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Search Results (377200 CVEs found)
| CVE | Vendors | Products | Updated | CVSS v3.1 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2026-68179 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: misc: nsm: only unlock nsm_dev on post-lock error paths nsm_dev_ioctl() jumps to the common out label even when the initial copy_from_user() fails before nsm->lock has been taken. The error path then blindly unlocks a mutex that was never acquired. This issue was found by our static analysis tool and then manually reviewed against the current tree. The grounded PoC kept the miscdevice ioctl entry and the pre-lock copy_from_user(&raw, argp, _IOC_SIZE(cmd)) failure path by issuing NSM_IOCTL_RAW with an invalid user pointer. That failure reaches the shared out label before mutex_lock(&nsm->lock). Lockdep reported: WARNING: bad unlock balance detected! exploit/193 is trying to release lock (&global_nsm.lock) at: nsm_dev_ioctl+0x5f/0xcf [vuln_msv] but there are no more locks to release! no locks held by exploit/193. Return immediately on the pre-lock copy_from_user() failure and keep the common unlock label for the post-lock paths only. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68178 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: misc: nsm: pin the module while the device is open misc_open() installs a misc driver's file operations with fops_get(), which pins file_operations::owner before replacing the file's f_op. The NSM misc device leaves nsm_dev_fops.owner unset, so opening /dev/nsm does not take a module reference on the nsm driver. If the driver is built as a module, an open file descriptor can therefore survive rmmod of the module that provides its ioctl callbacks. A later ioctl through that descriptor can call into unloaded module text. Set nsm_dev_fops.owner to THIS_MODULE so the misc core holds the module while any /dev/nsm file descriptor is open, matching the lifetime expectation for the installed file operations. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68177 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: tracing: Delay module ref count for "enable_event" trigger Triggers are now delayed from freeing, but can still be triggered until after the RCU grace period has ended. The freeing of the enable_event data is put into the private_data_free() callback, but the put of the module refcount is done immediately. It is possible that if a module is removed that has an event that would enable (or disable) it is still active, it can read the data of the module after it is removed causing a use-after-free bug. Move the trace_event_put_ref() that releases the module into the delayed callback so that the module can not be removed until any reference to its events are finished. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68173 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ublk: wait on ublk_dev_ready() instead of ub->completion ub->completion is only re-armed by a successful START_USER_RECOVERY. If the ublk server sends END_USER_RECOVERY without one - e.g. its START failed with -EBUSY and the error was ignored - the wait is satisfied by the stale completion of the previous recovery cycle, and the device is marked LIVE and the requeue list kicked while the FETCH stream is still running and ubq->canceling is still set. The kick redispatches a previously requeued request, __ublk_queue_rq_common() sees ->canceling and parks it again via __ublk_abort_rq(), and after the last FETCH clears ->canceling nothing ever kicks the requeue list again: the request is stranded there while holding its tag. If it is the flush machinery's flush_rq, every subsequent fsync piles up in uninterruptible sleep and teardown hangs on tag draining. This matches a report of a lost PREFLUSH with ext4 on top of ublk after daemon crash recovery. ub->completion is an edge-triggered latch used as a proxy for the level condition "every queue has fetched all I/O commands", which can regress (F_BATCH's UNPREP, daemon death) and whose re-arm can be skipped. Drop it and wait on the real condition instead: the new helper ublk_wait_dev_ready_and_lock() waits on ublk_dev_ready() via wait_var_event_interruptible(), woken from ublk_mark_io_ready(), then re-checks it under ub->mutex, waiting again on regression, and returns with the mutex held and readiness guaranteed. Readiness becomes true in the same ub->mutex critical section that clears the last queue's ->canceling, so END_USER_RECOVERY marks the device LIVE and kicks the requeue list strictly after ->canceling clears. The wait stays interruptible, so a server whose daemon died can still be signalled out. For ublk_ctrl_start_dev() this replaces the fail-fast -EINVAL on an F_BATCH ready->UNPREP regression with waiting until the device is ready again. