| CVE |
Vendors |
Products |
Updated |
CVSS v3.1 |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: shaper: rework the VALID marking (again)
Recent commit changed the semantics from NOT_VALID to VALID.
I didn't realize that the flags are not stored atomically
with the entry in XArray. There's still a race of reader
observing a VALID mark for a slot, getting interrupted,
writer replacing the entry with a different one, reader
continuing, fetching the entry which is now a different
pointer than the pointer for which VALID was meant.
The biggest consequence of this is that we may see a UAF
since net_shaper_rollback() assumed that entries without
VALID can be freed without observing RCU.
Looks like the XArray marks are buying us nothing at this
point. Let's convert the code to an explicit valid field.
The smp_load_acquire() / smp_store_release() barriers are
marginally cleaner. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
rxrpc: Fix DATA decrypt vs splice() by copying data to buffer in recvmsg
This improves the fix for CVE-2026-43500.
Fix the pagecache corruption from in-place decryption of a DATA packet
transmitted locally by splice() by getting rid of the packet sharing in the
I/O thread and unconditionally extracting the packet content into a bounce
buffer in which the buffer is decrypted. recvmsg() (or the kernel
equivalent) then copies the data from the bounce buffer to the destination
buffer. The sk_buff then remains unmodified.
This has an additional advantage in that the packet is then arranged in the
buffer with the correct alignment required for the crypto algorithms to
process directly. The performance of the crypto does seem to be a little
faster and, surprisingly, the unencrypted performance doesn't seem to
change much - possibly due to removing complexity from the I/O thread.
Yet another advantage is that the I/O thread doesn't have to copy packets
which would slow down packet distribution, ACK generation, etc..
The buffer belongs to the call and is allocated initially at 2K,
sufficiently large to hold a whole jumbo subpacket, but the buffer will be
increased in size if needed. However, to take this work, MSG_PEEK may
cause a later packet to be decrypted into the buffer, in which case the
earlier one will need re-decrypting for a subsequent recvmsg().
Note that rx_pkt_offset may legitimately see 0 as a valid offset now, so
switch to using USHRT_MAX to indicate an invalid offset.
Note also that I would generally prefer to replace the buffers of the
current sk_buff with a new kmalloc'd buffer of the right size, ditching the
old data and frags as this makes the handling of MSG_PEEK easier and
removes the re-decryption issue, but this looks like quite a complicated
thing to achieve. skb_morph() looks half way to what I want, but I don't
want to have to allocate a new sk_buff. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
bpf, skmsg: fix verdict sk_data_ready racing with ktls rx
sk_psock_strp_data_ready() already checks tls_sw_has_ctx_rx() and
defers to psock->saved_data_ready when a TLS RX context is present,
avoiding a conflict with the TLS strparser's ownership of the receive
queue (commit e91de6afa81c, "bpf: Fix running sk_skb program types
with ktls").
sk_psock_verdict_data_ready() has no equivalent guard. When a socket
is inserted into a sockmap (BPF_SK_SKB_VERDICT) before TLS RX is
configured, tls_sw_strparser_arm() saves sk_psock_verdict_data_ready
as rx_ctx->saved_data_ready. On data arrival:
tls_data_ready -> tls_strp_data_ready -> tls_rx_msg_ready
-> saved_data_ready() = sk_psock_verdict_data_ready()
-> tcp_read_skb() drains sk_receive_queue via __skb_unlink()
without calling tcp_eat_skb(), so copied_seq is not advanced.
tls_strp_msg_load() then finds tcp_inq() >= full_len (stale), calls
tcp_recv_skb() on the now-empty queue, hits WARN_ON_ONCE(!first), and
returns with rx_ctx->strp.anchor.frag_list pointing at a psock-owned
(potentially freed) skb. tls_decrypt_sg() subsequently walks that
frag_list: use-after-free.
