In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:
drm/amd/display: Validate payload length and link_index in dc_process_dmub_aux_transfer_async
[Why&How]
dc_process_dmub_aux_transfer_async() copies payload->length bytes into a
16-byte stack buffer (dpaux.data[16]) guarded only by an ASSERT(), which
is a no-op in release builds. If a caller ever passes length > 16 this
results in a stack buffer overflow via memcpy.
Additionally, link_index is used to dereference dc->links[] without
bounds checking against dc->link_count, risking an out-of-bounds access.
Replace the ASSERT with a hard runtime check that returns false when
payload->length exceeds the destination buffer size, and add a bounds
check for link_index before it is used.
(cherry picked from commit ba4caa9fecdf7a38f98c878ad05a8a64148b6881)
drm/amd/display: Validate payload length and link_index in dc_process_dmub_aux_transfer_async
[Why&How]
dc_process_dmub_aux_transfer_async() copies payload->length bytes into a
16-byte stack buffer (dpaux.data[16]) guarded only by an ASSERT(), which
is a no-op in release builds. If a caller ever passes length > 16 this
results in a stack buffer overflow via memcpy.
Additionally, link_index is used to dereference dc->links[] without
bounds checking against dc->link_count, risking an out-of-bounds access.
Replace the ASSERT with a hard runtime check that returns false when
payload->length exceeds the destination buffer size, and add a bounds
check for link_index before it is used.
(cherry picked from commit ba4caa9fecdf7a38f98c878ad05a8a64148b6881)
Default status is the baseline for the product, each version can override it (e.g. patched versions marked unaffected).
| Vendor | Product | Default status | Versions | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Linux | Linux | unaffected |
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| Linux | Linux | affected |
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No data.
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Advisories
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Fixes
Solution
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Workaround
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References
History
Fri, 24 Jul 2026 18:30:00 +0000
| Type | Values Removed | Values Added |
|---|---|---|
| Description | In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amd/display: Validate payload length and link_index in dc_process_dmub_aux_transfer_async [Why&How] dc_process_dmub_aux_transfer_async() copies payload->length bytes into a 16-byte stack buffer (dpaux.data[16]) guarded only by an ASSERT(), which is a no-op in release builds. If a caller ever passes length > 16 this results in a stack buffer overflow via memcpy. Additionally, link_index is used to dereference dc->links[] without bounds checking against dc->link_count, risking an out-of-bounds access. Replace the ASSERT with a hard runtime check that returns false when payload->length exceeds the destination buffer size, and add a bounds check for link_index before it is used. (cherry picked from commit ba4caa9fecdf7a38f98c878ad05a8a64148b6881) | |
| Title | drm/amd/display: Validate payload length and link_index in dc_process_dmub_aux_transfer_async | |
| First Time appeared |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| CPEs | cpe:2.3:o:linux:linux_kernel:*:*:*:*:*:*:*:* | |
| Vendors & Products |
Linux
Linux linux Kernel |
|
| References |
|
|
Projects
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MITRE
Status: PUBLISHED
Assigner: Linux
Published:
Updated: 2026-07-24T15:23:06.379Z
Reserved: 2026-07-19T15:36:31.770Z
Link: CVE-2026-64219
Vulnrichment
No data.
NVD
No data.
Redhat
No data.
OpenCVE Enrichment
No data.
Weaknesses
No weakness.