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68172 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 7.1 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: arm64: make huge_ptep_get handled unaligned addresses huge_ptep_get() can be handed a virtual address pointing to the middle of a contpmd/contpte mapped hugetlb folio (examples of callers are pagemap_hugetlb_range, page_mapped_in_vma). The arm64 helper rewalks the pgtables in find_num_contig to answer whether the huge pte we have maps a contpmd or a contpte hugetlb folio, and returns CONT_PMDS or CONT_PTES, so that it can collect a/d bits over the contiguous ptes. We can falsely return CONT_PTES instead of CONT_PMDS if the addr is not aligned. On systems where CONT_PTES != CONT_PMDS (meaning page size is 16K), we could collect excess A/D bit state, meaning extra work for the kernel. Even worse, we may iterate beyond the PTE table and dereference a garbage ptep pointer to access physical memory we don't own. Since the ptep pointer is a linear map address, we may run off the end of the linear map or into a hole, dereference a VA not mapped into the kernel pgtables and cause kernel panic. Fix this by aligning the pmdp pointer down to a contpmd base before checking equality with the passed huge pte pointer, to correctly answer whether the huge pte is the base of a contpmd block. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68170 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mptcp: fix stale skb->sk reference on subflow close The backlog list is updated by mptcp_data_ready() under mptcp_data_lock(). The cleanup of backlog references to a closing subflow, however, was performed in mptcp_close_ssk(), before __mptcp_close_ssk() acquires the ssk lock, and while holding neither the ssk lock nor mptcp_data_lock(). Because that traversal ran without mptcp_data_lock(), concurrent softirq RX processing on another CPU (subflow_data_ready() -> mptcp_data_ready() -> __mptcp_add_backlog(), under mptcp_data_lock()) could add a backlog entry referencing the ssk while the cleanup loop was in progress. Such an entry could be missed by the cleanup, or the concurrent list update could corrupt the traversal, leaving skb->sk pointing at the ssk after it is freed. A later mptcp_backlog_purge() then dereferences the stale pointer, triggering a warning in inet_sock_destruct() (ssk->sk_rmem_alloc != 0) followed by a use-after-free in mptcp_backlog_purge(). Fix this by moving the backlog cleanup into __mptcp_close_ssk(), after subflow->closing is set to 1 and while the ssk lock is still held, serialized under mptcp_data_lock(). The cleanup runs only on the push path (MPTCP_CF_PUSH), where backlog references accumulate; on other teardown paths the caller already handles cleanup. With subflow->closing set and mptcp_data_lock() held across the purge, any concurrent mptcp_data_ready() either completes its enqueue before the purge runs and is caught, or observes closing=1 and bails out. Once mptcp_data_unlock() is reached, no new skb referencing the ssk can be enqueued, so the cleanup is exhaustive. Remove the unprotected traversal from mptcp_close_ssk() entirely. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68163 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/page_vma_mapped: fix device-private PMD handling Commit 65edfda6f3f2 ("mm/rmap: extend rmap and migration support device-private entries") introduced the concept of device-private PMD entries, but did not correctly update the rmap walk code to account for them. As a result, when page_vma_mapped_walk() encounters device-private PMD entries, it takes no action other than to acquire the PMD lock and exit. However this is highly problematic for two reasons - firstly, device private entries possess a PFN so check_pmd() needs to be called to ensure an overlapping PFN range. Secondly, and more importantly, if PVMW_MIGRATION is set the caller assumes the returned entry is a migration entry, resulting in memory corruption when the caller tries to interpret the device private entry as such. In addition, commit 146287290023 ("mm/huge_memory: implement device-private THP splitting") allowed device private PMDs to be split like THP mappings, but again did not update this code path. As a result, we might race a PMD split prior to acquiring the PMD lock. This patch addresses all of these issues by invoking check_pmd(), ensuring PMVW_MIGRATION is not set and checks whether a split raced us we do for PMD THP and migration entries. Instead of checking for a subset of the cases after taking the pmd_lock(), put device-private along with pmd_trans_huge() and pmd_is_migration_entry(). Also remove thp_migration_supported() as it is already guarded by pmd_is_migration_entry(). [akpm@linux-foundation.org: fix Raspberry Pi 1 build, per David] | ||||