Apply the same fix as sk_psock_strp_data_ready(): if a TLS RX context
is present, call psock->saved_data_ready (sock_def_readable) to wake
recv() waiters and return immediately, leaving the receive queue
untouched. TLS retains sole ownership of the queue and decrypts the
record normally through tls_sw_recvmsg(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
tcp: fix stale per-CPU tcp_tw_isn leak enabling ISN prediction
Blamed commit moved the TIME_WAIT-derived ISN from the skb control
block to a per-CPU variable, assuming the value would always be consumed
by tcp_conn_request() for the same packet that wrote it. That assumption
is violated by multiple drop paths between the producer
(__this_cpu_write(tcp_tw_isn, isn) in tcp_v{4,6}_rcv()) and the consumer
(tcp_conn_request()):
- min_ttl / min_hopcount check
- xfrm policy check
- tcp_inbound_hash() MD5/AO mismatch
- tcp_filter() eBPF/SO_ATTACH_FILTER drop
- th->syn && th->fin discard in tcp_rcv_state_process() TCP_LISTEN
- psp_sk_rx_policy_check() in tcp_v{4,6}_do_rcv()
- tcp_checksum_complete() in tcp_v{4,6}_do_rcv()
- tcp_v{4,6}_cookie_check() returning NULL
When a packet is dropped on any of these paths, tcp_tw_isn is left set.
The next SYN processed on the same CPU then consumes the non zero value in
tcp_conn_request(), receiving a potentially predictable ISN.
This patch moves back tcp_tw_isn to skb->cb[], getting rid of the per-cpu
variable.
Note that tcp_v{4,6}_fill_cb() do not set it.
Very litle impact on overall code size/complexity:
$ scripts/bloat-o-meter -t vmlinux.old vmlinux.new
add/remove: 0/0 grow/shrink: 2/1 up/down: 8/-15 (-7)
Function old new delta
tcp_v6_rcv 3038 3042 +4
tcp_v4_rcv 3035 3039 +4
tcp_conn_request 2938 2923 -15
Total: Before=24436060, After=24436053, chg -0.00% |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpio: aggregator: fix a potential use-after-free
On error we free aggr->lookups->dev_id before removing the entry from
the lookup table. If a concurrent thread calls gpiod_find() before we
remove the entry, it could iterate over the list and call
gpiod_match_lookup_table() which unconditionally dereferences dev_id
when calling strcmp(). Reverse the order of cleanup. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
gpio: aggregator: remove the software node when deactivating the aggregator
The dynamic software node we create for the aggregator platform device
when using configfs is leaked when the device is deactivated. Destroy it
as the last step in the tear-down path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/xe/oa: Fix exec_queue leak on width check in stream open
In xe_oa_stream_open_ioctl(), when param.exec_q->width > 1 the
function returns -EOPNOTSUPP directly, skipping the existing
err_exec_q cleanup path. The exec_queue reference obtained by
xe_exec_queue_lookup() is leaked.
The exec queue holds a reference on the xe_file, which is only
dropped during queue teardown. The leaked lookup ref is not on
the file's exec_queue xarray, so file close cannot release it.
This keeps both the exec queue and the file private state pinned
indefinitely.
Jump to err_exec_q instead of returning directly so the reference
is released.
(cherry picked from commit 339fa0be9e4a5d69fa47e91f4a36574224fb478f) |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-pci: fix dma_vecs leak on p2p memory
We don't unmap P2P memory, so we don't need to track it. The dma_vec
allocation was getting leaked on the completion. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nvme-pci: fix dma mapping leak on data setup error
We're leaking the initial DMA mapping during iteration if we fail to
allocate the tracking descriptor for both PRP and SGL. Unmap the
iterator directly; we can't use the existing unmap helper because it
depends on the tracking descriptor being successfully allocated, so a
new one for an in-use iterator is provided.
