read straight from
the descriptor, so a crafted AIX image with pp_count larger than 1016
drives the loop to read pvd->ppe[i] past the end of the allocation (up
to 65535 entries, ~2 MB out of bounds).
The partition scan runs without mounting anything, when a block device
with a crafted AIX/IBM partition table appears (an attacker-supplied
image attached with losetup -P, or a device auto-scanned by udev), via
msdos_partition() -> aix_partition().
Clamp the scan to the number of entries the ppe[] array can hold. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
isofs: bound Rock Ridge symlink components to the SL record
get_symlink_chunk() and the SL handling in
parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal() walk the variable-length components of
a Rock Ridge "SL" (symbolic link) record. Each component is a two-byte
header (flags, len) followed by len bytes of text, so it occupies
slp->len + 2 bytes. Both loops read slp->len and advance to the next
component, and get_symlink_chunk() additionally does
memcpy(rpnt, slp->text, slp->len), but neither checks that the component
lies within the SL record before dereferencing it.
A crafted SL record whose component declares a len that runs past the
record (rr->len) therefore triggers an out-of-bounds read of up to 255
bytes. When the record sits at the tail of its backing buffer - for
example a small kmalloc()ed continuation block reached through a CE
record - the read crosses the allocation; get_symlink_chunk() then
copies the out-of-bounds bytes into the symlink body returned to user
space by readlink(), disclosing adjacent kernel memory.
ISO 9660 images are routinely mounted from untrusted removable media -
desktop environments auto-mount them (e.g. via udisks2) without
CAP_SYS_ADMIN - so the record contents are attacker-controlled.
Reject any component that does not fit in the remaining record bytes
before using it. In get_symlink_chunk() return NULL, like the existing
output-buffer (plimit) checks, so a malformed record makes readlink()
fail with -EIO rather than silently returning a truncated target; in
parse_rock_ridge_inode_internal() stop the inode-size walk. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: caam - use print_hex_dump_devel to guard key hex dumps
Use print_hex_dump_devel() for dumping sensitive key material in
*_setkey() to avoid leaking secrets at runtime when CONFIG_DYNAMIC_DEBUG
is enabled. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: ecc - Fix carry overflow in vli multiplication
The carry flag calculation fails when r01.m_high is saturated
(0xFFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF) and addition of lower bits overflows.
The condition (r01.m_high < product.m_high) doesn't handle the case
where r01.m_high == product.m_high and an additional carry exists
from lower-bit overflow.
When commit 3c4b23901a0c ("crypto: ecdh - Add ECDH software support")
introduced crypto/ecc.c, it split the muladd() function in the
micro-ecc library into separate mul_64_64() and add_128_128() helpers.
It seems the check got lost in translation.
Add proper handling for this boundary by accounting for the carry
from the lower addition. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: pcrypt - restore callback for non-parallel fallback
pcrypt installs pcrypt_aead_done() on the child AEAD request before
trying to submit it through padata. If padata_do_parallel() returns
-EBUSY, pcrypt falls back to calling the child AEAD directly.
That fallback must not keep the padata completion callback. Otherwise
an asynchronous completion runs pcrypt_aead_done() even though the
request was never enrolled in padata.
Restore the original request callback and callback data before calling
the child AEAD directly. This keeps the fallback path aligned with a
direct AEAD request while leaving the parallel path unchanged. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
crypto: loongson - Remove broken and unused loongson-rng
The loongson-rng rng_alg has several vulnerabilities, including not
providing forward security, and a use-after-free bug due to the use of
wait_for_completion_interruptible().
Meanwhile, the rng_alg framework doesn't really have any purpose in the
first place other than to access the software algorithms crypto/drbg.c
and crypto/jitterentropy.c. Hardware-specific rng_algs have no
in-kernel user, and unlike hwrng there's no feed into the actual Linux
RNG. As such, there's really no point to this code. There are of
course other rng_alg drivers that are similarly unused, but they're
similarly in the process of being phased out, e.g.
https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260529193648.18172-1-ebiggers@kernel.org and
https://lore.kernel.org/r/20260529220430.34135-1-ebiggers@kernel.org
Given that, there's no point in fixing forward these vulnerabilities,
and it makes much more sense to simply roll back the addition of this
driver. If this platform provides TRNG (not PRNG) functionality, it
could make sense to add a hwrng driver, but it would be quite different. |
