| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| Unauthenticated Broken Access Control in Thrive Leads Version <= 10.9.2 versions. |
| Unauthenticated Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in AffiliateX <= 2.3.5 versions. |
| Contributor Cross Site Scripting (XSS) in WordPress Social Login and Register <= 7.8.0 versions. |
| Author Cross Site Scripting (XSS) in Orbit Fox by ThemeIsle <= 3.0.7 versions. |
| Unauthenticated Broken Access Control in Event Tickets <= 5.29.0.1 versions. |
| Contributor Cross Site Scripting (XSS) in Photonic Gallery & Lightbox for Flickr, SmugMug & Others <= 3.33 versions. |
| Contributor Server Side Request Forgery (SSRF) in Feedzy <= 5.2.4 versions. |
| Subscriber Broken Access Control in YayPricing <= 3.5.6 versions. |
| Unauthenticated Cross Site Request Forgery (CSRF) in Insert Headers and Footers Code – HT Script <= 1.1.8 versions. |
| Shop manager Cross Site Scripting (XSS) in Checkout Field Editor for WooCommerce – Checkout Manager <= 3.0.5 versions. |
| NitroShare Desktop through 0.3.4 contains a path traversal vulnerability in its LAN file transfer server that allows unauthenticated attackers on the same network to write arbitrary files by sending a crafted filename containing directory traversal sequences in the JSON item header name field. Attackers can exploit the lack of path validation to write files outside the transfer root directory to arbitrary locations the current user has write access, including the Windows Startup folder, enabling persistent code execution on the next user login. |
| VeloCloud Orchestrator (VCO) on-prem has a security issue where this issue may allow a remote attacker to access privileged internal functionality and impact the VCO host. Successful exploitation may compromise the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the orchestrator and data managed by the orchestrator.
This functionality was intended to be for internal use only and is not intended to be remotely accessible.
Hosted and Dedicated versions of VCO have already been patched in advance of this notice going out.
This issue was discovered externally and is known to be actively exploited. |
| A VCO feature does not sufficiently validate caller-supplied input, allowing requests to be made on behalf of authenticated tenant accounts to internal services that are not otherwise accessible. This vulnerability requires a minimum role of Enterprise Standard Admin.
This issue was discovered internally by Arista and the company is not aware of any malicious uses of this issue in customer networks. |
| An input validation vulnerability exists in an API component of the orchestrator. An authenticated user can exploit this flaw to manipulate backend queries, which may result in unauthorized access to data beyond their intended privileges and cause the underlying system to initiate unintended outbound network connections.
This issue was discovered internally by Arista and the company is not aware of any malicious uses of this issue in customer networks. |
| Use of Insufficiently Random Values, Protection Mechanism Failure vulnerability in Apache Wicket.
This issue affects Apache Wicket: from 9.0.0 through 9.23.0, from 10.0.0 through 10.9.0.
Users are recommended to upgrade to version 10.10.0, which fixes the issue. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
scsi: fcoe: Reject FIP descriptors with zero fip_dlen in CVL walker
drivers/scsi/fcoe/fcoe_ctlr.c::fcoe_ctlr_recv_clr_vlink() advanced the
descriptor cursor by an attacker-supplied fip_dlen without ever
requiring dlen >= sizeof(struct fip_desc) in the default branch. The
named descriptor cases (FIP_DT_MAC, FIP_DT_NAME, FIP_DT_VN_ID) checked
their per-type minimum lengths, but a FIP_DT_NON_CRITICAL descriptor
(fip_dtype >= 128, which the standard requires receivers to silently
ignore) skipped that check entirely.
An unauthenticated L2 peer on the FCoE control VLAN could hang
fcoe_ctlr_recv_work on an fcoe, qedf, or bnx2fc initiator indefinitely
by emitting one FIP CVL frame whose single descriptor had fip_dtype ==
FIP_DT_NON_CRITICAL and fip_dlen == 0: the cursor advanced zero bytes
per iteration and the loop condition rlen >= sizeof(*desc) stayed true
forever, blocking every subsequent FIP frame on that controller.
Tighten the outer dlen guard to also reject dlen < sizeof(struct
fip_desc), so a malformed descriptor whose length cannot even cover the
descriptor header is rejected before the switch. This is the same
lower-bound the named cases already apply and is the minimum scope that
closes the loop. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
thunderbolt: property: Cap recursion depth in __tb_property_parse_dir()
A DIRECTORY entry's value field is used as the dir_offset for a
recursive call into __tb_property_parse_dir() with no depth counter.