The mappings were also leaking when the driver detects an invalid
bio_vec when mapping PRPs, so fix that too. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net: mana: validate rx_req_idx to prevent out-of-bounds array access
In mana_hwc_rx_event_handler(), rx_req_idx is derived from
sge->address in DMA-coherent memory. In Confidential VMs
(SEV-SNP/TDX), this memory is shared unencrypted and HW can modify
WQE contents at any time. No bounds check exists on rx_req_idx,
which can lead to an out-of-bounds access into reqs[].
Add bounds check on rx_req_idx in mana_hwc_rx_event_handler() before
using it to index the reqs[] array. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
blk-mq: pop cached request if it is usable
When submitting a bio to blk-mq, if the task should sleep after peeking
a cached request, but before it pops it, the plug flushes and calls
blk_mq_free_plug_rqs, freeing the cached_rqs. This creates a
use-after-free bug. Fix this by popping the cached request before any
possible blocking calls if it is suitable for use.
Popping this request first holds a queue reference, so avoid any
serialization races with queue freezes and can safely proceed with
dispatching that request to the driver. This potentially increases a
timing window from when a driver wants to freeze its queue to when
requests stop being dispatched. That scenario is off the fast path
though, and drivers need to appropriately handle requests during a
freeze request anyway.
The downside is the popped element needs to be individually freed when
we performed a bio plug merge. The cached request would have had to be
freed later anyway, but this patch does it inline with building the plug
list instead of after flushing it. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ksmbd: fix durable reconnect error path file lifetime
After a durable reconnect succeeds, ksmbd_reopen_durable_fd() republishes
the same ksmbd_file into the session volatile-id table. If smb2_open()
then takes a later error path, cleanup first calls ksmbd_fd_put(work, fp)
and then unconditionally calls ksmbd_put_durable_fd(dh_info.fp).
In this case fp and dh_info.fp are the same object. The first put drops the
reconnect lookup reference, but the final durable put can run
__ksmbd_close_fd(NULL, fp). Because the final close is not session-aware,
it can free the file object without removing the volatile-id entry that was
just published into the session table.
Use the session-aware put for the final reconnect drop when the reconnect
had already succeeded and the error path is cleaning up the republished
file. Earlier reconnect failures, before fp is assigned to dh_info.fp, keep
using the durable-only put path. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
security/keys: fix missed RCU read section on lookup
Nicholas Carlini reports that the keyring code calls assoc_array_find()
in find_key_to_update() without holding the RCU read lock, while the
assoc_array_gc() code really is designed around removing the node from
the tree and then freeing it after an RCU grace-period.
The regular key handling doesn't see this because holding the keyring
semaphore hides any lifetime issues, but the persistent key handling
uses a different model.
Instead of extending the keyring locking, just do the simple RCU locking
that the assoc_array was designed for. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
Input: usbtouchscreen - clamp NEXIO data_len/x_len to URB buffer size
nexio_read_data() pulls data_len and x_len from a packed __be16 header
in the device's interrupt packet and then walks packet->data[0..x_len)
and packet->data[x_len..data_len) comparing each byte against a
threshold.
Both fields are 16-bit on the wire (max 65535). The existing
adjustments shave at most 0x100 / 0x80 off, so the loop bound can still
reach roughly 0xfeff. The URB transfer buffer for NEXIO is rept_size
(1024) bytes from usb_alloc_coherent(), with the first 7 occupied by the
packed header — so packet->data[] has 1017 valid bytes. read_data()
callbacks are not given urb->actual_length, and nothing else bounds the
walk.
A device that lies about its length can get a ~64 KiB out-of-bounds read
past the coherent DMA allocation. The first index whose byte exceeds
NEXIO_THRESHOLD lands in begin_x / begin_y and from there into the
reported touch coordinates, so adjacent kernel memory contents leak to
userspace as ABS_X / ABS_Y events. Far enough out, the read can also
hit an unmapped page and fault.
