In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ksmbd: validate response sizes in ipc_validate_msg()

ipc_validate_msg() computes the expected message size for each
response type by adding (or multiplying) attacker-controlled fields
from the daemon response to a fixed struct size in unsigned int
arithmetic. Three cases can overflow:

KSMBD_EVENT_RPC_REQUEST:
msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_rpc_command) + resp->payload_sz;
KSMBD_EVENT_SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST:
msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_share_config_response) +
resp->payload_sz;
KSMBD_EVENT_LOGIN_REQUEST_EXT:
msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_login_response_ext) +
resp->ngroups * sizeof(gid_t);

resp->payload_sz is __u32 and resp->ngroups is __s32. Each addition
can wrap in unsigned int; the multiplication by sizeof(gid_t) mixes
signed and size_t, so a negative ngroups is converted to SIZE_MAX
before the multiply. A wrapped value of msg_sz that happens to
equal entry->msg_sz bypasses the size check on the next line, and
downstream consumers (smb2pdu.c:6742 memcpy using rpc_resp->payload_sz,
kmemdup in ksmbd_alloc_user using resp_ext->ngroups) then trust the
unverified length.

Use check_add_overflow() on the RPC_REQUEST and SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST
paths to detect integer overflow without constraining functional
payload size; userspace ksmbd-tools grows NDR responses in 4096-byte
chunks for calls like NetShareEnumAll, so a hard transport cap is
unworkable on the response side. For LOGIN_REQUEST_EXT, reject
resp->ngroups outside the signed [0, NGROUPS_MAX] range up front and
report the error from ipc_validate_msg() so it fires at the IPC
boundary; with that bound the subsequent multiplication and addition
stay well below UINT_MAX. The now-redundant ngroups check and
pr_err in ksmbd_alloc_user() are removed.

This is the response-side analogue of aab98e2dbd64 ("ksmbd: fix
integer overflows on 32 bit systems"), which hardened the request
side.

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Source ID Title
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8488-1 Linux kernel vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8488-2 Linux kernel (Raspberry Pi) vulnerabilities
Ubuntu USN Ubuntu USN USN-8507-1 Linux kernel (NVIDIA) vulnerabilities
Fixes

Solution

No solution given by the vendor.


Workaround

No workaround given by the vendor.

History

Sat, 23 May 2026 11:45:00 +0000


Wed, 06 May 2026 20:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-787

Sun, 03 May 2026 06:30:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Metrics cvssV3_1

{'score': 7.1, 'vector': 'CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:N/A:H'}


Sat, 02 May 2026 00:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Weaknesses CWE-131
References
Metrics threat_severity

None

threat_severity

Moderate


Fri, 01 May 2026 14:15:00 +0000

Type Values Removed Values Added
Description In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ksmbd: validate response sizes in ipc_validate_msg() ipc_validate_msg() computes the expected message size for each response type by adding (or multiplying) attacker-controlled fields from the daemon response to a fixed struct size in unsigned int arithmetic. Three cases can overflow: KSMBD_EVENT_RPC_REQUEST: msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_rpc_command) + resp->payload_sz; KSMBD_EVENT_SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST: msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_share_config_response) + resp->payload_sz; KSMBD_EVENT_LOGIN_REQUEST_EXT: msg_sz = sizeof(struct ksmbd_login_response_ext) + resp->ngroups * sizeof(gid_t); resp->payload_sz is __u32 and resp->ngroups is __s32. Each addition can wrap in unsigned int; the multiplication by sizeof(gid_t) mixes signed and size_t, so a negative ngroups is converted to SIZE_MAX before the multiply. A wrapped value of msg_sz that happens to equal entry->msg_sz bypasses the size check on the next line, and downstream consumers (smb2pdu.c:6742 memcpy using rpc_resp->payload_sz, kmemdup in ksmbd_alloc_user using resp_ext->ngroups) then trust the unverified length. Use check_add_overflow() on the RPC_REQUEST and SHARE_CONFIG_REQUEST paths to detect integer overflow without constraining functional payload size; userspace ksmbd-tools grows NDR responses in 4096-byte chunks for calls like NetShareEnumAll, so a hard transport cap is unworkable on the response side. For LOGIN_REQUEST_EXT, reject resp->ngroups outside the signed [0, NGROUPS_MAX] range up front and report the error from ipc_validate_msg() so it fires at the IPC boundary; with that bound the subsequent multiplication and addition stay well below UINT_MAX. The now-redundant ngroups check and pr_err in ksmbd_alloc_user() are removed. This is the response-side analogue of aab98e2dbd64 ("ksmbd: fix integer overflows on 32 bit systems"), which hardened the request side.
Title ksmbd: validate response sizes in ipc_validate_msg()
First Time appeared Linux
Linux linux Kernel
CPEs cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:*
Vendors & Products Linux
Linux linux Kernel
References

Projects

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cve-icon MITRE

Status: PUBLISHED

Assigner: Linux

Published:

Updated: 2026-06-14T17:43:59.233Z

Reserved: 2026-03-09T15:48:24.132Z

Link: CVE-2026-31707

cve-icon Vulnrichment

No data.

cve-icon NVD

Status : Modified

Published: 2026-05-01T14:16:20.720

Modified: 2026-06-17T10:34:16.900

Link: CVE-2026-31707

cve-icon Redhat

Severity : Moderate

Publid Date: 2026-05-01T00:00:00Z

Links: CVE-2026-31707 - Bugzilla

cve-icon OpenCVE Enrichment

Updated: 2026-05-06T22:30:13Z

Weaknesses