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Search Results (22889 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-74478 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: um: vector: fix use-after-free in vector_mmsg_rx() When vector_mmsg_rx() discards a packet whose overlay header fails verify_header(), it frees the skb and continues the loop: if (header_check < 0) { dev_kfree_skb_irq(skb); vp->estats.rx_encaps_errors++; continue; } The normal and short-packet paths fall through to the bottom of the loop body, which clears the consumed slot and advances the cursors: (*skbuff_vector) = NULL; mmsg_vector++; skbuff_vector++; The verify_header() < 0 path skips that via continue, so the freed skb is left in skbuff_vector[] and the cursors do not advance. The next iteration reads the same slot, gets the freed skb, and frees it again, producing a refcount underflow / use-after-free in the RX path. Discard the slot the same way the other paths do before continuing. Only transports whose verify_header() can return negative are affected: GRE and L2TPv3 do so on a cookie/session-id mismatch (raw/tap do not), so any peer on such a transport can trigger it without authentication. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74473 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vxlan: use pskb_network_may_pull() in route_shortcircuit() route_shortcircuit() currently calls pskb_may_pull(skb, sizeof(struct iphdr)) (or ipv6hdr), which checks if bytes are available starting from skb->data. However, in vxlan_xmit(), skb->data points to the MAC header, so skb_network_offset(skb) is ETH_HLEN (14 bytes). Using pskb_may_pull(skb, 20) only checks 20 bytes from skb->data (which is 14 bytes MAC header + 6 bytes of IP header), leaving the rest of the IP header potentially un-pulled in non-linear frags. Subsequent dereferences of ip_hdr(skb)->daddr can read beyond the pulled linear buffer length. Fix this by using pskb_network_may_pull(), which adds skb_network_offset(skb) to the length check to ensure the full network header is present in the linear buffer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74472 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ublk: reset kernel-owned dev_info fields in ublk_ctrl_add_dev() ublk_ctrl_add_dev() memcpy()s the userspace ublksrv_ctrl_dev_info into ub->dev_info and then fixes up the fields the driver owns, but misses ->state and ->ublksrv_pid. A device added with ->state = UBLK_S_DEV_LIVE passes the "->state != UBLK_S_DEV_DEAD" test that ublk_stop_dev_unlocked() uses as its proxy for "a disk is attached", while ->ub_disk is still NULL, so DEL_DEV right after ADD_DEV oopses in del_gendisk(). UBLK_S_DEV_QUIESCED plus UBLK_F_USER_RECOVERY dies one step earlier, in ublk_force_abort_dev(). A poisoned ->state also gets START_USER_RECOVERY and the char device read/write path onto a device that was never started, and wedges START_DEV at -EEXIST. A poisoned ->ublksrv_pid just makes GET_DEV_INFO report an unrelated task as the ublk server. Reset both after the memcpy(), as ublk_detach_disk() does. Userspace only ever reads these back, so correcting them silently breaks nothing. ADD_DEV has copied ->state in unsanitized since ublk was merged, but back then it was harmless: the gendisk was allocated during ADD_DEV, and both teardown and the START_DEV -EEXIST check keyed off disk_live() rather than ->state. The oops became reachable once the disk allocation moved to START_DEV and those checks switched to ->state. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74469 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 8.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: prevent peer transport count overflow sctp_assoc_add_peer() increments the association's 16-bit transport_count for every new unique peer. Adding the 65,536th transport wraps the count to zero. SCTP sock_diag uses transport_count to reserve the INET_DIAG_PEERS payload, then copies one sockaddr_storage for every entry in transport_addr_list. After the wrap, a diagnostic dump reserves an empty payload and writes 8 MiB of peer addresses past the skb tail. Reject a new unique peer when transport_count has reached U16_MAX. Perform the check after the existing-peer lookup so a duplicate address continues to return its existing transport at the limit. