QWED is open-source AI verification infrastructure for deterministic verification of LLM outputs, tool calls, code, schemas, and agent state before production execution. Prior to 5.1.2, the qwed package passes caller-controlled math expressions directly to SymPy parse_expr() without restricted global_dict and local_dict namespaces, allowing Python eval() to resolve builtins and execute arbitrary Python code in the API server process. In src/qwed_new/api/main.py, POST /verify/math is protected by get_current_tenant but accepts any valid tenant API key, reads the expression field, applies only a cosmetic re.sub(r'(\d)(()', r'\1*\2', expression) normalization, and passes the result to parse_expr(). In src/qwed_new/core/batch.py, POST /verify/batch sends math items through batch_service.create_job(), stores item.query verbatim, and _verify_item() passes VerificationType.MATH input to parse_expr() without sanitization. The default-enabled POST /auth/signup endpoint allows anyone to create a standard tenant account, POST /auth/api-keys issues an x-api-key, and either vulnerable path can then be used to read or write files, modify data, execute operating system commands, terminate the service, and compromise other tenants in a shared deployment. This issue is fixed in version 5.1.2.
Project Subscriptions
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Advisories
| Source | ID | Title |
|---|---|---|
Github GHSA |
GHSA-q27q-98j4-9pfv | qwed Vulnerable to Authenticated Remote Code Execution via Unsafe SymPy `parse_expr()` |
Fixes
Solution
No solution given by the vendor.
Workaround
No workaround given by the vendor.
References
History
Tue, 25 Aug 2026 16:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | QWED is open-source AI verification infrastructure for deterministic verification of LLM outputs, tool calls, code, schemas, and agent state before production execution. Prior to 5.1.2, the qwed package passes caller-controlled math expressions directly to SymPy parse_expr() without restricted global_dict and local_dict namespaces, allowing Python eval() to resolve builtins and execute arbitrary Python code in the API server process. In src/qwed_new/api/main.py, POST /verify/math is protected by get_current_tenant but accepts any valid tenant API key, reads the expression field, applies only a cosmetic re.sub(r'(\d)(()', r'\1*\2', expression) normalization, and passes the result to parse_expr(). In src/qwed_new/core/batch.py, POST /verify/batch sends math items through batch_service.create_job(), stores item.query verbatim, and _verify_item() passes VerificationType.MATH input to parse_expr() without sanitization. The default-enabled POST /auth/signup endpoint allows anyone to create a standard tenant account, POST /auth/api-keys issues an x-api-key, and either vulnerable path can then be used to read or write files, modify data, execute operating system commands, terminate the service, and compromise other tenants in a shared deployment. This issue is fixed in version 5.1.2. | |
| Title | QWED: Authenticated Remote Code Execution via Unsafe SymPy `parse_expr()` | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-94 | |
| References |
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| Metrics |
cvssV3_1
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Projects
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: GitHub_M
Published:
Updated: 2026-08-25T16:23:39.334Z
Reserved: 2026-06-16T23:18:03.169Z
Link: CVE-2026-55585
No data.
Status : Received
Published: 2026-08-25T17:17:32.903
Modified: 2026-08-25T17:17:32.903
Link: CVE-2026-55585
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
Updated: 2026-08-25T18:15:04Z
Weaknesses
Github GHSA