| CVE-2026-68162 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: avoid auth_enable sysctl UAF during netns teardown proc_sctp_do_auth() updates the SCTP control socket after changing net.sctp.auth_enable. The handler gets the per-net SCTP state from ctl->data, so an already opened sysctl file can still target a network namespace while that namespace is being torn down. SCTP previously registered its per-net sysctls from sctp_defaults_init(), while the control socket is created later from sctp_ctrlsock_init(). This exposed a window during initialization where auth_enable was writable before net->sctp.ctl_sock existed, and a teardown window where auth_enable stayed writable after inet_ctl_sock_destroy() had released the control socket. Move the per-net SCTP sysctl registration into sctp_ctrlsock_init() after sctp_ctl_sock_init() succeeds, and unregister the sysctl table before destroying the control socket in sctp_ctrlsock_exit(). If sysctl registration fails after the control socket was created, destroy the control socket in the same init path. Make sctp_sysctl_net_unregister() tolerate a missing header and clear the saved pointer so init-error and exit paths can safely share the unregister helper. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68161 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: sctp: close UDP tunnel sockets during netns teardown proc_sctp_do_udp_port() starts per-net SCTP UDP tunneling sockets when net.sctp.udp_port is set, and stops/restarts them when the sysctl value changes. The netns exit path does not stop these sockets, so a namespace can be torn down while its SCTP UDP tunnel sockets are still installed. Close the UDP tunnel sockets from sctp_ctrlsock_exit() after unregistering the per-net sysctl table. This prevents new sysctl writes from racing in while the sockets are being released, and closes the sockets before the control socket is destroyed. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68160 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: ceph: fix pre-auth out-of-bounds read on snaptrace in ceph_handle_caps() ceph_handle_caps() reads snap_trace_len from the wire-format ceph_mds_caps header and uses it unconditionally to build a fake end pointer (snaptrace + snaptrace_len) that is later handed to ceph_update_snap_trace() in the CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT case: snaptrace = h + 1; snaptrace_len = le32_to_cpu(h->snap_trace_len); p = snaptrace + snaptrace_len; ... case CEPH_CAP_OP_IMPORT: if (snaptrace_len) { ... if (ceph_update_snap_trace(mdsc, snaptrace, snaptrace + snaptrace_len, false, &realm)) { ... } ceph_update_snap_trace() then decodes a struct ceph_mds_snap_realm from snaptrace using ceph_decode_need(&p, e, sizeof(*ri), bad) with the attacker-supplied fake end e == snaptrace + snaptrace_len. With snaptrace_len == 0xFFFFFFFF the bound check is trivially satisfied, ri = p reads sizeof(struct ceph_mds_snap_realm) past the legitimate msg->front buffer, and ri->num_snaps / ri->num_prior_parent_snaps then drive further out-of-bounds reads of the encoded snap arrays. The eleven msg_version >= 2 .. msg_version >= 12 decoder blocks above the op switch each catch this OOB through their ceph_decode_*_safe() / ceph_decode_need() helpers, but they sit behind a hdr.version-gated if, so a malicious or compromised MDS that sets msg->hdr.version = 1 reaches the IMPORT path with no version-gated decoder having validated snap_trace_len. The shape has been present since ceph_handle_caps() was introduced. Validate snap_trace_len against the message front buffer before consuming it, using the canonical ceph_decode_need() / ceph_has_room() helper. The helper bounds the length with subtraction (n <= end - p, guarded by end >= p) rather than pointer addition, so it is wrap-safe for the attacker-controlled u32 length on 32-bit builds where p + snap_trace_len could overflow the address space. This matches the rest of the ceph decode path (e.g. the pool_ns_len check a few lines below), and the existing goto bad cleanup already covers this exit path. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68159 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: bound pg_{temp,upmap,upmap_items} length to CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE __decode_pg_temp() decodes an user-controlled length but only rejects values large enough to overflow the allocation; it does not bound it to CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE. The helper backs both pg_temp and pg_upmap decoding, and apply_upmap()/get_temp_osds() later copy the decoded list into the fixed-size on-stack array struct ceph_osds.osds[CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE]. A monitor that sends an OSDMap with a pg_temp/pg_upmap entry longer than 32 thus causes a stack out-of-bounds write. An OSD set for a single PG can never exceed CEPH_PG_MAX_SIZE, so reject longer entries at decode time. The bound is well below the old overflow threshold, so it also covers the allocation-size overflow the previous check guarded against. BUG: KASAN: stack-out-of-bounds in ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds Write of size 4 ... by task exploit kasan_report (mm/kasan/report.c:595) ceph_pg_to_up_acting_osds (net/ceph/osdmap.c:2617 net/ceph/osdmap.c:2833) calc_target (net/ceph/osd_client.c:1638) __submit_request (net/ceph/osd_client.c:2394) ceph_osdc_start_request (net/ceph/osd_client.c:2490) ceph_osdc_call (net/ceph/osd_client.c:5164) rbd_dev_image_probe (drivers/block/rbd.c:6899) do_rbd_add (drivers/block/rbd.c:7138) ... kernel BUG at net/ceph/osdmap.c:2670! [ idryomov: do the same in __decode_pg_upmap_items() ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-68158 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: Fix multiplication overflow in decode_new_up_state_weight() If a message of type CEPH_MSG_OSD_MAP contains a (maliciously) corrupted osdmap, out-of-bounds memory accesses may occur in decode_new_up_state_weight(). This happens because the bounds check for the new_state part is based on calculating its length depending on a len value read from the incoming message. This calculation may overflow leading to an incorrect bounds check. Subsequently, out-of-bounds reads may occur when decoding this part. This patch switches the multiplication to use check_mul_overflow() to abort processing the osdmap if an overflow occurred. Therefore, osdmaps/messages containing large values for len that result in a multiplication overflow are treated as invalid. [ idryomov: rename new_state_len -> new_state_item_size, formatting ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-68157 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: guard missing CRUSH type name lookup Localized read selection can walk a parent bucket whose name exists in the CRUSH map while its type has no matching entry in type_names. get_immediate_parent() then dereferences a NULL type_cn and passes an invalid pointer into strcmp(), causing a null-ptr-deref. Skip such malformed parent buckets unless both the bucket name and type name metadata are present. This keeps malformed hierarchy data from crashing locality lookup and safely falls back to "not local". [ idryomov: add WARN_ON_ONCE ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-68156 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: refresh auth->authorizer_buf{,_len} after authorizer update ceph_x_create_authorizer() caches au->buf->vec.iov_base and au->buf->vec.iov_len in struct ceph_auth_handshake. These cached values are then used by the messenger connect code when sending the authorizer. ceph_x_update_authorizer() can rebuild the authorizer when a newer service ticket is available. If the rebuilt authorizer no longer fits in the existing buffer, ceph_x_build_authorizer() drops its reference to au->buf and allocates a new one. If this is the final reference, ceph_buffer_put() frees the old ceph_buffer and its vec.iov_base, but auth->authorizer_buf still points at that freed memory. A subsequent msgr1 reconnect can therefore queue the stale pointer and trigger a KASAN slab-use-after-free in _copy_from_iter() while tcp_sendmsg() copies the authorizer. Refresh auth->authorizer_buf and auth->authorizer_buf_len after a successful authorizer rebuild so the messenger sends the current buffer. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68155 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 7.5 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: Reject monmaps advertising zero monitors A message of type CEPH_MSG_MON_MAP contains a monmap that is sent from a monitor to the client. This monmap contains information about the existing monitors in the cluster. Currently, a monmap indicating that there are zero monitors in the cluster is treated as valid. However, it is impossible to have zero monitors in the cluster and still receive a valid monmap from a monitor. Therefore, such a monmap must be corrupted and should be treated as invalid. Furthermore, a monmap with a monitor count of zero can subsequently crash the client when attempting to open a session with a monitor in __open_session(). This happens because the "BUG_ON(monc->monmap->num_mon < 1)" assertion in pick_new_mon() is triggered. This patch extends a check in ceph_monmap_decode() to also reject arriving mon_maps with num_mon == 0 rather than only with num_mon > CEPH_MAX_MON. [ idryomov: drop "log output for unusual values of num_mon" part ] | ||||