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74465 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: openvswitch: fix potential UAF on meter attach failure While attaching a newly created meter attach_meter() function makes the new meter visible to other CPUs but can still fail afterwards. On failure, it detaches the meter back and returns an error. However, this is an unexpected behavior for the ovs_meter_cmd_set() that uses a plain kfree(meter) on attach failure without waiting for RCU readers to stop using it, assuming it was never visible. This is never a problem for ovs-vswitchd as it always creates meters before creating any flows that use them. But the UAF can be triggered with a custom application using uAPI: BUG: KASAN: slab-use-after-free in ovs_meter_execute (net/openvswitch/meter.c:653) Read of size 8 at addr ffff88810d152650 by task meter/2508 Call Trace: ovs_meter_execute (net/openvswitch/meter.c:653) do_execute_actions (net/openvswitch/actions.c:1407) ovs_execute_actions (net/openvswitch/actions.c:1584) ovs_packet_cmd_execute (net/openvswitch/datapath.c:703) ... netlink_sendmsg (af_netlink.c:1900) Allocated by task 2519: __kasan_kmalloc (mm/kasan/common.c:398 mm/kasan/common.c:415) ovs_meter_cmd_set (net/openvswitch/meter.c:422) ... netlink_sendmsg (af_netlink.c:1900) Freed by task 2519: kfree (mm/slub.c:2705 mm/slub.c:6405 mm/slub.c:6720) ovs_meter_cmd_set (net/openvswitch/meter.c:479) ... netlink_sendmsg (af_netlink.c:1900) Fix that by making sure attach_meter() doesn't make the meter visible until all the checks are done and the function can't fail anymore. This also makes sure the "hash" value is calculated after the potential re-sizing of the table. Reported by Trend Micro's Zero Day Initiative as ZDI-CAN-31642. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74461 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: i2c: imx: Cancel hrtimer before clearing slave pointer In i2c_imx_unreg_slave(), the slave pointer is set to NULL after disabling interrupts. However, a pending interrupt might already have started the hrtimer (i2c_imx_slave_timeout) before the pointer was cleared. If the hrtimer fires after i2c_imx->slave is set to NULL, the timer callback i2c_imx_slave_finish_op() will call i2c_imx_slave_event() with a NULL slave pointer, which results in a use-after-free / NULL pointer dereference. Fix by canceling the hrtimer and waiting for it to complete after disabling interrupts, before clearing the slave pointer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74460 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: ems_usb: validate CPC message lengths ems_usb_read_bulk_callback() walks CPC messages packed in one USB receive buffer. Check that each declared message fits in the URB payload. Also require the type-specific payload to cover the fields used by the CAN, state, error and overrun handlers. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74453 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/vc4: Zero the tile state data array before each BIN job The binner BO is a single 16MB buffer split into 512KB slots that are handed out to jobs at submission time and recycled as jobs complete, without ever being cleared. Each slot holds the job's Tile State Data Array (TSDA) at its start, followed by the tile allocation pool. While the tile allocation pool is only walked by the render thread through branches the binner generated during the current job, the TSDA is the PTB's own per-tile bookkeeping and is consumed by the hardware itself. Although the kernel sets the "Auto-initialise Tile State Data Array" flag in the tile binning mode configuration, the PTB demonstrably still acts on stale tile state left by the slot's previous user: the binner ends up creating invalid command streams with invalid primitive streams and branches, which can cause GPU hangs as observed in [1][2]. Zero the TSDA when the job's binning slot is configured. This clears 48 bytes per tile (~24KB for a 1080p frame) in the submission path, and guarantees the PTB never sees another job's tile state. The tile count is only checked for being non-zero today, so the 8-bit fields it comes from can describe a tile state array almost six times larger than the slot it has to live in. Bound it before the slot is handed out, since such size decides how much of the slot is left for the tile alloc pool. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74444 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: drm/vmwgfx: validate DRAW_PRIMITIVES header size before division vmw_cmd_draw() computes maxnum = (header->size - sizeof(cmd->body)) / sizeof(*decl); where header->size is u32 and is taken straight from the user-supplied command stream. When header->size is less than sizeof(cmd->body) the unsigned subtraction wraps to nearly 4 GiB, producing a huge maxnum. Any user-controlled cmd->body.numVertexDecls then passes the bound and the loop dereferences decl[i] far past the end of the kernel command bounce buffer, producing an out-of-bounds read of kernel memory. Reject undersized headers up front. | ||||
| CVE-2026-72392 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ipv6: fib6: fix NULL deref in fib6_walk_continue() on multi-batch dump inet6_dump_fib() saves its progress in cb->args[1] as a positional index within the current hash chain. Between batches, a concurrent fib6_new_table() can insert a new table at the chain head, shifting all existing entries. The saved index then lands on a different table, causing fib6_dump_table() to set w->root to the wrong table while w->node still points into the previous one. fib6_walk_continue() dereferences w->node->parent (NULL) and panics: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000008 RIP: 0010:fib6_walk_continue+0x6e/0x170 Call Trace: <TASK> fib6_dump_table.isra.0+0xc5/0x240 inet6_dump_fib+0xf6/0x420 rtnl_dumpit+0x30/0xa0 netlink_dump+0x15b/0x460 netlink_recvmsg+0x1d6/0x2a0 ____sys_recvmsg+0x17a/0x190 Fix by storing tb->tb6_id in cb->args[1] instead of a positional index. On resume, skip entries until the id matches; a concurrent head-insert can never match the saved id, so the walker always resumes on the correct table. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74564 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: netfilter: xt_hashlimit: validate hashtable supports XT_HASHLIMIT_RATE_MATCH The XT_HASHLIMIT_RATE_MATCH flag mode changes the semantics of the dsthash_ent structure which represents an entry in the hashtable. There is a union area which uses a different layout to express the rate match mode. Update .checkentry path to validate the XT_HASHLIMIT_RATE_MATCH mode flag is requested by two or more different rules that refer to the same hashtable. Otherwise, uninitialized access to the burst field in the union is possible. Reject the use of the XT_HASHLIMIT_RATE_MATCH mode flag if set on by revision less than 3 too. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74555 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: scsi: libsas: Fix HA resume deadlock and hisi_sas disk-wake race Commit fbefe22811c3 ("scsi: libsas: Don't always drain event workqueue for HA resume") introduced sas_resume_ha_no_sync() to avoid a deadlock: the PHYE_RESUME_TIMEOUT handler, running on the HA event workqueue, calls sas_deform_port() -> sas_destruct_devices(), which removes SCSI devices and waits for the host to become runtime-active. But the host cannot resume until sas_resume_ha() -> sas_drain_work() returns, and the drain is blocked on that very handler. However skipping the drain reintroduces a race: hisi_sas returns from resume before all PHY UP work and libsas discovery work finish. The controller may then autosuspend while disks are still waking up. The disks issue IO to a suspended controller, the IO fails, and the disks get disabled. Fix the deadlock at its source by moving the PHYE_RESUME_TIMEOUT notification to after sas_drain_work(). By then the host resume is about to complete, so device removal through device_link no longer blocks on the resume and the cycle is broken. With the deadlock gone, restore sas_resume_ha() (the draining variant) in hisi_sas and remove sas_resume_ha_no_sync(). The reorder is safe for the other libsas consumers (isci, pm8001, aic94xx, mvsas). During suspend, sas_suspend_devices() calls sas_notify_lldd_dev_gone() for each device, which sets dev->lldd_dev to NULL. When scsi_unblock_requests re-enables I/O in resume, any I/O to a timed-out phy's disk is immediately rejected by the LLDD before reaching hardware: isci returns SAS_DEVICE_UNKNOWN (mapped to DID_BAD_TARGET), and pm8001 returns SAS_PHY_DOWN (mapped to DID_NO_CONNECT). Both complete directly via scsi_done() without entering SCSI EH. This is identical in both the old and new