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Search Results (82443 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-46199 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdgpu/vcn4: Prevent OOB reads when parsing dec msg Check bounds against the end of the BO whenever we access the msg. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46198 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: batman-adv: fix integer overflow on buff_pos Fixing an integer overflow present in batadv_iv_ogm_send_to_if. The size check is done using the int type in batadv_iv_ogm_aggr_packet whereas the buff_pos variable uses the s16 type. This could lead to an out-of-bound read. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46197 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/amdkfd: validate SVM ioctl nattr against buffer size Validate nattr field against the buffer size, preventing out-of-bounds buffer access via user-controlled attribute count. (cherry picked from commit 5eca8bfdfa456c3304ca77523718fe24254c172f) | ||||
| CVE-2026-46189 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/vmw_pvrdma: Fix double free on pvrdma_alloc_ucontext() error path Sashiko points out that pvrdma_uar_free() is already called within pvrdma_dealloc_ucontext(), so calling it before triggers a double free. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46186 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: virtio_bt: validate rx pkt_type header length virtbt_rx_handle() reads the leading pkt_type byte from the RX skb and forwards the remainder to hci_recv_frame() for every event/ACL/SCO/ISO type, without checking that the remaining payload is at least the fixed HCI header for that type. After the preceding patch bounds the backend-supplied used.len to [1, VIRTBT_RX_BUF_SIZE], a one-byte completion still reaches hci_recv_frame() with skb->len already pulled to 0. If the byte happened to be HCI_ACLDATA_PKT, the ACL-vs-ISO classification fast-path in hci_dev_classify_pkt_type() dereferences hci_acl_hdr(skb)->handle whenever the HCI device has an active CIS_LINK, BIS_LINK, or PA_LINK connection, reading two bytes of uninitialized RX-buffer data. The same hazard exists for every packet type the driver accepts because none of the switch cases in virtbt_rx_handle() check skb->len against the per-type minimum HCI header size before handing the frame to the core. After stripping pkt_type, require skb->len to cover the fixed header size for the selected type (event 2, ACL 4, SCO 3, ISO 4) before calling hci_recv_frame(); drop ratelimited otherwise. Unknown pkt_type values still take the original kfree_skb() default path. Use bt_dev_err_ratelimited() because both the length and pkt_type values come from an untrusted backend that can otherwise flood the kernel log. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46178 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/mlx4: Fix resource leak on error in mlx4_ib_create_srq() Sashiko points out that mlx4_srq_alloc() was not undone during error unwind, add the missing call to mlx4_srq_free(). | ||||
| CVE-2026-46177 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipmi: Add limits to event and receive message requests The driver would just fetch events and receive messages until the BMC said it was done. To avoid issues with BMCs that never say they are done, add a limit of 10 fetches at a time. In addition, an si interface has an attn state it can return from the hardware which is supposed to cause a flag fetch to see if the driver needs to fetch events or message or a few other things. If the attn bit gets stuck, it's a similar problem. So allow messages in between flag fetches so the driver itself doesn't get stuck. This is a more general fix than the previous fix for the specific bad BMC, but should fix the more general issue of a BMC that won't stop saying it has data. This has been there from the beginning of the driver. It's not a bug per-se, but it is accounting for bugs in BMCs. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46173 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: exit: prevent preemption of oopsing TASK_DEAD task When an already-exiting task oopses, make_task_dead() currently calls do_task_dead() with preemption enabled. That is forbidden: do_task_dead() calls __schedule(), which has a comment saying "WARNING: must be called with preemption disabled!". If an oopsing task is preempted in do_task_dead(), between becoming TASK_DEAD and entering the scheduler explicitly, bad things happen: finish_task_switch() assumes that once the scheduler has switched away from a TASK_DEAD task, the task can never run again and its stack is no longer needed; but that assumption apparently doesn't hold if the dead task was preempted (the SM_PREEMPT case). This means that the scheduler ends up repeatedly dropping references on the dead task's stack, which can lead to use-after-free or double-free of the entire task stack; in other words, two tasks can end up running on the same stack, resulting in various kinds of memory corruption. (This does not just affect "recursively oopsing" tasks; it is enough to oops once during task exit, for example in a file_operations::release handler) | ||||