| CVE-2026-68154 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 9.8 Critical |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: reject zero bucket types in crush_decode CRUSH bucket type 0 is reserved for devices. The mapper relies on that invariant and uses type 0 to identify leaf devices. If crush_decode() accepts a bucket with type 0, a malformed CRUSH map can make the mapper treat a negative bucket ID as a device and pass it to is_out(), which then indexes the OSD weight array with a negative value. Reject zero bucket types while decoding the CRUSH map so the invalid state never reaches the mapper. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68153 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: libceph: remove debugfs files before client teardown ceph_destroy_client() tears down the monitor client before removing the per-client debugfs files. A concurrent read of the monmap debugfs file can enter monmap_show() after ceph_monc_stop() has freed monc->monmap, triggering a use-after-free. Remove the debugfs files before stopping the OSD and monitor clients. debugfs_remove() drains active handlers and prevents new accesses, so the debugfs callbacks can no longer race the rest of client teardown. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68152 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: amt: fix use-after-free in AMT delayed works When an AMT device is removed, pending delayed works can still access the freed amt_dev structure, which may result in kernel crashes or memory corruption. amt_dev_stop() cancels req_wq and discovery_wq with cancel_delayed_work_sync(), but these works can be scheduled again from event_wq after the cancellation. This allows delayed works to access the freed amt_dev structure after the netdev has been released. The following is a simple race scenario: CPU0 CPU1 amt_dev_stop() cancel_delayed_work_sync() amt_event_work() mod_delayed_work(req_wq) free netdev req_wq accesses freed amt_dev Use disable_delayed_work_sync() in amt_dev_stop() to prevent req_wq and discovery_wq from being queued again and wait for running work items to complete. The delayed works are disabled after initialization in amt_newlink() and enabled only when the device is successfully opened. This keeps the delayed work lifecycle synchronized with the lifetime of the AMT device. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68149 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 8.4 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fs: preserve ACL_DONT_CACHE state in forget_cached_acl() The ACL_DONT_CACHE state is meant to be a constant state for the inode for filesystems that want to opt out of posix acl caching. Commit facd61053cff1 ("fuse: fixes after adapting to new posix acl api") used this facility to opt out of posix acl caching for fuse inodes with fuse server that does not negotiate FUSE_POSIX_ACL (fc->posix_acl). The commit also takes care to gate the forget_all_cached_acls() call in fuse_set_acl() on fc->posix_acl because there is no need for it, but there are other placed in fuse code which call forget_all_cached_acls() unconditional to fc->posix_acl and those cause the loss of the ACL_DONT_CACHE state. This is not only a functional bug. Properly timed, a get_acl() from this fuse filesystem can return a stale cached value, as was observed in tests, because set_acl() does not invalidate the unintentional acl cache. We could fix this in fuse, but it actually makes no sense for the vfs helper forget_cached_acl() to invalidate the ACL_DONT_CACHE state, so let it not do that to fix fuse and future users of ACL_DONT_CACHE. | ||||
| CVE-2026-68148 | 1 Linux | 1 Linux Kernel | 2026-08-13 | 7.8 High |
| In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: fscrypt: Add missing superblock check in find_or_insert_direct_key() The legacy 'fscrypt_direct_keys' table caches master keys that are used by v1 encryption policies that have FSCRYPT_POLICY_FLAG_DIRECT_KEY. It's just a global table for all filesystems (since the keys can be provided by the legacy process-subscribed keyrings mechanism, which makes it difficult to reuse super_block::s_master_keys). The entries in it ('struct fscrypt_direct_key') do contain a super_block pointer, though, for passing to fscrypt_destroy_inline_crypt_key() when the last inode that references the key is evicted. However, when finding the fscrypt_direct_key for an inode, we weren't actually comparing the super_block pointer. As a result, inodes with different super_blocks could point to the same fscrypt_direct_key. That could extend the lifetime of a fscrypt_direct_key beyond the super_block it points to, causing a use-after-free later. Fix this by creating distinct fscrypt_direct_key structs for distinct super_block structs. Note that this problem doesn't exist in the v2 policy equivalent ("per-mode keys"), since the data structures there are per super_block. | ||||