ordering since lldd_dev_gone runs during suspend, before resume. The reorder only affects when the PHYE_RESUME_TIMEOUT handler runs (synchronized by sas_drain_work() vs. asynchronous after resume returns), not whether I/O can reach the device. aic94xx and mvsas do not register any PM ops and never reach this code path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74549 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: hwmon: (nct6775-core) Prevent access to unsupported weight registers Sashiko reports: During initialization of the nct6116 chip, the driver sets data->pwm_num to 5. However, it assigns several NCT6106 register arrays (such as NCT6106_REG_WEIGHT_DUTY_STEP, NCT6106_REG_WEIGHT_TEMP_SEL, and NCT6106_REG_WEIGHT_TEMP_*) to data->REG_PWM and data->REG_WEIGHT_TEMP. These arrays only contain 3 elements. In nct6775_update_pwm(), the driver iterates up to data->pwm_num. If data->has_pwm has bits 3 or 4 set (which is structurally possible for nct6116), the loop attempts to read elements at index 3 and 4 from these 3-element arrays. This results in a global out-of-bounds read, which can be caught by KASAN. Furthermore, the driver uses these garbage out-of-bounds values as hardware register addresses for subsequent read and write operations. This leads to invalid hardware register access, potentially causing hardware misconfiguration or system crashes. The underlying problem is that the chip does support up to five fan control channels, but only the first three support weight control. Fix the problem by extending the affected weight register arrays with zeroed fields. The driver uses zeroed register addresses to determine if a register is supported or not, and skips accesses for unsupported registers. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74519 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: pinctrl: devicetree: don't free uninitialized dev_name on error path dt_remember_or_free_map() duplicates dev_name for each map entry. If kstrdup_const() fails, dt_free_map() frees dev_name in all num_maps entries, including entries that have not been initialized. Some pinctrl drivers, including pinctrl-imx, allocate the map with kmalloc() and leave dev_name for the core to initialize. The untouched entries therefore contain uninitialized data which is passed to kfree_const(). Reproduced on qemu's mcimx6ul-evk (pinctrl-imx) with failslab injection while binding the pinctrl-consuming device, under KASAN: BUG: KASAN: double-free in dt_free_map+0x34/0xa4 Free of addr c425a900 by task init/1 kfree from dt_free_map+0x34/0xa4 dt_free_map from dt_remember_or_free_map+0x184/0x198 dt_remember_or_free_map from pinctrl_dt_to_map+0x33c/0x4c8 pinctrl_dt_to_map from create_pinctrl+0x9c/0x5c0 Initialize all dev_name fields to NULL before duplicating the device name, making the full-map cleanup safe after a partial failure. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74499 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.0 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ALSA: usb-audio: fix OOB write in snd_usbmidi_akai_output() snd_usbmidi_akai_output() computes its fill-loop bound buf_end = ep->max_transfer - MAX_AKAI_SYSEX_LEN - 1; as a signed int, so a small device-advertised bulk-OUT max_transfer makes buf_end negative. The loop guard then compares the u32 urb->transfer_buffer_length against that negative int: the usual arithmetic conversion turns buf_end into a large unsigned value, so the guard stays true and each iteration keeps appending SysEx framing and payload bytes past the end of the URB transfer buffer, which is only max_transfer bytes long. A USB device that advertises a tiny bulk-OUT endpoint can therefore trigger an attacker-length- and content-controlled heap out-of-bounds write when a process writes to the created /dev/snd/midiC*D* node. Return early when there is no room for even one SysEx, so the loop is never entered with a bound that would wrap. The loop is the last statement of the function, so bailing out is equivalent to it not running. Discovered by XBOW, triaged by Baul Lee <baul.lee@xbow.com> | ||||