Fix this all by clamping data_len to the buffer's data[] capacity and
x_len to data_len. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
ACPI: button: Fix ACPI GPE handler leak during removal
Commit a7e23ec17fee ("ACPI: button: Install notifier for system events
as well") changed the ACPI notify handler type for ACPI buttons to
ACPI_ALL_NOTIFY, but it forgot to update acpi_button_remove() to reflect
that change. This leads to leaking the notify handler past driver
removal, which may cause a kernel crash to occur if ACPI notify on
the given device is triggered after removing the driver, and causes a
subsequent probe of the given device with the same driver to fail.
Address this by updating the acpi_remove_notify_handler() call in
acpi_button_remove() as appropriate. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
net/sched: sch_sfb: Replace direct dequeue call with peek and qdisc_dequeue_peeked
When sfb has children (eg qfq qdisc) whose peek() callback is
qdisc_peek_dequeued(), we could get a kernel panic. When the parent of such
qdiscs (eg illustrated in patch #3 as tbf) wants to retrieve an skb from
its child (sfb in this case), it will do the following:
1a. do a peek() - and when sensing there's an skb the child can offer, then
- the child in this case(sfb) calls its child's (qfq) peek.
qfq does the right thing and will return the gso_skb queue packet.
Note: if there wasnt a gso_skb entry then qfq will store it there.
1b. invoke a dequeue() on the child (sfb). And herein lies the problem.
- sfb will call the child's dequeue() which will essentially just
try to grab something of qfq's queue.
[ 127.594489][ T453] KASAN: null-ptr-deref in range [0x0000000000000048-0x000000000000004f]
[ 127.594741][ T453] CPU: 2 UID: 0 PID: 453 Comm: ping Not tainted 7.1.0-rc1-00035-gac961974495b-dirty #793 PREEMPT(full)
[ 127.595059][ T453] Hardware name: Bochs Bochs, BIOS Bochs 01/01/2011
[ 127.595254][ T453] RIP: 0010:qfq_dequeue+0x35c/0x1650 [sch_qfq]
[ 127.595461][ T453] Code: 00 fc ff df 80 3c 02 00 0f 85 17 0e 00 00 4c 8d 73 48 48 89 9d b8 02 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 89 f2 48 c1 ea 03 <80> 3c 02 00 0f 85 76 0c 00 00 48 b8 00 00 00 00 00 fc ff df 4c 8b
[ 127.596081][ T453] RSP: 0018:ffff88810e5af440 EFLAGS: 00010216
[ 127.596337][ T453] RAX: dffffc0000000000 RBX: 0000000000000000 RCX: dffffc0000000000
[ 127.596623][ T453] RDX: 0000000000000009 RSI: 0000001880000000 RDI: ffff888104fd82b0
[ 127.596917][ T453] RBP: ffff888104fd8000 R08: ffff888104fd8280 R09: 1ffff110211893a3
[ 127.597165][ T453] R10: 1ffff110211893a6 R11: 1ffff110211893a7 R12: 0000001880000000
[ 127.597404][ T453] R13: ffff888104fd82b8 R14: 0000000000000048 R15: 0000000040000000
[ 127.597644][ T453] FS: 00007fc380cbfc40(0000) GS:ffff88816f2a8000(0000) knlGS:0000000000000000
[ 127.597956][ T453] CS: 0010 DS: 0000 ES: 0000 CR0: 0000000080050033
[ 127.598160][ T453] CR2: 00005610aa9890a8 CR3: 000000010369e000 CR4: 0000000000750ef0
[ 127.598390][ T453] PKRU: 55555554
[ 127.598509][ T453] Call Trace:
[ 127.598629][ T453] <TASK>
[ 127.598718][ T453] ? mark_held_locks+0x40/0x70
[ 127.598890][ T453] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 127.599053][ T453] sfb_dequeue+0x88/0x4d0
[ 127.599174][ T453] ? ktime_get+0x137/0x230
[ 127.599328][ T453] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 127.599480][ T453] ? qdisc_peek_dequeued+0x7b/0x350 [sch_qfq]
[ 127.599670][ T453] ? srso_alias_return_thunk+0x5/0xfbef5
[ 127.599831][ T453] tbf_dequeue+0x6b1/0x1098 [sch_tbf]
[ 127.599988][ T453] __qdisc_run+0x169/0x1900
The right thing to do in #1b is to grab the skb off gso_skb queue.