| CVE-2026-46172 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: xfrm6: release dst on error in xfrm6_rcv_encap() xfrm6_rcv_encap() performs an IPv6 route lookup when the skb does not already have a dst attached. ip6_route_input_lookup() returns a referenced dst entry even when the lookup resolves to an error route. If dst->error is set, xfrm6_rcv_encap() drops the skb without attaching the dst to the skb and without releasing the reference returned by the lookup. Repeated packets hitting this path therefore leak dst entries. Release the dst before jumping to the drop path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46170 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: pm: ADD_ADDR rtx: free sk if last When an ADD_ADDR is retransmitted, the sk is held in sk_reset_timer(), and released at the end. If at that moment, it was the last reference being held, the sk would not be freed. sock_put() should then be called instead of __sock_put(). But that's not enough: if it is the last reference, sock_put() will call sk_free(), which will end up calling sk_stop_timer_sync() on the same timer, and waiting indefinitely to finish. So it is needed to mark that the timer is done at the end of the timer handler when it has not been rescheduled, not to call sk_stop_timer_sync() on "itself". | ||||
| CVE-2026-46158 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: pm: ADD_ADDR rtx: always decrease sk refcount When an ADD_ADDR is retransmitted, the sk is held in sk_reset_timer(). It should then be released in all cases at the end. Some (unlikely) checks were returning directly instead of calling sock_put() to decrease the refcount. Jump to a new 'exit' label to call __sock_put() (which will become sock_put() in the next commit) to fix this potential leak. While at it, drop the '!msk' check which cannot happen because it is never reset, and explicitly mark the remaining one as "unlikely". | ||||
| CVE-2026-46150 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fanotify: fix false positive on permission events fsnotify_get_mark_safe() may return false for a mark on an unrelated group, which results in bypassing the permission check. Fix by skipping over detached marks that are not in the current group. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46149 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: target: configfs: Bound snprintf() return in tg_pt_gp_members_show() target_tg_pt_gp_members_show() formats LUN paths with snprintf() into a 256-byte stack buffer, then will memcpy() cur_len bytes from that buffer. snprintf() returns the length the output would have had, which can exceed the buffer size when the fabric WWN is long because iSCSI IQN names can be up to 223 bytes. The check at the memcpy() site only guards the destination page write, not the source read, so memcpy() will read past the stack buffer and copy adjacent stack contents to the sysfs reader, which when CONFIG_FORTIFY_SOURCE is enabled, fortify_panic() will be triggered. Commit 27e06650a5ea ("scsi: target: target_core_configfs: Add length check to avoid buffer overflow") added the same bound to the target_lu_gp_members_show() but the tg_pt_gp variant was missed so resolve that here. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46133 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: RDMA/rxe: Reject unknown opcodes before ICRC processing Even after applying commit 7244491dab34 ("RDMA/rxe: Validate pad and ICRC before payload_size() in rxe_rcv"), a single unauthenticated UDP packet can still trigger panic. That patch handled payload_size() underflow only for valid opcodes with short packets, not for packets carrying an unknown opcode. The unknown-opcode OOB read described below predates that commit and reaches back to the initial Soft RoCE driver. The check added there reads pkt->paylen < header_size(pkt) + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE where header_size(pkt) expands to rxe_opcode[pkt->opcode].length. The rxe_opcode[] array has 256 entries but is only populated for defined IB opcodes; any other entry (for example opcode 0xff) is zero-initialized, so length == 0 and the check degenerates to pkt->paylen < 0 + bth_pad(pkt) + RXE_ICRC_SIZE which does not constrain pkt->paylen enough. rxe_icrc_hdr() then computes rxe_opcode[pkt->opcode].length - RXE_BTH_BYTES which underflows when length == 0 and passes a huge value to rxe_crc32(), causing an out-of-bounds read of the skb payload. Reproduced on v7.0-rc7 with that fix applied, QEMU/KVM with CONFIG_RDMA_RXE=y and CONFIG_KASAN=y, after rdma link add rxe0 type rxe netdev eth0 A single 48-byte UDP packet to port 4791 with BTH opcode=0xff and QPN=IB_MULTICAST_QPN triggers: BUG: KASAN: slab-out-of-bounds in crc32_le+0x115/0x170 Read of size 1 at addr ... The buggy address is located 0 bytes to the right of allocated 704-byte region Call Trace: crc32_le+0x115/0x170 rxe_icrc_hdr.isra.0+0x226/0x300 rxe_icrc_check+0x13f/0x3a0 rxe_rcv+0x6e1/0x16e0 rxe_udp_encap_recv+0x20a/0x320 udp_queue_rcv_one_skb+0x7ed/0x12c0 Subsequent packets with the same shape fault on unmapped memory and panic the kernel. The trigger requires only module load and "rdma link add"; no QP, no connection, and no authentication. Fix this by rejecting packets whose opcode has no rxe_opcode[] entry, detected via the zero mask or zero length, before any length arithmetic runs. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46132 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: rtnetlink: zero ifla_vf_broadcast to avoid stack infoleak in rtnl_fill_vfinfo rtnl_fill_vfinfo() declares struct ifla_vf_broadcast on the stack without initialisation: struct ifla_vf_broadcast vf_broadcast; The struct contains a single fixed 32-byte field: /* include/uapi/linux/if_link.h */ struct ifla_vf_broadcast { __u8 broadcast[32]; }; The function then copies dev->broadcast into it using dev->addr_len as the length: memcpy(vf_broadcast.broadcast, dev->broadcast, dev->addr_len); On Ethernet devices (the overwhelming majority of SR-IOV NICs) dev->addr_len is 6, so only the first 6 bytes of broadcast[] are written. The remaining 26 bytes retain whatever was previously on the kernel stack. The full struct is then handed to userspace via: nla_put(skb, IFLA_VF_BROADCAST, sizeof(vf_broadcast), &vf_broadcast) leaking up to 26 bytes of uninitialised kernel stack per VF per RTM_GETLINK request, repeatable. The other vf_* structs in the same function are explicitly zeroed for exactly this reason - see the memset() calls for ivi, vf_vlan_info, node_guid and port_guid a few lines above. vf_broadcast was simply missed when it was added. Reachability: any unprivileged local process can open AF_NETLINK / NETLINK_ROUTE without capabilities and send RTM_GETLINK with an IFLA_EXT_MASK attribute carrying RTEXT_FILTER_VF. The kernel walks each VF and emits IFLA_VF_BROADCAST, leaking 26 bytes of stack per VF per request. Stack residue at this call site can include return addresses and transient sensitive data; KASAN with stack instrumentation, or KMSAN, will flag the nla_put() when reproduced. Zero the on-stack struct before the partial memcpy, matching the existing pattern used for the other vf_* structs in the same function. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46129 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: btrfs: fix double free in create_space_info() error path When kobject_init_and_add() fails, the call chain is: create_space_info() -> btrfs_sysfs_add_space_info_type() -> kobject_init_and_add() -> failure -> kobject_put(&space_info->kobj) -> space_info_release() -> kfree(space_info) Then control returns to create_space_info(): btrfs_sysfs_add_space_info_type() returns error -> goto out_free -> kfree(space_info) This causes a double free. Keep the direct kfree(space_info) for the earlier failure path, but after btrfs_sysfs_add_space_info_type() has called kobject_put(), let the kobject release callback handle the cleanup. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46124 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: isofs: validate block number from NFS file handle in isofs_export_iget isofs_fh_to_dentry() and isofs_fh_to_parent() pass an attacker- controlled block number (ifid->block or ifid->parent_block) from the NFS file handle to isofs_export_iget(), which only rejects block == 0 before calling isofs_iget() and ultimately sb_bread(). A crafted file handle with fh_len sufficient to pass the check added by commit 0405d4b63d08 ("isofs: Prevent the use of too small fid") can still drive the server to read any in-range block on the backing device as if it were an iso_directory_record. That earlier fix was assigned CVE-2025-37780. sb_bread() on an out-of-range block returns NULL cleanly via the EIO path, so there is no memory-safety violation. For in-range reads of adjacent-partition data on the same block device, the unrelated bytes end up in iso_inode_info fields that reach the NFS client as dentry metadata. The deployment surface (isofs exported over NFS from loop-mounted images) is narrow and requires an authenticated NFS peer, but the malformed-file-handle class is reportable as hardening next to the existing CVE-2025-37780 fix. Reject block >= ISOFS_SB(sb)->s_nzones in isofs_export_iget() so the check covers both isofs_fh_to_dentry() and isofs_fh_to_parent() call sites with a single line. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46123 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 7.7 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: Bluetooth: virtio_bt: clamp rx length before skb_put virtbt_rx_work() calls skb_put(skb, len) where len comes directly from virtqueue_get_buf() with no validation against the buffer we posted to the device. The RX skb is allocated in virtbt_add_inbuf() and exposed to virtio as exactly 1000 bytes via sg_init_one(). Checking len against skb_tailroom(skb) is not sufficient because alloc_skb() can leave more tailroom than the 1000 bytes actually handed to the device. A malicious or buggy backend can therefore report used.len between 1001 and skb_tailroom(skb), causing skb_put() to include uninitialized kernel heap bytes that were never written by the device. The same path also accepts len == 0, in which case skb_put(skb, 0) leaves the skb empty but virtbt_rx_handle() still reads the pkt_type byte from skb->data, consuming uninitialized memory. Define VIRTBT_RX_BUF_SIZE once and reuse it in alloc_skb() and sg_init_one(), and gate virtbt_rx_work() on that same constant so the bound checked matches the buffer actually exposed to the device. Reject used.len == 0 in the same gate so an empty completion can no longer reach virtbt_rx_handle(). Use bt_dev_err_ratelimited() because the length value comes from an untrusted backend that can otherwise flood the kernel log. Same class of bug as commit c04db81cd028 ("net/9p: Fix buffer overflow in USB transport layer"), which hardened the USB 9p transport against unchecked device-reported length. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46120 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ip6_gre: Use cached t->net in ip6erspan_changelink(). After commit 5e72ce3e3980 ("net: ipv6: Use link netns in newlink() of rtnl_link_ops"), ip6erspan_newlink() correctly resolves the per-netns ip6gre hash via link_net. ip6erspan_changelink() was not converted in that series and still uses dev_net(dev), which diverges from the device's creation netns after IFLA_NET_NS_FD migration. This re-inserts the tunnel into the wrong per-netns hash. The original netns keeps a stale entry. When that netns is later destroyed, ip6gre_exit_rtnl_net() walks the stale entry, producing a slab-use-after-free reported by KASAN, followed by a kernel BUG at net/core/dev.c (LIST_POISON1) in unregister_netdevice_many_notify(). Reachable from an unprivileged user namespace (unshare --user --map-root-user --net). ip6gre_changelink() earlier in the same file already uses the cached t->net; only ip6erspan_changelink() has the wrong shape. | ||||
| CVE-2026-46113 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-06-01 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: KVM: x86: Fix shadow paging use-after-free due to unexpected GFN The shadow MMU computes GFNs for direct shadow pages using sp->gfn plus the SPTE index. This assumption breaks for shadow paging if the guest page tables are modified between VM entries (similar to commit aad885e77496, "KVM: x86/mmu: Drop/zap existing present SPTE even when creating an MMIO SPTE", 2026-03-27). The flow is as follows: - a PDE is installed for a 2MB mapping, and a page in that area is accessed. KVM creates a kvm_mmu_page consisting of 512 4KB pages; the kvm_mmu_page is marked by FNAME(fetch) as direct-mapped because the guest's mapping is a huge page (and thus contiguous). - the PDE mapping is changed from outside the guest. - the guest accesses another page in the same 2MB area. KVM installs a new leaf SPTE and rmap entry; the SPTE uses the "correct" GFN (i.e. based on the new mapping, as changed in the previous step) but that GFN is outside of the [sp->gfn, sp->gfn + 511] range; therefore the rmap entry cannot be found and removed when the kvm_mmu_page is zapped. - the memslot that covers the first 2MB mapping is deleted, and the kvm_mmu_page for the now-invalid GPA is zapped. However, rmap_remove() only looks at the [sp->gfn, sp->gfn + 511] range established in step 1, and fails to find the rmap entry that was recorded by step 3. - any operation that causes an rmap walk for the same page accessed by step 3 then walks a stale rmap and dereferences a freed kvm_mmu_page. This includes dirty logging or MMU notifier invalidations (e.g., from MADV_DONTNEED). The underlying issue is that KVM's walking of shadow PTEs assumes that if a SPTE is present when KVM wants to install a non-leaf SPTE, then the existing kvm_mmu_page must be for the correct gfn. Because the only way for the gfn to be wrong is if KVM messed up and failed to zap a SPTE... which shouldn't happen, but *actually* only happens in response to a guest write. That bug dates back literally forever, as even the first version of KVM assumes that the GFN matches and walks into the "wrong" shadow page. However, that was only an imprecision until 2032a93d66fa ("KVM: MMU: Don't allocate gfns page for direct mmu pages") came along. Fix it by checking for a target gfn mismatch and zapping the existing SPTE. That way the old SP and rmap entries are gone, KVM installs the rmap in the right location, and everyone is happy. | ||||