| CVE-2026-74475 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 10 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: vxlan: use neigh_ha_snapshot() in route_shortcircuit() The neighbour hardware address n->ha can be updated asynchronously by the neighbour subsystem, protected by n->ha_lock seqlock. Reading n->ha without holding the seqlock loop can lead to torn reads or reading a partially updated MAC address. Use neigh_ha_snapshot() in route_shortcircuit() to safely copy n->ha under read_seqbegin()/read_seqretry() lock protection before using it. Note that arp_reduce() and neigh_reduce() seem to have the same issue left for future patches. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74471 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Check return value of __register_event() in trace_module_add_events() trace_module_add_events() ignores the return value of __register_event() and unconditionally calls __add_event_to_tracers() for each event. If __register_event() fails (for example, if event_init() fails), the trace_event_call is not added to ftrace_events list, but __add_event_to_tracers() still creates a trace_event_file pointing to it. If module loading subsequently fails and module memory is freed, tracing state retains a stale trace_event_call pointer in trace_event_file, leading to a use-after-free when tracefs or tracing subsystem operations are later executed. Fix this by checking the return value of __register_event() and only calling __add_event_to_tracers() if event registration succeeded. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74464 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: net: openvswitch: fix skb leak on flow key update failure during ct ovs_ct_execute() always steals or frees the skb on failure while ovs_flow_key_update() does not. So, if it fails and we return right away, the skb ends up leaked. Fix that by breaking instead and letting the common error handling code at the bottom of the loop to free the skb properly. This is a very unlikely scenario as it requires the packet to become unparseable by applying a set of actions on a previously parseable skb, but should be fixed nevertheless. Reported by Sashiko. | ||||
| CVE-2026-74456 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: can: peak_usb: peak_usb_start(): fix double free of transfer buffer on URB submit error In peak_usb_start(), each RX URB transfer buffer is allocated with kmalloc() and the URB is flagged URB_FREE_BUFFER so that the final usb_free_urb() also frees the transfer buffer. If usb_submit_urb() fails, the error path frees the buffer explicitly with kfree(buf) and then calls usb_free_urb(urb). Because URB_FREE_BUFFER is set, usb_free_urb() -> urb_destroy() frees the same buffer a second time, a double free of the transfer buffer. BUG: KASAN: double-free in usb_free_urb.part.0+0x91/0xb0 Free of addr ffff8881069ccb80 by task trigger.sh/285 Call Trace: kfree+0x113/0x3c0 usb_free_urb.part.0+0x91/0xb0 Drop the redundant kfree(buf); usb_free_urb() already releases the transfer buffer. This mirrors commit 03819abbeb11 ("net: usb: lan78xx: Fix double free issue with interrupt buffer allocation"). | ||||
| CVE-2026-72237 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-19 | 5.5 Medium |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: perf/x86/amd/brs: Fix kernel address leakage A user-only branch stack can contain branches that originate from the kernel. As a result, kernel addresses are exposed to user space even when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested. On AMD processors supporting X86_FEATURE_BRS (Zen 3 only), perf can still report entries such as SYSRET/interrupt returns for which the branch-from addresses are in the kernel. E.g. $ perf record -j any,u -c 4000 -e branch-brs -o - -- \ perf bench syscall basic --loop 1000 | \ perf script -i - -F brstack|tr ' ' '\n'| \ grep -E '0x[89a-f][0-9a-f]{15}' ... 0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2e32955eb/-/-/-/0//- 0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2d94a9821/-/-/-/0//- 0xffffffff810001c4/0x72e2d94ffa1b/-/-/-/0//- ... BRS provides no hardware branch filtering, so privilege level filtering is performed entirely in software. However, amd_brs_match_plm() only validates the branch-to address against the requested privilege levels. For branches from the kernel to user space, the branch-from address is left unchecked and is leaked. Extend the software filter to also validate the branch-from address, so that any branch record whose branch-from address is in the kernel is dropped when PERF_SAMPLE_BRANCH_USER is requested. | ||||