This patchset fixes that issue by changing #1b to use qdisc_dequeue_peeked()
method instead. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: llcp: Fix use-after-free in llcp_sock_release()
llcp_sock_release() unconditionally unlinks the socket from the local
sockets list. However, if the socket is still in connecting state, it
is on the connecting list.
Fix this by checking the socket state and unlinking from the correct list. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
nfc: llcp: Fix use-after-free race in nfc_llcp_recv_cc()
A race condition exists in the NFC LLCP connection state machine where
the connection acceptance packet (CC) can be processed concurrently with
socket release. This can lead to a use-after-free of the socket object.
When nfc_llcp_recv_cc() moves the socket from the connecting_sockets
list to the sockets list, it does so without holding the socket lock.
If llcp_sock_release() is executing concurrently, it might have already
unlinked the socket and dropped its references, which can result in
nfc_llcp_recv_cc() linking a freed socket into the live list.
Fix this by holding lock_sock() during the state transition and list
movement in nfc_llcp_recv_cc(). After acquiring the lock, check if
the socket is still hashed to ensure it hasn't already been unlinked
and marked for destruction by the release path. This aligns the locking
pattern with recv_hdlc() and recv_disc(). |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
xfrm: Check for underflow in xfrm_state_mtu
Leo Lin reported OOB write issue in esp component:
xfrm_state_mtu() returns u32 but performs its arithmetic in unsigned
modulo-2^32 space using an attacker-influenced "header_len + authsize +
net_adj" subtracted from a small "mtu" argument. A nobody user can
install an IPv4 ESP tunnel SA with a large authentication key
(XFRMA_ALG_AUTH_TRUNC, e.g. hmac(sha512), 64-byte key, 64-byte trunc),
configure a small interface MTU (68 bytes), and set XFRMA_TFCPAD to a
large value. When a single UDP datagram is then sent through the
tunnel, xfrm_state_mtu() underflows to a near-2^32 value, and
esp_output() consumes it as a signed int via:
padto = min(x->tfcpad, xfrm_state_mtu(x, mtu_cached))
esp.tfclen = padto - skb->len (assigned to int)
esp.tfclen ends up negative (e.g. -207). It is sign-extended to size_t
when passed to memset() inside esp_output_fill_trailer(), producing a
~16 EB write of zeroes at skb_tail_pointer(skb). KASAN logs it as
"Write of size 18446744073709551537 at addr ffff888...".
Check for underflow and return 1. This causes the sendmsg attempt to
fail with ENETUNREACH. |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
accel/rocket: fix UAF via dangling GEM handle in create_bo
rocket_ioctl_create_bo() inserts a GEM handle into the file's IDR via
drm_gem_handle_create() early on, then performs several operations that
can fail (sgt allocation, drm_mm insert, iommu_map). If any fail after
the handle is live, the error path calls drm_gem_shmem_object_free()
which kfree's the object without removing the handle from the IDR.
This leaves a dangling handle pointing to freed slab memory. Any
subsequent ioctl using that handle (PREP_BO, FINI_BO, SUBMIT) calls
drm_gem_object_lookup() and dereferences freed memory (UAF).
Fix by moving drm_gem_handle_create() to after all fallible operations
succeed, matching the pattern used by panfrost, lima, and etnaviv.
Also fix drm_mm_insert_node_generic() whose return value was silently
overwritten by iommu_map_sgtable() on the next line. Add the missing
error check.
[tomeu: Move handle creation to the very end] |