A crafted peer that chains DIRECTORY entries into a back-reference
loop drives the parser until the kernel stack is exhausted and the
guard page fires. Any untrusted XDomain peer (cable, dock, in-line
inspector, adjacent host) that reaches the PROPERTIES_REQUEST
control-plane exchange can trigger this without authentication.
Thread a depth counter through tb_property_parse() and
__tb_property_parse_dir(), and reject blocks that exceed
TB_PROPERTY_MAX_DEPTH = 8. That is comfortably larger than any
observed legitimate XDomain layout.
Operators who do not need XDomain host-to-host discovery can disable
the path entirely with thunderbolt.xdomain=0 on the kernel command
line. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: gadget: f_fs: copy only received bytes on short ep0 read
ffs_ep0_read() allocates its control-OUT data buffer with
kmalloc() (not kzalloc) at the Length value from the Setup
packet, then copies that full len to userspace regardless of
how many bytes were actually received:
data = kmalloc(len, GFP_KERNEL);
...
ret = __ffs_ep0_queue_wait(ffs, data, len);
if ((ret > 0) && (copy_to_user(buf, data, len)))
ret = -EFAULT;
__ffs_ep0_queue_wait() returns req->actual, which on a short
control OUT transfer is strictly less than len. The
copy_to_user() call still copies len bytes, so on a short OUT
the last (len - ret) bytes of the kmalloc() buffer --
uninitialised slab residue -- are delivered to the FunctionFS
daemon.
Short ep0 OUT completions are specified USB control-transfer
behavior and are produced by in-tree UDCs:
* dwc2 continues on req->actual < req->length for ep0 DATA OUT
(short-not-ok is the only ep0-OUT stall path).
* aspeed_udc ends ep0 OUT on rx_len < ep->ep.maxpacket.
* renesas_usbf logs "ep0 short packet" and completes the
request.
* dwc3 stalls on short IN but not on short OUT.
A short ep0 OUT is therefore not evidence of a broken UDC; it is
a normal condition f_fs has to cope with. The sibling gadgetfs
implementation in drivers/usb/gadget/legacy/inode.c already does
this correctly via min(len, dev->req->actual) before
copy_to_user(). This patch brings f_fs.c to the same safe
pattern rather than trimming at a defensive layer.
The bug is reached from the FunctionFS device node, which in
real deployments is owned by the privileged gadget daemon
(adbd, UMS, composite gadget services, etc.); it is not
reachable from unprivileged userspace. Linux host stacks
normally reject short-wLength control OUTs before they reach
the gadget, so reproducing this required a build that
bypasses that host-side check. With the bypass in place, a
1-byte payload on a 64-byte Setup produces 63 bytes of
non-canary slab residue in the daemon's read buffer.
Fix by copying only ret (actually received) bytes to
userspace. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
USB: serial: belkin_sa: validate interrupt status length
The Belkin interrupt callback treats interrupt data as a four-byte
status report and reads LSR/MSR fields at offsets 2 and 3. The
interrupt-in buffer length is derived from endpoint wMaxPacketSize, and
short interrupt transfers may complete successfully with a smaller
actual_length.
Check the completed interrupt packet length before parsing status
fields so short interrupt endpoints and short successful packets are
ignored instead of causing out-of-bounds or stale status-byte reads.
KASAN report as below:
BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in belkin_sa_read_int_callback()
Read of size 1
Call trace:
belkin_sa_read_int_callback() (drivers/usb/serial/belkin_sa.c:202)
__usb_hcd_giveback_urb() (drivers/usb/core/hcd.c:1630)
dummy_timer() (?:?) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
usb: usbtmc: check URB actual_length for interrupt-IN notifications
USBTMC devices can use an optional interrupt endpoint for notification
messages. These typically contain two-byte headers indicating the
payload format, but the driver does not check if these headers are
present before accessing the data buffers. In cases where the URB
actual_length is not enough to fit these headers, the driver will either
cause an out-of-bounds read, or consume stale leftover data from a
previous notification.
Fix by checking if actual_data contains enough bytes for the headers,
otherwise resubmit URB to the interrupt endpoint. |
