Data::RingBuffer::Shared versions before 0.04 for Perl allow a stack buffer overflow via an unvalidated elem_size in ring_read_seq.
The attach-time validator ring_validate_header checks the capacity-overflow and total_size consistency of the header but never caps elem_size against the destination size. ring_read_seq does memcpy(out, ring_slot(h, seq), elem_size) with elem_size read raw from the mmap'd segment, copying into a fixed 8-byte destination scalar. An elem_size larger than 8 bytes writes past the destination.
A local peer that can write the backing file can leave the header valid while setting a large elem_size, so the next read copies a file-controlled length into the fixed 8-byte stack buffer, corrupting adjacent stack frames.
The attach-time validator ring_validate_header checks the capacity-overflow and total_size consistency of the header but never caps elem_size against the destination size. ring_read_seq does memcpy(out, ring_slot(h, seq), elem_size) with elem_size read raw from the mmap'd segment, copying into a fixed 8-byte destination scalar. An elem_size larger than 8 bytes writes past the destination.
A local peer that can write the backing file can leave the header valid while setting a large elem_size, so the next read copies a file-controlled length into the fixed 8-byte stack buffer, corrupting adjacent stack frames.
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Fixes
Solution
Upgrade to Data::RingBuffer::Shared 0.04 or later, which pins elem_size to the fixed element size of the buffer's registered variant.
Workaround
For deployments that cannot upgrade to 0.04, place the backing file in a directory writable only by the owning user, so a local peer cannot tamper with the elem_size the read path trusts.
References
History
Tue, 21 Jul 2026 19:45:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | Data::RingBuffer::Shared versions before 0.04 for Perl allow a stack buffer overflow via an unvalidated elem_size in ring_read_seq. The attach-time validator ring_validate_header checks the capacity-overflow and total_size consistency of the header but never caps elem_size against the destination size. ring_read_seq does memcpy(out, ring_slot(h, seq), elem_size) with elem_size read raw from the mmap'd segment, copying into a fixed 8-byte destination scalar. An elem_size larger than 8 bytes writes past the destination. A local peer that can write the backing file can leave the header valid while setting a large elem_size, so the next read copies a file-controlled length into the fixed 8-byte stack buffer, corrupting adjacent stack frames. | |
| Title | Data::RingBuffer::Shared versions before 0.04 for Perl allow a stack buffer overflow via an unvalidated elem_size in ring_read_seq | |
| Weaknesses | CWE-121 | |
| References |
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Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: CPANSec
Published:
Updated: 2026-07-21T19:04:20.191Z
Reserved: 2026-07-02T16:24:17.913Z
Link: CVE-2026-59144
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Weaknesses